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This master thesis case study is about outsourcing and the company Havyard. More 
specifically it concerns Havyards practice of international trading of ships’ system 
packages. In collaboration with Havyard it mapped the activities related to the information 
and coordination functions of the transportation part this trading practice. The activities 
were used as a basis for answering the research questions and testing the propositions. 
 
The main research question asked was: In what way, if at all, should further outsourcing of 
the relevant transportation, information and coordination functions in Havyard take place? 
In the attempt to answer this three supporting research questions were formulated. 1) What 
main scenarios related to the demand and expansion of sales of system packages do 
Havyard believe is plausible for the near future, and how would these affect any need for 
outsourcing? 2) What are the main considerations facing Havyard in evaluating 
outsourcing of the mapped activities? and 3) What type of information is needed to be 
shared with a third party logistics provider (3PL) in order to outsource the mapped 
activities? Propositions were also formulated, mainly on the basis of Transaction cost 
economics (TCE). A twist to the classical TCE-propositions was made however, in that 
“employees’ recommendation to outsource/not outsource the activity” was used instead of 
the activities actual ownership. A reason for this choice was that the trading operations 
were relative newly started in Havyard, in 2012, and therefore an “adjustment process” 
could perhaps be expected before the classical TCE-propositions can be tested in a fair 
way. 
 
The highlights of the findings are: 
 Six of the 12 activities required the use of highly sensitive information for execution. 
Of the remaining six activities five included somewhat sensitive information. Only the 
activity that was already outsourced did not involve the use of any sensitive 
information. Highly sensitive information in this context is defined in the propositions 
section below. 
 The need to use highly sensitive information in the mapped activities did not seem to 
be associated with employees’ recommendation “not to outsource” the activity. 
 Employees’ considerations that clearly excluded the possibility of outsourcing only 
existed for a minority of the mapped activities. 
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 It mattered very little for the employees’ recommendation to outsource or not if, in 
2016, the demand stayed on the same level as in 2012 or if it increased by a lot 
(“scenario 3” as presented in the case description). 
 Eleven of the original twelve activities were applicable to the TCE-propositions. Of 
these, only in four of the activities was the corresponding TCE-propositions supported 
by the data. Of these four, one activity was already outsourced. 
 Based on these results, activity number 3 and 11 should be seriously considered for 
outsourcing as both employee recommendation and the TCE-prediction pointed 
towards outsourcing. Activities number 5 and 8 should probably also be seriously 
considered for outsourcing as most of the informants recommended that should be 
(outsourced).  
 In three of the 12 activities the Resource-based view (RBV) seemed to have more 
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2.0 Case description 
2.1 Case introduction 
The present thesis deals with the question of what activities related to international 
transportation of ships’ equipment packages that should be outsourced. These packages are 
partly bought from suppliers and partly manufactured by Havyard, before they are 
integrated into a bundle and sold to an end customer. Currently the actual physical 
transportation activities and a certain amount of related information based work are 
outsourced to a 3PL, Kuehne + Nagel (K+N). Havyard is concerned with the questions of 
whether a 3PL could take over even more functions.   
 
The term “system package” is in this thesis used to mean all the components Havyard 
orchestrates and (re)sells to one customer in the timespan of one “sales project” to one 
final customer. The packages are currently being sold to customers in Spain and China, but 
expansions are planned. 
2.2 Research questions 
The main research question (RQ) triggered a long investigation, recorded in the literature 
survey, on what theoretical material could be helpful to answer it. It is hopefully justified 
in that it allowed scientifically interesting propositions to be constructed, to facilitate its 
answer, based on the relevant academic literature. The main RQ was jointly agreed upon 
by the author of this study, his supervisor, and the main informant from Havyard. In order 
to assist the building up to a satisfactory answer of the main RQ three additional RQs were 
constructed. Each of these supporting RQs gave rise to one proposition each. The 
propositions are treated in a separate section further down. 
 
Main research question (RQ): 
1. In what way, if at all, should further outsourcing of the relevant transportation, 
information and coordination functions in Havyard take place?  
Supporting RQs: 
1. What main scenarios related to the demand and expansion of sales of system 
packages do Havyard believe is plausible for the near future, and how would these 
affect any need for outsourcing? 
2. What are the main considerations facing Havyard in evaluating outsourcing of the 
mapped activities? 
3.  What type of information is needed to be shared with a 3PL in order to outsource 
the mapped activities?  
2.3 About the focal company 
Havyard Group AS is a shipbuilding company established in 2000. It is fully integrated in 
the sense that it delivers products and services within the complete value chain from vessel 
design to support of vessels in operation (Halvorsen, 2012). Havyard deliver ship designs, 
ship equipment, constructs advanced vessels for offshore oil production as well as fishing 
and fish farming, for shipyards and ship owners in a global context. It aims at having the 
best competence within all the vital segments of the value chain (Havyard, 2013). The 
group is divided into the following business units: Havyard design & solutions, Havyard 
ship technology, Havyard power & systems and MMC. It has about 650 employees 
worldwide. 550 in Norway, and 100 outside Norway (Havyard, 2013a). The group’s head 
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office is in Fosnavåg, south of Ålesund. The shipyard, Havyard Ship Technology AS, is 
located about 260 km from the main office, at Leirvik in Sogn (Kvalsvik, 2012). In 2012 
the group had revenues of 1600 million kroner before tax. They are among the four biggest 
shipbuilders in Norway together with Ulstein, Kleven, Vard and Bergen Group (Havyard, 
2013b). The group is owned by Havila AS which is also headquartered in Fosnavåg 
(Havila, 2013). 
2.4 Financial and technical data: 
One system package typically has a value of 60-100 million NOK (Havyard, 2013b). 
Typical yearly revenue is about 500 million kroner, and a profit margin of 25 to 50 percent 
is considered very satisfactory, although in 2012 it was less than this. That year Havyard 
resold four system packages, and paid K+N about 2 million NOK for the transportation 
related tasks. K+N are paid on a per job basis, which is based on a price list. 
 
Figure 1: An example of a list of component and batches in a system package. 
 
Figure 1. From Havyard 2013c. 
 
2.5 Description of the shipment process 
2.5.1 Rudimentary description 
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Normally the customer of Havyard is a shipyard, although in special cases it can be a 
shipping company (Havyard, 2013b). However, it is the shipping company, and not the 
shipyard, that usually initiates contact with Havyard. The reason for this is that a shipping 
company may believe that Havyard can provide a better solution than the end customer 
shipyard. Havyard normally sells a ship design as well as a system package to this end 
customer. This thesis is not concerned with the ship design part of the business. 
 
When an order is placed for a system package Havyard instruct its suppliers of the 
necessary configuration of the components and place its own orders. One system package 
is typically split into several shipment batches that include several components each. 
Suppliers may be from all over the world. Examples are Norway, Germany and China. 
Transport and handling from suppliers to the two storage hubs in Rotterdam and Bergen is 
the responsibility of the suppliers. The two main arguments for why this is so, according to 
the purchasing manager (PM), is that such a responsibility would involve more follow-up 
work and more risk (Havyard, 2014a). He is not sure if it would be beneficial in terms of 
economy for Havyard to hold such a responsibility, and this master thesis this not look 
further into that possibility. Another related issue is why suppliers can not be instructed to 
simply send goods directly to end customer, without stopping at the Havyard hubs. The 
main reason given was that the current solution is more cost efficient. Further reasons may 
be that the equipment needs to be controlled for faults, and document replacements have to 
take place as the end customer purchase from Havyard and not Havyards supplier, before 
shipment to end customer. The hubs provide a space for such operations. Also, one batch 
can include equipment from many suppliers. 
 
Transport and handling from one of the two storage hubs to customs station/port of final 
customer is the responsibility of Havyard. Havyard has outsourced this function to K+N. 
In the storage hubs consolidation of goods take place. Havyard does not have its own 
people to receive and inspect the load. K+N do this. If no damage to the goods has been 
found at these hubs by K+N, then it is deemed free of damages, and it will be the legal 
responsibility of K+N if damages are registered at a later stage (Havyard, 2014a). One way 
K+N document their findings is by taking pictures of the goods. The risk for damages and 
losses is transferred to end customer when K+N start transporting the goods from hub. 
This is stated in Incoterms (Havyard, 2014b). Because of uncertainty in terms of time and 
costs of customs in the country of final customer, Havyard only specifies in the contract 
that they deliver to the boarder/customs/agreed on harbor of the destination country. To do 
















Figure 2: Information and materials flow. 
 
Figure 2. Composed by the author. 
 
2.5.2 Note on the shipment method used by K+N: 
Goods to China are sent by boat, while trucks are used for Spain. Sea is seen by PM as a 
possible alternative to road transport to Spain. 90 percent of what is sent to China is 
shipped in containers. Goods to Spain are not sent in containers. One advantage of this is 
that there are no container rental costs. 
2.5.3 Customs and hub-transit procedures: 
There are three main stages where customs are involved (Havyard, 2014c). When goods 
enter the hub in Bergen or Rotterdam, when goods leave the country again, and when 
goods enter the country of final destination. In the first case dealings with customs is the 
responsibility of the supplier. In the second case it is the responsibility of Havyard (or 
K+N). And in the last case it is the responsibility of end customer. It is not quite clear why 
the responsibilities are not analogous between supplier and Havyard (supplier have the 
responsibility to deal with customs in end-country, but not Havyard when they themselves 
operate as a supplier). 
 
The goods are declared to customs as they leave the country of the hubs so that Havyard 
can get refunded any customs duty paid when goods entered the country. In the 
Netherlands Havyard own a company that handles most of this for the Rotterdam hub at 
least. The goods are stored in storage facilities until the paperwork is ok. The document 
used for this outbound customs declaration is a customs invoice currently made by 
Havyard. The values on this document are the prices Havyard paid supplier. For this 
process it is important that the value of the goods have not increased (on paper at least), as 
this could imply that the goods somehow has been changed so that other custom 
regulations would apply.  
 
K+N remove all accompanying documents from the shipments from supplier before goods 
are sent off to final destination. However, the customs invoice is needed under transport in 
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case of inspections etc. This customs invoice is, PM believes, separated out from any other 
documents and kept by K+N upon final delivery. End customer use a different document, 
the commercial invoice, which has as value the price end-customer have paid Havyard for 
the goods. The commercial invoice is a requirement on the letter of credit (LC). 
2.5.4 The relevant activities 
2.5.4.1 Presentation of the activities currently performed by Havyard 
In the sales phase before the contract with end customer is fully made the transportation 
costs must be calculated. This is a recurring problem (Havyard, 2014b; Havyard, 2014d). 
The transportation costs are needed in order to adjust the price in the contract with the end 
customer. Volume, size and weight on the equipment that is to be sent must be obtained in 
order to get a price estimate from 3PL. 
 
Currently one staff member from Havyard coordinate almost everything related to the 
transportation function of system packages. This has not previously been the main job of 
the employee, but after deals were signed for two system packages in July 2012 the related 
activities started requiring almost one full time position. Below is a description of 
activities related to the transportation function performed by the purchasing department in 
Havyard after the signing of a contract with buyer (Havyard, 2013c): 
- Sign contract with suppliers 
o Back to back contracts are often used, meaning that obligations and liabilities 
(for instance requirements for documentation various guarantees) in the 
contract with end customer are passed on to suppliers.  
o Make sure correct terms and time of delivery is included so that equipment can 
be merged into larger batches and shipped to final customer. 
o Obtain documents Havyard need for LC. Other certificates are also needed. 
- Obtain delivery times for all batches, documentation (engineering manual, installation 
manual, instruction manual, drawings, calculations). 
- Inform 3PL of planned times for delivery, consolidation, labeling and shipment 
forwarding. 
When all goods are in hub and ready to be shipped to final customer the following 
tasks must be performed: 
 
- Make sure suppliers deliver on time, contact if necessary. If the batch is not complete, 
obtain list of goods to come.  
- Obtain list of components from suppliers, and merge this into a common list of 
packages with Havyard logo and send this to end-customer and bank. 
- Make customs invoice for outbound customs in country of the relevant Havyard hub  
- Make EUR1-document for deliveries from Norway (will be sent to bank for LC). 
- Insure the transport and obtain proof of insurance for bank for LC. The chief 
procurement officer (CPO) points out that to insure a “total policy” is used (Havyard, 
2014e). This includes all shipments the company makes for the agreed period 
(normally one year). However, individual proof of insurance must be sent to bank for 
LC and must specify value, weight, quantities, and description of goods (Havyard, 
2014f) 
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- Obtain “certificate of origin” if this is necessary for bank for LC. 
When one shipment is received by customer, the following must be done: 
 
- Havyard requires that the goods are controlled within a certain time, for instance 14 
days. Any deviations from what is ordered should here be discovered. If the goods are 
simply stored for a longer period before use without being checked first, it is more 
difficult to control if deviations occurred due to reasons outside of Havyards/3PLs 
control. 
 
In addition to this the project manager (PJM) opens up the letter of credit from the bank of 
the buyer to control that it is correct before any delivery of goods are set in motion 
(Havyard, 2014g). This controlling that funds are secured for the transaction is apparently 
an important principle in trading of equipment in the ship building industry. The PJM also 
revises if needed the delivery times, in collaboration with the customer. The purchasing 
department has the responsibility to keep PJM updated on any deviations from plans. The 
department further has the full responsibility that the goods are ordered and delivered. 
 
The 3PL handles very little of the contact with buyer. PM states that this is because 
Havyard want to remain in control of the projects, but also due to issues of core 
competencies. If the 3PL was to handle all contact with buyer then Havyard would have to 
make available for the 3PL at least part of the sales contracts, as well as those of the 
suppliers. This communication handling could have serious commercial consequences. For 
instance, there can be many possible reasons why deliveries are late, and it is Havyards 
people who currently hold this information. The CPO does not believe it is a very good 
idea to outsource much of the communication to customer due to this. Of course, a 
required practical direct communication between 3PL and buyer currently take place when 
the goods are on its way. 
2.5.4.2 Challenges with todays practice and reasons to improve from 
Havyards point of view 
 Expected increased demand makes current capacity to coordinate the transportation 
activities too low. 
 CPO believes that more logistics competence is needed in the case of increased 
demand. 
 Recurring problem of difficulties in budgeting transportation costs. 
 The service coordinator (SC) (whose job-area is more operative than the other 
informants) thinks a major area with improvement potential is more control with 
suppliers: how many batches will there be?, is certificate of origin needed? Etc. 
Plan of delivery should be included in the contracts (Havyard, 2014h). 
 If scenario 3 was to materialize Havyard would probably need to make more 
fundamental changes to routines due to stricter import regulations of Brazil 
(Havyard, 2014a). 
 Most of the transport related activities are not part of Havyards core competence. 
The literature refers to these as candidates for outsourcing. 
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2.5.4.3 Possible improvements from Havyards point of view 
This section is mostly based on phone interviews with CPO (Havyard, 2013c; Havyard, 
2014b). Exceptions are stated in the text. The CPO expects to save money if the points of 
coordination between Havyard, 3PL, end customer and supplier can be improved. He 
acknowledges the potential benefits of using the 3PL as a type of consultant in the stage of 
creating the contract with the customer. The 3PL could then help with issues such as how 
to avoid charges that later can be returned (Intracomunity trading). On this point there have 
been a few cases of surprises with regards to customs expenses. 3PL can also be much 
involved in the documentation process connected to letter of credit.  
 
In the most extreme case, CPO says, Havyard can leave all communication and monitoring 
of the deliveries of suppliers to the 3PL. In that case an agreement of confidentiality would 
have to be made between Havyard and the 3PL as the 3PL would need more information 
from the sensitive contracts between Havyard and suppliers. The PM states a similar 
opinion in being open to the possibility that the paperwork and the sending of various 
requests (late shipments, missing parts etc) towards suppliers are possible candidates for 
sourcing out to a 3PL (Havyard, 2014i). 
 
In the case that demand will be the same in 2016 as it was in 2012 (scenario 1 below), the 
main improvement CPO mentions to be desirable are various degrees of standardization of 
processes to increase efficiency and save costs. CPO also mentioned an alternative where a 
logistics coordination function forms a separate unit and has its own dedicated people from 
purchasing, engineering, project and so on. This solution was not elaborated on further in 
this thesis, even though it could have been fruitful.  
 
According to Porter (1985) and Grant (2005) cited in Neves et al. (2013) firms should on a 
strategic level clearly decide which activities should be considered for outsourcing. 
Havyard does not have any strategy document on outsourcing (Havyard, 2014j). However, 
the CPO stated that, “on a general basis, activities that others can do better than us and 
does not touch our core activity will be evaluated for outsourcing”. According to CPO the 
logistics and transportation function overall is not part of the core competence of Havyard. 
However, there might be aspects of it that involves such core competence such as sales and 
purchasing contracts, risk associated with leaving communication with supplier or end 
customer to a 3PL. 
 
CPO elaborates on a general vision on the arrangements of the mapped activities: 
 
I think there is a [big] potential to reduce our own logistics follow-up work by 
outsourcing the transportation function. The idea is that 3PL work in a way 
integrated with Havyard and has full access to all contracts and contact persons 
from our suppliers. All follow-up work of delivery of equipment at the planned 
times and follow-up/delivery of documentation to LC can be outsourced. This 
would save Havyard for work. The condition is that good communication channels 
are established so that 3PL rapports to the purchaser responsible for the particular 
project [one sale of a package with design/equipment to end customer and all it 
involves is considered one project], who in turn are in contact with our end 
customer, so that we can follow up our liabilities in the project against end 
customer with regards to deviations and changes. The responsibility of 3PL would 
then be to follow up of the physical delivery of goods, and documentation for LC. 
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The responsibility of Havyard would be to follow up of documentation such as 
manuals and certificates from 3PL which is to be delivered to end customer.  
 
By outsourcing to a 3PL we will reduce our own logistics follow-up work (which 
takes much time). In this way our fixed costs (logistics follow-up personnel) is 
reduced and we will be more flexible for highs and lows in the market (Havyard, 
2014e). 
2.5.5 Havyards justification for using the 3PL K+N: 
Havyard have no intention of being experts on the transportation part of the logistics 
operations and therefore does not desire to enterprise into this area (Havyard, 2014b). One 
main reason Havyard use K+N is that they have a sufficiently large global network of staff 
and therefore do not use subcontractors in carrying out the deliveries. Other important 
criteria for the 3PL selection were price, shipment time, and risk assessment in terms of 
loss or damage to goods.  
2.6 Prognoses and future scenarios 
2.6.1 Prognoses 
Together, this and the next section answer the first part of the first supporting RQ: “What 
main scenarios related to the demand and expansion of sales of system packages do 
Havyard believe is plausible for the near future, and how would these affect any need for 
outsourcing?” 
 
Today’s volume can be handled with the current resources of the company. However it is 
expected that sales of system packages are to be expanded in the near future to Turkey as 
well as more to China. The companies also look into Brazil. To cope with this increased 
demand, the CPO envisages a small team of two or three people who can work with the 
transportation related activities. In addition, due to market fluctuations, there is a need for 
flexibility from any logistics partner to scale up or down as needed (Havyard, 2014k). 
2.6.2 Scenarios for 2016 
1. Demand stays the same as in 2012 (four system packages) (China and Spain). 
2. Demand increase by three times in China (twelve system packages), and in Turkey by 
four system packages. 
3. Demand increase to twelve system packages in China, in Spain to three, in Turkey to 
six system packages, and in Brazil to four. 
The middle scenario was not used in the interviews, mainly for two reasons. The first was 
that it was discovered that employees’ considerations of outsourcing did not seem to vary 
so much with the scenarios. Therefore including only the more extreme scenarios would 
seem to suffice to obtain an adequate picture of any differences between them. The second 
reason was that including all the scenarios would make interview even longer than they 
were all ready, as well as making them unnecessarily repetitive with little or no gains in 
knowledge. This second reason is also why scenarios are not included in the sections on 
activity information flows and outsourcing considerations. 
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3.0 Literature survey 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary objectives of the literature survey is to find out what kind of theory could be 
best applied to the Havyard case in order to facilitate the research questions concerning 
outsourcing, and to obtain a satisfactory level of understanding of the relevant literature. A 
secondary objective of the survey is to find industry specific literature. Due to these 
objectives the surveys is to a large extent explorative, and enquire in some detail into the 
history, assumptions and concepts of theories that the author find particular relevant to the 
case; mainly Transaction cost economics (TCE) and the Resource-based view (RBV). This 
decision is supported by many researchers who seem to have identified that the literature 
on the outsourcing decision can be said to broadly fall within these two academic 
traditions (Logan, 2000; Rodiquez and Robaina, 2006; MCIvor, 2009; Williamson, 1999; 
Madhok, 2002 among others).  
 
The relevant literature for this case study includes the following three main topics: 1) 
Outsourcing 2) third and fourth party logistics (3/4PL) and general business relationships 
3) specific literature to the ship construction- and ships’ systems package trade industry. 
Literature that this survey has found to be relevant to the outsourcing decision is from a 
wide range of academic disciplines such as logistics, supply chain management (SCM), 
economics, business strategy, marketing, contract law, and sociology. Literature on 
outsourcing also exists under the names “the make-or-buy decision”, “global sourcing”, 
and “vertical integration”. These terms are arguably interchangeable in this context and 
this study will mostly use the term outsourcing. 
 
The structure of the literature survey is as follows. First it will provide different definitions 
of the term “outsourcing”, and some relevant statistics on the current state of it. Then a 
section on common motivations behind the decision to outsource follows. A section on 
third and fourth party logistics and business relationships in general is then offered. A 
portion on industry specific literature follows. The remaining part of the survey is 
dedicated to a review of theories and findings dealing with the boundaries of firms. The 
first part of this gives a presentation of the three main streams of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), transaction cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and property rights 
theory (PRT). As it was decided during the process of survey that TCE was the most 
relevant of these, this subsection is much more comprehensive than the other two. The 
subsection also includes a review of the specific model of TCE that the case study is based 
on. A section on resource-based theories follows. After this comes a chapter presenting the 
literature theorizing about the relationship between TCE and resource-based theories. A 
small chapter on the “tautology criticism” is then included. Network theory, resource-
dependence theory, power arguments, marketing-channels are then reviewed, before a 
section is included on relevant literature that does not belong in any of the above 
categories. A chapter where some case studies and other prescriptive approaches relevant 
to the present case study is presented next. At the end a summary of the whole literature 
survey is included.  
3.2 Definitions and some relevant statistical data on outsourcing  
Rodriquez and Robaina (2006) provide a review on the recent literature on outsourcing, 
and classifies it into two: works that deals with the propensity to outsource, and works that 
study the relationship between the outsourcing decision and organizational performance. 
This classification was not adopted in the present survey. They also collected different 
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definitions of outsourcing, which was also the most relevant and recent source of general 
outsourcing definitions found after a bit of searching. The tablebelow is adapted to include 
one newer definition from Caniels et al. (2009): 
 
Table 2. Different definitions of outsourcing. 
Author(s) (year) Definition 
Harrigan (1985) A variety of ‘make or buy’ decisions’ to 
obtain the necessary supplies of materials 
and services for the production of the 
organization’s goods and services. 
Loh and Venkatraman (1992) External vendors’ provision of physical 
and/or human resources associated with 
the user organization’s information 
technology infrastructure. 
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) External acquisition of activities, including 
those traditionally considered an integral 
part of any firm, provided that they do not 
form part of the firm’s core capabilities. 
Ventura (1995) Exchange relationships with independent 
firms with whom stable cooperation 
agreements can be established. 
Lei and Hitt (1995) The act of trusting in external capabilities 
and skills for the manufacture of determined 
production components and other activities 
that have added value (often capital 
intensive). 
Rothery and Roberson (1996) The act of turning to an external 
organization to perform a function 
previously performed in-house. It entails the 
transfer of the planning, administration and 
development of the activity to an 
independent third party. 
Casani et al. (1996) Long-term link related to the development 
of determined activities or tasks  
that are not essential to the firm by 
specialized professionals, who, in time, 
become strategic partners. 
Blumberg (1998) Process of making contracts with a third 
party to handle a part of the client firm’s 
business. 
Sacristán (1999) Collaboration agreement between different 
types of firms in which one firm is a 
specialist in technology and makes a 
significant contribution to the other by 
providing physical and/or human resources 
during a certain period in order to attain a 
determined objective. 
Greaver (1999) The act of an organization transferring 
periodic internal activities and decision-
taking to external suppliers through 
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contracts. 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) It is the substitution of activities performed 
in-house by acquiring them externally, 
although the firm has the necessary 
management and financial capabilities to 
develop them internally. It is also an 
abstention from performing activities in-
house. 
Campos (2001) It consists of contracting an external 
supplier to perform a task previously 
executed by the organization itself, and may 
also even involve new activities. 
Bailey et al. (2002) Handing over some or all of that particular 
activity and related services to a third party 
management, for the required result. 
Quélin and Duhamel (2003) The operation of shifting a transaction 
previously governed internally to an 
external supplier through a long-term 
contract, and involving the transfer to 
the vendor. 
McCarthy and Anagnostou (2004) Not only consists of purchasing products or 
services from external sources, but also 
transfers the responsibility for business 
functions and often the associated 
knowledge (tacit and codified) to the 
external organization. 
Mol et al. (2005) The procurement of supplies from legally 
independent entities (suppliers). 
Caniels and Roeleveld (2009) Procuring a good or service from an 
external third party that was either 
originally sourced internally or could have 
been sourced internally notwithstanding the 
decision to go outside 
Table 2. Different definitions of outsourcing. Adapted from Espino‐Rodríguez et al. 
(2006). 
 
According to the same paper outsourcing was, at least in 2006, one of the strategic 
decisions that attract the most interest from professionals and scholars. In 2007, a world 
wide survey (the annual State of Logistics Outsourcing report) reported that 82 percent of 
the participating companies used 3PL services (SCDigest.com, 2007), and 83 percent of 
those companies using 3PL services said they were outsourcing some part of the 
transportation management functions; the lowest being 77 percent in North America and 
the highest being 91 percent in Europe. In the 2014- version of the State of Logistics 
Outsourcing report, 90 percent of 3PL customers report that their relationship with the 3PL 
generally has been successful. Interestingly a higher percentage, 97, of 3PL reported the 
equivalent with respect to the 3PL-customer. 47 percent of 3PL customers reported having 
been involved in so-called gainsharing arrangements with a 3PL, while 60 percent of the 
3PLs report the same. Nearly half of shippers, and 61 percent of 3PLs say centralized 
procurement functions are playing more or much more of a role in the selection process 
compared with three years ago. 
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From the definitions above then, one should be able to get a pretty clear idea of what is 
meant by outsourcing, if it was at all needed. From the statistics it is seen that outsourcing 
of 3PL services is very common. Further that most of the current experiences are reported 
to be positive from both sides, all though such figures may be misleading as the 
partnerships not working very well probably are terminated and so will not be included in 
that particular statistic. 
3.3 Drivers for outsourcing 
In order to be able to evaluate the merits of the theories of outsourcing, it is useful to look 
at what various actors regard as the drivers for outsourcing. The words “drivers” and 
“motivators” are used interchangeably in this section. Ghodeswar and Vaidyanathan 
(2008) have composed a list of some major drivers of outsourcing, presumably supposed 
to hold across industries: 
 
Table 3. Major drivers for outsourcing. 
Organisational drivers - To achieve a greater focus on core 
business 
- To increase flexibility to deal with ever 
changing business conditions 
- To gain access to products, services and 
emerging technologies 
- To assign operational issues to an outside 
expert 
- To have greater thrust on market 
positioning and new product 
development 
- To redirect resources from non-core 
activities to greater focus in 
serving the customer 
Improvement drivers - To improve operating performance, 
quality, timeliness, and 
productivity 
- To obtain expertise, skills, and innovative 
ideas 
- To obtain technologies which otherwise 
will not be available 
- To improve management and control of 
operational processes 
including risk management 
- To improve credibility and image by 
associating with superior 
providers 
- To eliminate the fixed cost of internal staff 
by moving the function to a 
supplier 
- To become more flexible, dynamic to 
meet the changing opportunities 
Financial and cost drivers - To reduce investment in assets 
- To reduce the invested capital funds in 
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non-core business functions 
- To expanding its operations into a new 
geographical region 
- To reduce or control operating costs 
- To access an outside provider’s lower cost 
structure 
- To achieve cost reduction with enhanced 
performance 
- To handle varying demand more 
efficiently because of economies of 
scale 
Revenue drivers - To achieve aggressive growth objectives 
by gaining increased market 
access 
- To leverage on the service provider’s best 
processes, capacity and 
systems 
- To expand capacity to design, test and 
build new products and 
services 
- To stretch its limits in handling the 
increased volume of business 
- To manage demand efficiently through 
outsider’s automation, process 
maturity and the latest technology 
- To focus on enablers of business growth 
and strategies to fulfil them 
 
Table 3. Drivers for outsourcing. From Ghodeswar et al. (2008).  
 
Fill and Visser (2000) also produce table of drivers with a more prescriptive approach: 
Table 4. More drivers for outsourcing. 
Quality Actual capacity is temporarily isufficient to 
comply with demand. The quality motive 
can be subdivided into three aspects: 
increased quality demands, shortage of 
qualified personnel, outsourcing as a 
transition period. 
Cost Outsourcing is a possible solution to control 
increasing costs and is compativle with a 
cost leadership strategy. By controlling and 
decreasing costs a company can increase its 
competitive position. 
Finance A company has a limited investment 
budget. The funds must be used for 
investments in core business activities, 
which are long-term decisions. 
Core-business Core-business is a primary activity with 
which an organization generates revenues. 
To concentrate on core-business activities is 
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a strategic decision. All subsequent 
activities are mainly supportive and should 
be outsourced. 
Cooperation Cooperation between companies can lead to 
conflict. In order to avoid such conflict 
those activities that are produced by both 
organizations should be subject to total 
outsourcing. 
Table 4. More drivers for outsourcing. From Fill et al. (2000). 
 
Fersht and Snowdon  (2013) in a survey called “State of the outsourcing industry 2013: 
executive findings”, conducted with the support of KPMG, found that cost reduction, 
greater scale to operations and process standardization to be he main motivators among 
“IT and business firms”. Among strategic focus the core reasons for outsourcing was 
found to be accessing better talent, gaining access to better technology, and improving 
analytical capabilities. Perhaps interesting was that “mid-market enterprises” ($1bn-$5-bn) 
were more motivated by such “strategic” needs than “high-end enterprises” (>$5-bn). 
Finally, outsourcing customers were generally satisfied in respect to cost reduction and 
standard delivery, but less in strategic areas such as improving analytical capabilities, 
access to talent and achieving innovation.  
 
Kersten et al. (2007) did a survey of literature dealing with motives for outsourcing of 
logistics services. Out of a sample of twelve papers, the top three motivators mentioned 
was: cost reduction, improvement of service level/service quality and focus on core 
business/core competencies. According to Bottani and Rizzi (2006) one of the most 
frequently claimed drivers for logistics outsourcing is the possibility of focusing on core 
activities. Other drivers, they say, are typically market expansion due to globalization and 
deregulation, trade offs between asset specificity and performance measurements, 
corporate restructuring programs, cost reduction programs geared towards converting fixed 
costs into variable costs, needs for extra space, and changes occurring in labor related 
issues. Finally, Anderson et al. (2010) studied what firms look for in their selection of third 
party logistics providers. They found that the 3PL customers can be usefully classified into 
three segments based on their different preferences of order qualifiers and order winners 
such as price, customer interaction, customer service recovery, and supply chain capacity. 
A common preference for all, however, was reliable performance.  
 
The drivers presented in this section provide a good point of reference for comparison in 
the section on “arguments for- and against outsourcing, and overall judgment” in the 
analysis section. 
3.4 Third- and fourth party logistics providers, logistics 




Hertz and Alfredsson (2003) use the following definition of 3PL: “An external provider 
who manages, controls, and delivers logistics activities on behalf of a shipper”. Coyle et al. 
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(2003, p.425), define 3PL as an external organization “that performs all or part of a 
company’s logistics functions.” 
 
Marasco (2007) reviewed 152 articles published up to 2006 on the subject of  3PLs. She 
concludes that despite the growing body of literature on the topic, little effort has been 
devoted to synthesize the overall state of research on 3PL. Selviaridis et al. (2007) also did 
a literature review and found that most of the research performed on 3PLs have been 
empirical-descriptive, and generally lacks a theoretical foundation. It calls for more 
normative, qualitative and theory driven studies, as well as further empirical research in 
relation to 3PL design and implementation and fourth party logistics services. Skjoett-
Larsen (2000) concluded that third party logistics not only is a tool for cost efficiency, but 
that it is also is a strategic measure to create competitive advantage through better service 
and flexibility. He further found that changes in attitudes and investments in human 
resources were important for the success of such schemes. Marasco (2007) found that 
organizational culture plays a significant role in the development and maintenance over 
time of 3PL arrangements, but that attempts to separate different aspects of such culture 
and its influence on performance has not been given sufficient attention considering the 
international trend of 3PL outsourcing. He calls for more research on the complexities in 
behavior arising from the interaction between 3PL and buyer and points to the fact that 
some scholars have begun to approach 3PL research from a relationship marketing 
perspective. Soonhong et al. (2005) found that in 3PL collaborative schemes respondents 
involved reported a “blurring of the lines” instead of an “us vs them” approach. This was 
expressed in different ways, treating arrangements as if they were both part of the same 
operation, treating them as co-owned, and employing a new focus on the best common 
solution. They also found that several outcomes of 3PL collaborations was more efficiency 
and market positions for the customer firms in the study.  
 
Large (2007) found four factors that potentially had influence on third-party relationship 
performance: the demanded specificity, the intended performance evaluation, the expected 
adaptation by the provider and the willingness of the customer to adapt to the provider. It 
further found that the complexity of service and the amount of existing assets of customers 
influence the degree of partner-spesific adaptions. Tian et al. (2007) found that, based on 
evidence collected from China, satisfaction of customers in previous interaction with 3PLs, 
the level of relationship-spesific investment from the 3PL, how 3PL handels information 
sharing, and the reputation of the 3PL are main determinants of the level of trust towards 
3PL providers. Further that the level of trust may influence the level of loyal behaviour 
towards 3PLs. Knemeyer (2003) argues that mistakes can offer opportunities for 3PL to 
impress customers and so to win their loyalty. He presents a simple model borrowed from 
relationship marketing theory where efforts in building customer relationships (in this case 
it would be Havyard) leads to retention of customers which produce referrals, which in 
turn can increase the likelihood of a favorable recovery process from mistakes. Jayaram et 
all (2010) identified four factors in a 3PL-customer relationship that were found to be 
correlated with a firms performance. These were information integration, 3PL selection 
criteria, performance evaluation, and relationship building. Such results may be useful as it 
can allow firms to focus their attention on certain issues that often increase firm 
performance. 
3.4.2 4PLs 
According to Vivaldini et al. (2008) a 4PL combine the management and operation of 
supply chain logistics. Win (2008) says that 4PL has emerged as the good alternative to 
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allows firms to have a single point of accountability across both supply as well as demand 
networks. Bedeman et al. (2003, p 470) include the following key characteristics of a 4PL 
“Supply chain (SC) visionary; SC planner and optimizer; deal shaper and maker; SC re-
engineers; project management; service, system and information integrator; and 
continuous innovation”. From all these criteria mentioned it seems that 4PLs can be 
visualized to exist on a level above 3PLs. Further, several of the mapped activities in the 
present case study are probably suitable for being candidate activities for 4PLs rather than 
just 3PLs. To simplify the thesis will use the term 3PL, even though 4PL may in cases be 
relevant.  
3.4.3 Logistics intermediary 
There also exists literature on so called logistics intermediaries. This term seems to be 
somewhat exchangeable with 3PL and 4PL, exemplified by the definition of 
businessdictionary.com: “A party who arranges shipping, warehousing, distribution and 
other goods movement on behalf of goods providers and shipping companies”. Some 
sources perhaps define it a bit broader than common definitions of 3/4PLs (Song et al., 
2001). In any case, due to the similarity the term will not be used further in this thesis.  
3.4.4 Categorizations and properties of business relationships 
In a study on the strategic development of third party logistics providers Hertz and 
Alfredsson (2003) found that the 3PL firms in her study were all focused on moving into 
more advanced and complex services such as 4PL without letting their former business 
strategy hinder them. They also found that the ability to cope with strategic alliances is 
essential for understanding and developing the business. A main challenge for 3PLs 
according to them is to balance between high adaptation to particular customers and 
organizing the systems and business for coordination of several businesses (general 
problem solving skills). In their view the strategic development of the 3PLs depend on 
how these two factors are balanced. They also provide a model where 3PLs are classified 
based on abilities of “general problem solving” on one axis, and customer adaption on the 
other. A somewhat similar approach is found in “Outsourcing: guidelines for a structured 
approach” by Franceschini et al. (2003). They develop a model claimed to be based on 
“total quality management” principles, and categorize the types of relationships between 
outsourced and outsourcer based on the levels of specificity on one axis, and complexity 
on the other. 
 
In “Developing and implementing supply chain partnerships” (1996) Lambert et al. 
develop a model to determine if a partnership is warranted, and if so of what kind it should 
be. They identify six different types of supply chain relationships. 
Figure 3. Types of supply chain relationships. 
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Figure 3. Types of supply chain relationships. From Lambert et al. (1996). 
 
This classification can probably be useful as a point of reference for managers, who are 
outsourcing more or less activities to a 3PL, in order to more easily evaluate if this can 
have any effect on the main type of business relationship. An example is Havyard and 
K+N. Due to required limitations in the scope of the study it will not be explicitly used in 
the analysis section however. 
 
According to Anderson (1995), the main benefits of logistics alliances are better 
economies of scale and scope, bargaining power, efficiency, range of services, faster 
learning, increased network with other providers, more knowledge of various kind, faster 
implementation of new systems, restructuring of the supply chain and decreased 
investment base. Trust is especially important between firms when there is much at stake 
(Maltz et al., 1997), such as when one firm has outsourced important logistics functions to 
a 3PL. For the 3PL, its existing relationships or customers are both a source of restrain and 
development.  Ford et al. (1998) found that there is inertia to change due to conflicts of 
interests, limited knowledge and the risk involved in changing. However, Bagchi et al. 
(1998) found that such relationships tend to deepen over time and the number of activities 
that are increased. More integration between the third party logistics provider and the 
customer would mean a higher commitment from both parties. This would have effects on 
both suppliers and other actors close in the supply chain. Such a strategic alliance is 
naturally also more costly to switch than a relationship with low commitment (Hertz and 
Alfredsson, 2003). 
 
This section should provide information sufficient for a satisfactory understanding of the 
concepts of 3- and 4PLs for the purposes of the master thesis, as well as for some of the 
traditional research efforts that has been undertaken to understand these phenomena. 
Different kinds of business relationships in general were also touched upon in this section, 
but this material was not directly used in the analysis part of the thesis. 
3.5 Industry-specific literature 
There are some studies of relevance specific to the maritime industries. On Havyard 
specifically there is Kvalsvik (2012) who dealt with intra-organizational information 
sharing for purchasing activities in shipbuilding. Høystakli and Skeide (2012) are also of 
relevance and concentrates on Outsourcing and considerations and experiences in the 
maritime industry in Møre & Romsdal. In “Partner selection for interfirm collaboration in 
ship design” Solesvik and Encheva (2010) focus on the criteria used by maritime firms in 
the evaluation of partners for strategic alliances. Ruska et al. (2012) shows how buyers in 
shipbuilding projects in the maritime sector tend to prioritize technical, operational and 
business capabilities over relational and developmental capabilities and that the buyer and 
its suppliers diverge in their assessments of the suppliers' capabilities, creating potential 
misunderstandings and false expectations in the buyer–supplier relationships. Shinohara et 
al. (2005) deals with how incentive schemes can be applied to the maritime shipping 
industry. Hervik et al. (2012) provides a status report of the maritime sector in Møre og 
Romsdal. 
 
An attempt was made to locate literature specifically on the practice of international 
system package reselling. In addition to several attempts at database searching, Havyard, 
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Innovation Norway, and “Molde kunnskapspark” was contacted for this purpose. No such 
academic literature could be located. 
 
Finally, the International commercial terms, commonly referred to as Incoterms, was 
located as a potential relevant text for the thesis. Incoterms is a series of commercial terms 
published by the International Chamber of Commerce. These are widely used in 
International commercial transactions or procurement processes. The terms are accepted 
and implemented by governments, legal authorities and practitioners across the globe. 
Some of its purpose is to eliminate or reduce uncertainties connected to difference in 
interpretation of national rules, and for this reason some of the terms are often included in 
commercial contracts around the world (iccbooks, 2013). In the end, however, it was not 
really used apart from being referred to in what it said about the ownership of 
responsibility of international shipments: that such a responsibility is transferred to the 
recipient as soon as the batch leaves its port of origin. The specific literature mentioned 
above this was in the end mostly used for inspirational purposes. 
3.6 Theories of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
This term was coined in the book Market and Hierarchies (1975) by Oliver E. Williamson, 
and refers to some of the most basic parts of the framework used to organizations and the 
interface within organizations elaborated on in the section of Transaction Cost Economics 
below. According to Geraldi (2007) there are three main streams in the NIE: TCE, Agency 
theory and Property rights theory. Out of the three, TCE will be elaborated on the most. 
3.6.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
3.6.1.1 Introduction 
The following outline of TCE has a certain level of detail. To make it more reader-friendly 
the subsections with the most direct relevance to the analysis section of this thesis are 
identified and located close to the beginning of this chapter. They are probably “critical 
dimensions for describing transactions” and “a simple contractual schema”.  
TCE is usually associated with two main figures; Ronald H. Coase, who received the 
Nobel prize in economics in 1991, and Oliver E. Williamson, who received the price in 
2009 (press release at nobelprize.org). A relatively short introduction to TCE is 
Williamsons 22 page “Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction” from 2007. 
Williamson (1975, p 4-6, 1981 and 1991b) and Tadelis and Williamson (2010) give an 
overview of the main academic disciplines and literature that TCE is based on. The 
antecedent academic disciplines are economics, organization theory, contract law, and 
business history. Specific antecedent works are Commons (1934), Coase (1937), Barnard 
(1938), Hayek (1962), Simon (1947; 1962), Chandler (1962), and Arrow (1962; 1969). 
Williamson (among others 1981; 1991b) seems to give special credit to John R. Commons 
for proposing in his 1934 paper that the transaction be made the basic unit of economic 
analysis.  
 
Commons argued that a transaction involved three distinguished social relations: conflict, 
dependence and order (p. 657). He explains it in the following way: 
 
The parties are involved in a conflict of interest on account of the universal 
principle of scarcity. Yet, they depend on each other for reciprocal alienation and 
acquisition of what the other wants but does not own. […] it actually creates, out of 
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conflict of interests, a workable mutuality and orderly expectation of property and 
liberty. (p. 657)  
 
In the same tradition, Williamson writes that “TCE views governance as the means by 
which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains” (2008, p. 14). 
It is interesting in passing to note a similarity to some aspects of Supply chain management 
(SCM). Central in Mentzer et al.’s (2007) article on how to define SCM are aspects of 
mutuality and conflict resolution. An institution, or organization presumably, Commons 
defined as “collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action” (p. 
648). Commons relevance to TCE is summarized by Williamson (1981): 
 
He recognized that there were a variety of governance structures with which to 
mediate the exchange of goods or services between technologically separable 
entities. Assessing the capacities of different structures to harmonize relations 
between parties and recognizing that new structures arose in the service of these 
harmonizing purposes were central to the study of institutional economics as he 
conceived it. (p. 550) 
 
TCE was pioneered Coase by in his much cited article from 1937, “The nature of the 
firm”. In it he asked the question: “[…] having regard to the fact that if production is 
regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at 
all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?” (p. 388). His main answer was that 
there is a cost involved in organizing production using the price mechanism – the 
transaction costs, and that such costs could be minimized by internalizing. He argues that 
“a firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions 
coordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes 
smaller as he abandons the organization of such transactions” (p. 393).  
The theory was further developed by Oliver E. Williamson (1971, 1975 and so on). 
Williamson has defined transaction costs as the cost of running the economic system 
(Berghuis et al., 2013). In the Institutions of Capitalism (1985) Williamson states that it is 
the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. To the proposition that transaction 
costs are a negligible part of economic activity, Williamson (1979) responds by arguing 
that if that is so then “the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any 
advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be 
eliminated by costless contracting.” The theory’s relevance to outsourcing can be 
exemplified by the fact that Williamsons very first transaction cost article from 1971 dealt 
with the problem of vertical integration, which, he said, turned out to be a prototypical 
problem (Williamson, 1999). Williamson (2008) said that the make-or-buy decision is the 
canonical transaction for TCE.  
3.6.1.2 Limits to the growth of firms: 
Coase (1937, p.394) asks the question “[…] why, if by organizing one can eliminate 
certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at 
all? Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?” His main answer was that there 
are diminishing returns to management. As a firm becomes larger, the costs of organizing 
additional transactions within the firms may rise. A point is reached then where the costs 
of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in 
carrying out the transaction in the open market (or by another entrepreneur). According to 
Staffan Canback (2002) Williamson (1975, p. 126-130) suggested four limiting factors to 
the growth of the firm (or diseconomies of scale etc.): Atmospheric consequence, 
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Bureaucratic insularity, Incentive limits of the employment relation, communication 
distortion due to bounded rationality. Canback studied empirically these effects, and found 
that these four sources of diseconomies of scale are consistent with the theoretical and 
empirical economics and sociology literature. 
3.6.1.3 Critical dimensions for describing transactions 
Williamson (1979; 1981) specifies three main attributes for describing transactions. They 
are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions.  
 
Asset specificity: This is the most important dimension for describing transactions 
according to Williamson (1981). It is meant to measure the degree investments are 
specialized to a particular transaction. If this is high the transaction is referred to as 
idiosyncratic. The alternative use of such investment should the transaction in question be 
interrupted is much lower than if the relation was sustained. The “supplier is ‘locked into’ 
the transaction to a significant degree” (p.555). However, this is symmetrical in that “the 
buyer cannot turn to alternative sources of supply and obtain the item on favorable terms, 
since the cost of supply from unspecialized capital is presumably great” (p.555). Asset 
specificity can be broken down into four components:  
- Site specificity (things can be located close to each other to economize on 
transportation and inventory costs). According to Williamson (1981, p. 555-557) 
transactions involving some degree of “core technology” will often be picked up by 
this measure. On the predictive power on firm’s boundaries of core technology, 
however, Williamson says that “the common ownership of some stations – the core – is 
sufficiently obvious that a careful, comparative assessment is unneeded” (p. 557).  
- Physical asset specificity: For instance when special instruments are needed to produce 
a component.  
- Human asset specificity: This arises from learning by doing. 
- Dedicated asset, as added in Williamson (1983;1985): This is “[…] a discrete 
investment in plant. Although these assets add to the firm’s generalized (as contrasted 
with special purpose) production capability, the investment would not be undertaken 
but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a specific customer 
(1983, p. 526). As with other types of asset specificity, dedicated assets lose value if 
put to alternative use (or alternative users). 
- Temporal specificity, as acknowledged by Williamson (1991), can be thought of as a 
type of site specificity where acceptable time responsiveness by on-site human assets is 
important. The concept is similar to technological nonseperability.  
 
Uncertainty:  According to Williamson (1985) the influence of uncertainty on economic 
organization is conditional on especially asset specificity. If assets are non-specific, 
continuity has little value, and uncertainty becomes less relevant as market transactions 
would apply. However  
 
Whenever assets are specific in nontrivial degree, increasing the degree of 
uncertainty makes it more imperative that the parties devise a machinery to "work 
things out"-since contractual gaps will be larger and the occasions for sequential 
adaptations will increase in number and importance as the degree of uncertainty 
increases (p. 60).  
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Environmental/state contingent/exogenous and behavioral uncertainty is distinguished 
(Williamson, 1985). Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) state that environmental and behavioral 
uncertainty give rise to the adaption problem and performance evaluation problem 
respectively. Sandvik (2008) decompose behavioral uncertainty into relevant subcategories 
in an article on risk and supply chains. 
 
Frequency: Williamson (1985) describes the basic proposition for the effect of frequency:  
 
Specialized governance structures are more sensitively attuned to the governance 
needs of nonstandard transactions than are unspecialized structures, ceteris paribus. 
But specialized structures come at a great cost, and the question is whether the 
costs can be justified. This varies with the benefits on the one hand and the degree 
of utilization on the other.  
 
The benefits of specialized governance structures are greatest for transactions 
supported by considerable investment in transaction-specific assets. The reasons 
are those described previously. Whether the volume of transactions processed 
through a specialized governance structure utilizes it to capacity is then the 
remaining issue. The cost of specialized governance structures will be easier to 
recover for large transactions of a recurring kind. (p. 60) 
 
Still, the net effect of frequency on predicted governance depends on the particulars, and is 
relevant due to both reputation effects and setup costs (Williamson, 2008, p. 8). Due to the 
implicated difficulty in determining its net effect, the case study interviews will not ask 
questions trying to estimate this variable. 
 
Ivanaj and Franzil (2006) provides some discussion on each of the three main dimensions 
of a transaction in light of logistics outsourcing, which will not be described here.  
3.6.1.4 Forms of transaction costs 
According to Dahlman (1979) transaction costs can be divided into three main categories: 
 
 Search and information costs: Are costs incurred in finding out the relevant prices, 
that the good is in the market and so on. 
 Bargaining and decision costs: These are costs required to come to an acceptable 
agreement with the other party in the transaction, making a feasible contract etc. 
 Policing and enforcement costs: are the costs of making sure the parties sticks to 
the terms of the contract, and taking appropriate action if this turns out not to be the 
case. 
3.6.1.5 A “simple contractual schema” – model of the current case study 
A presentation of the model that the present case study will be based on follows in this 
section. It is presented in Williamson (2008), but first developed in Williamson (2002), 
and is coined a “simple contractual schema”. K is a measure of asset specificity, while s is 
a measure of the level of efforts to safeguard specific investments which can include 
penalties, verification procedures, information disclosure, arbitration mechanisms and, in 
the limit, unified ownership. The schema illustrates a tendency to take transactions out of 
the market as asset specificity increase. With the increase of safeguards, k, there are 
 24 
bureaucratic costs (transaction costs) and so internal organization can be thought of as the 
organization form of last resort.  In the model, if asset specificity is high and inadequate 
safeguards are provided, then farsighted players will reflect such risk in the price bid. On 
this account interfirm trade may be discouraged.  
 
On the conditions necessary for a stable outsourcing relationship Williamson (2008) 
writes: “The viability of the hybrid turns crucially on the efficacy of credible commitments 
(penalties for premature termination, information-disclosure and verification mechanisms, 
specialized dispute settlement and the like), the cost-effectiveness of which varies with the 
attributes of transactions.” (p. 8-9). Thus, even if asset specificity and uncertainty are not 
low, outsourcing may still be feasible if costliness of implementing satisfying contractual 
safeguards, in order to protect specialized investments and make possible sequential 
adaptions, is low. He makes the clarification that outsourcing properly includes outside 
procurement both for generic goods and services as well as more complex transactions. In 
other words all the nodes A, B and C may be potential outsourcing alternatives. However, 
for the purpose of his paper as well as this thesis only outsourcing of type C is considered. 
He also makes the point that for the hybrid alternative continuity has value.   
 
Figure 4. A simple contractual schema. 
 
Figure 4. A simple contractual schema. From Williamson (2008).   
 
Williamson (2008) identifies three main styles for dealing with the contractual interface 
for hybrid transactions (transactions where investments in specific assets are required):  
 
Muscular: Is that one of the parties, usually the buyer, deals with one of the parties in a 
peremptory way. Tend to “use up” suppliers and discard them.  For transactions where 
asset specific investments are involved it is short sighted, as supplier will price in the risk 
that they face should something go wrong and hence buyer will pay for this regardless. 
 
Benign: This approach assumes that there will be the appropriate measure of cooperation 
to deal with unforeseen contingencies, so that continuity and mutual gains can be realized. 
Defection can be expected when the “lawful” gains to be had from the insistence on the 
literal terms of the contract exceed the discounted value of continuing the exchange 
relationship, then defection from the spirit of the contract can be projected. 
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Credible: This style differ from benign contracting in that it does not project benign 
behaviors when temptations to defect are present, and from muscular contracting in that it 
is not mean spirited. This style recognizes that all complex contracts are incomplete and 
therefore pose adaptation needs to unforeseen circumstances. The parties look ahead, 
uncover potential hazards, work out the mechanisms to cope and put this into the contract. 
As a result, credible commitments are introduced to lower the risks of various hazards. 
With this style there exists a risk that a too calculative approach will develop and threaten 
the relationship. 
3.6.1.6 Rudiments of contract law in TCE and derived propositions: 
One of the antecedents of TCE is, as stated above, contract law. Being an important 
component of the framework, some of its rudiments will be presented here. Williamson 
(1979), based on Macneil, identifies three main types of contracts. 
 
Classical contract law: This corresponds to what in economic terms would be called 
contingent-claims contracting. It involves comprehensive contracting where all relevant 
future contingencies regarding the supply of goods or services are described and 
discounted for. Third-party involvement is not encouraged in this kind of contract. 
Emphasis is on legal rules, formal documents, and transactions that are fast to pay off. 
 
Neoclassical contract law: Long term contracts under circumstances of uncertainty would 
be too costly to impossible to make. A recognition that the world is not simple, that 
agreements are not complete, and that some contracts will never be agreed on unless the 
parties involved have some trust in the settlement apparatus characterize this tradition of 
contract-law. The contractual relation then may include an additional governance structure, 
such as an arbitrator, which can facilitate adaptions to unforeseen circumstances and 
evaluate performance. One reason why the latter is so relevant is due to the observation 
that litigation more frequently lead to break-down of relationships than do arbitration. 
 
Relational contracting: This type responds to pressures to sustain ongoing relations. It 
has similarities to “a minisociety with a vast array of norms beyond those centered on the 
exchange and its immediate processes.” (Macneil as cited in Williamson 1979, p 238). 
Where the reference point for making adaptions in the neoclassical scheme is the original 
agreement, the reference points in the relational scheme is the entire relation as it has 
developed through time, which may or may not include an original agreement. Williamson 
(1979) illustrates below which governance structures and contract schemes are most suited 
to the different types of transactions. It is based on two properties of the transaction; 
investment characteristics and frequency. It should be noted that Williamson (2008) says 
that frequency is relevant in both reputation effects and setup costs and depend on the 











Figure 5. Governance structures and contract schemes. 
 
Figure 5. Governance structures and contract schemes most suited to the different types of 
transactions. From Williamson (1979). 
 
Where investment characteristics are not specific there is no risk of such an investment 
loosing value should the agreement be abruptly terminated. Hence market governance and 
classical contracting works well. Where there is mixed or a high level of transaction 
specific investments and only occasional frequency there are strong incentives to see the 
contract through to completion.  As frequency is only occasional it may make it more 
difficult to recover the set up costs. Neoclassical contracting and trilateral governance, 
involving an arbitrator, are desirable here. If investments are more than nontrivially 
idiosyncratic, then the more uncertainty that surrounds the transactions, the more important 
it becomes that the parties have agreed upon methods of arbitration as gaps in the contracts 
will be larger, and the number and importance of sequential adaptions will increase. 
Specialized governance structures (unified or bilateral governance), and the relational 
contract scheme, are ideal for transactions where the frequency is recurrent and 
investments are mixed or idiosyncratic. Market transactions would here be hazardous due 
to the transaction specific investment. The recurrent frequency allows fast recovery of set 
up costs.  
 
In Williamson (1985, p. 79) the same figure as above is included with a small 
modification, reflecting the prediction that, even if frequency is only occasional, very high 











Figure 6. Updated version of governance structures and contract schemes. 
 
Figure 6. Updated version of governance structures and contract schemes most suited to 
the different types of transactions.  From Williamson (1985). 
 
At the end of his 1979 paper, Williamson draws certain refutable implications for the 
organization of transactions. The most relevant are cited bellow (p. 259-60): 
 
General: 
1. Nonspesific transactions, either occasional or recurrent, are efficiently organized by 
markets. 
2. Occasional transactions that are non-standardized stand most to benefit from 
adjudication. 
3. A transaction-specific governance structure is more fully developed where 
transactions are 1) recurrent, 2) entail idiosyncratic investment, and 3) are executed 
under greater uncertainty. 
 
Commercial transactions: 
1. Optimization of commercial transactions requires simultaneous attention to (1) 
production economies, (2) transaction-cost economies, and (3) component design. 
2. The reason why Macaulay observes so few litigated cases in business is because 
markets work well for nonspecific transactions, while recurrent, nonstandard 
transactions are governed by bilateral or unified structures. 
3. As uncertainty increases, the obligational market-contracting mode will not be used 
for recurrent transactions with mixed investment features. Such transactions will 
either be standardized, and shifted to the market, or organized internally. 
4. As uncertainty increases, the obligational market-contracting mode will not be used 
for recurrent transactions with mixed investment features. Such transactions will 
either be standardized, and shifted to the market, or organized internally. 
5. Where inventory and related flow-process economies are great, site-specific supply 
and transaction-specific governance (commonly vertical integration) will be 
observed. Generic demand here has little bearing. 
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6. The organization of the interface between manufacturing and distribution reflects 
similar investment considerations: goods and services that can be sold without 
incurring transaction-specific investment will be distributed through conventional 
marketing channels while those where such investments are great will be supported 
by specialized-mainly bilateral (for ex-ample, franchising) or unified (forward 
integration)-governance structures. 
7. The governance of technical change poses special difficulties. The frequently noted 
limits of markets often give way to more complex governance relations, again for 
the same general reasons and along the same general lines as are set out here. 
3.6.1.7 Main differences between modes of governance 
Williamson (2003) summarized the important differences for TCE between three main 
forms of governance, market, hybrid and hierarchy, in the following table: 
 
Table 5. Attributes of leading generic modes of governance. 
Governance attributes Governance modes 
 Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Incentives High-powered Less high-powered Low-powered 
Administrative support 
by bureaucracy 
Nil Some Much 
Contract law regime Legalistic Contract as 
framework 
Firm as own court of 
ultimate appeal (fiat) 
Table 5. From Williamson (2003). 
 
Markets are characterized by high powered incentives, while hierarchy is low. Firms have 
the burden and benefits of more administrative rules and procedures than markets. Markets 
relies more on courts for solving disputes than do hierarchy, which can settle many 
disputes internally by fiat. For hybrid modes this depends on the contract. The contract 
may dictate that arbitration should be used in case of disputes.  In addition to these three 
attributes, a fourth one is mentioned in Williamson (1998), which is that of adaption to 
unforeseen circumstances. He explains: “markets enjoy the advantage in effecting 
autonomous adaption in response to changes in relative prices, but the advantage accrues 
to firms as more cooperative adaptions are needed.” (p. 37)  
3.6.1.8 Operationalization 
According to Williamson (2010 handbook) TCE was made operational in three steps.  
 
First, it took the transaction to be the basic unit of analysis and named the key 
attributes across which transactions differ. Second, it described the properties of 
alternative modes of governance. Last, the analysis was completed by applying the 
‘discriminating alignment’ hypothesis: different kinds of transactions are more 
efficiently governed by different modes of governance. (p. 9)  
 
Williamson (1979, p. 246) says that governance structures are regarded as part of the 
optimization problem. The “discriminating alignment hypothesis” is described in greater 
detail in Williamson (1999). In it he says that TCE works out of this hypothesis. The 
hypothesis is that transactions, which differ in their characteristics, are aligned with 
governance structures, which are different in cost and competence, in order to obtain an 
economizing result. 
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3.6.1.9 Formalizing TCE: 
Efforts have been made to create fully formalized models of the transaction cost approach. 
However, this is a work in progress (Williamson, 2010). Williamson says that the TCE 
have, like many other theories, undergone a natural progression from informal (1930-
1970), to pre-formal (1970’s), to semi-formal (1980s and later), where full formalization is 
the last step. 
Berghuis et al. (2013) claim, in a case study on firms in the Netherlands, that what these 
authors call transaction management has become a major entrepreneurial skill there. It 
found however, that transaction costs currently are only intuitively dealt with in organizing 
production, in contrast to the use of formalized methods.  
3.6.1.10 Empirical support: 
The main lessons of this section are that the empirical work on TCE is substantial and 
overall on the supportive side, that measurement problems and lack of testing for 
interaction effects is an issue, and that the theory has interdisciplinary applicability as 
variations on a theme, the latter also being mentioned in Williamson (1979; 2008). 
According to the economist Paul Joskow (2005), TCE has attracted considerable empirical 
study, much more than other traditional theories of vertical integration or the more recent 
property right theory. For this development he mainly credits scholars of TCE who has 
produced testable hypotheses as well as provided guidance for empirical researchers. 
Further he states that the empirical results of TCA are much more supportive than is the 
case with other theories of vertical integration. 
 
Shelanski and Klein (1995) did a review and assessment of the empirical research on TCE 
and concluded that they believed the “[…] empirical literature, on the whole, is remarkably 
consistent with the predictions of TCE – more so than is typically the case in economics”.  
Aubert et al. (1996) made a study on outsourcing behavior on ten large organizations and 
concluded that the results “support the basic principles of transaction cost and incomplete 
contract theories” (p. 51). 
 
David and Han (2004) undertook a statistical meta-analysis of 63 articles containing 
empirical evidence. They assessed both the empirical support for the theory, and also the 
degree of paradigm consensus in the empirical literature. Mixed results were found. They 
found support in some areas such as asset specificity. For uncertainty and performance 
however they found relatively little support. They further found extensive disagreement on 
how to operationalize some of the central constructs and propositions of the theory. 
 
Geyskens et al. (2006) also conducted a quantitative meta-analysis of empirical studies of 
the TCE’s predictive power on the make, buy or ally decision.  They mostly found it to 
have strong support. However, they did not find support for the claim that asset specificity 
had stronger predictive power than uncertainty. 
 
Lafontaine and Slade (2007) reviewed the empirical evidence of papers that have 
examined different theories about vertical integration and firm boundaries and concluded 
that “The large body of empirical research in the area has found considerable support for 
the notion, derived from TCE, that specific investments are economically and statistically 
important when it comes to the decision to organize the production of a given input 
internally or externally” (p. 24). In general they found the other main dimensions of TCE 
also to have predictive power. They note that the measurement of concepts such as asset 
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specificity can be problematic in that publicly available data rarely contain useful 
information regarding things like specify or complexity. As a result, they claim, most 
researchers rely on qualitative data obtained directly from inspection, interviews, or 
questionnaires.  
 
Macher and Richman (2008) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical literature 
across academic disciplines involving those of the social sciences and business fields. 
They observed that TCE was increasingly being used in fields outside business related 
ones, for instance public policy, agriculture and health. They found that there was “[…] 
considerable support of many of the central tenets of TCE, but we also observe a number 
of lingering theoretical and empirical issues that needs to be addressed” (p. 2). Of these 
issues they emphasized measurement issues, especially with regards to asset specificity 
and opportunism. They also observe that “surprisingly few studies explore the interaction 
effects among transaction cost variables and between these variables and other potentially 
relevant factors” (p.43). Finally they conclude that the interdisciplinary breadth and 
volume of empirical work on TCE illustrates that the theory holds predictive power across 
disciplines. 
 
According to Nisticò (2008) most of the empirical studies on make or buy decisions are 
connected with TCE. She claims that the relationship between vertical integration and 
asset specificity is the most studied area. She concludes that most these studies confirm the 
prediction that asset specificity makes vertical integration more likely.  
Of relevance to this master thesis case study is also the empirical finding of Buvik and 
Andersen (2002), in analyzing data from 177 relationships involving manufacturing firms 
in Norway, that ex post transaction cost reductions were higher in international buyer-
seller relationships than domestic ones when vertical coordination was increased and 
substantial asset specificity was present. The main reason given for these findings was that 
the Norwegian business environment is characterized by higher levels of transparent trade 
conditions “in which reputation effects might attenuate trading hazards to some degree” 
(p.18) than the international arena. 
 
Finally, Berghuis et al. (2013) claim to have demonstrated that international fragmentation 
of production is followed by a rise in transaction and orchestration activities. They claim 
that standardization (of components or procedures) plays a major role in lowering 
transaction costs. It decreases the likelihood of miscommunication and makes drafting of, 
and negotiating contracts easier. Tasks are outsourced (to those places in the world) where 
the lower production costs outweigh the additional transaction costs. It claims that, as long 
as the transaction costs associated with orchestration and coordination are lower than the 
revenues arising from the fragmentation of production the process of specialization of 
production will continue world wide. It emphasizes the importance of finding a good 
balance between orchestration skills (or trade) and technological development. 
3.6.1.11 Extension of TCE: 
Gifford (2004) extend the transaction cost approach of Coase (1937) and Williamson 
(1985) by considering endogenous transaction costs, or opportunity costs of making a new 
transaction. It assumes that the entrepreneur has a limited amount of attention to spend on 
activities. Therefore opportunity costs of negotiating and writing new contracts arises, as 
the entrepreneurs attention is directed away from internal contracts to external ones or vica 
versa. The decision of a company to make or buy therefore depends on the evaluation of 
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the optimal allocation of the attention of the decision maker. This in turn depends on the 
entrepreneurs core competencies as well as how complete contracts in the internal and 
external markets are. 
Boundreau et al. (2007) argues that in addition to transaction costs, there are also 
transaction benefits that should be taken into account, particularly in knowledge intense 
firms. They suggest four additional transaction dimensions likely to yield “transaction 
benefits”. These are: intensity of knowledge, segmentation of knowledge, dispersion of 
knowledge, and scarcity of knowledge. They suggest that some firms today mix 
governance modes so they can use hierarchies to manage transaction costs and 
communities to drive innovation, and create a model to attempt to show this. 
 
Sandvik and Bråthen (2007) studied the relationship between TCE and Supply chain 
management (SCM). They produce a table where SCM is compared to the classical TCE 
forms of governance in several aspects. This is perhaps especially interesting because 
SCM may not traditionally have been thought of as a form of governance comparable to 
the ones mentioned in the TCE literature. The paper found that attributes used to describe 
traditional governance forms of TCE could also usefully be applied to SCM. The paper 
also introduces an additional form of governance given the name “contingent hybrid 
governance”. This form is located on the scale between (discreet) market governance and 
hybrid governance. To describe it an analogy is made to the infinite prisoners’ dilemma 
game where the participants are playing a “tit-for-tat” strategy. In this strategy one player 
would, after playing cooperate initially, replicate the move of the other player. In this way 
transgressions are made unprofitable in the standard set-up of the game. This governance 
form therefore is “[…] called contingent hybrid governance because its stability can give 
the impression of a hybrid relationship, while in reality it is mainly contingent on cost 
considerations (p. 22)”.  
3.6.1.12 Assumptions and basic concepts of the TCE framework 
This section is an overview of the main assumptions and some of the basic concepts of the 
TCE-theory and may be skipped without much loss of continuity to the rest of the thesis. 
3.6.1.12.1 Uncertainty and small-numbers exchange relations, bounded 
rationality and opportunism 
Williamson sets out the fundamental assumption of his framework in “Market and 
Hierarchies” from 1975. In it the cause of market failure (and hence the reason to take a 
transaction out of the market) is the coming together of certain environmental and human 
factors (p. 9). The environmental ones are uncertainty and small-numbers exchange 
relations, and the human ones are bounded rationality and opportunism. Williamson quotes 
Herbert Simon on the pairing of bounded rationality with uncertainty: “The capacity of the 
human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with 
the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the 
real world.” (p. 9). Opportunism is defined as a “lack of candor or honesty in transactions, 
to include self-interest seeking with guile.” (p.9) He goes on to state that opportunist 
inclinations pose little risk “as long as competitive (large-numbers) exchange relations 
obtain.” (p. 9). However, “although a large-numbers exchange condition obtains at the 
outset, it is transformed during contract execution into a small-numbers exchange relation 
on account of 1) idiosyncratic experience associated with contract execution, and 2) 
failures in the human and nonhuman capital markets” (p.  29). 
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It is specified that bounds on rationality are interesting only to the extent that these bounds 
are reached, which is under conditions of uncertainty and/or complexity. When this is the 
case the entire decision tree cannot, or is too difficult, to draw (p. 22). Williamson quotes 
Herbert in making the point that the distinction between uncertainty and sufficient 
complexity becomes irrelevant to the problem:  
 
What may be referred to as ‘uncertainty’ in chess is ‘uncertainty introduced into a 
perfectly certain environment by inability – computational inability – to ascertain 
the structure of the environment. But the result of the uncertainty, whatever its 
source, is the same: approximation must replace exactness in reaching a decision. 
(p.23). 
 
If everything in the environment was known and simple then contracts could be formulated 
for all exchange relations. But this is not so. Therefore:  
 
In consideration of the problems that both long- and short-term contracts are 
subject to – by reasons of bounded rationality and uncertainty in the first instance 
and the pairing of opportunism with small-numbers relations in the second – 
internal organization may arise instead. (p. 10) 
 
Williamson further assumes that opportunism in internal supply relations does not pose the 
same difficulties as it does across a market because 1) profit is more nearly joint 
maximized and 2) incentive and control mechanisms is much more extensive and refined 
than what is the case with exchanges in the market. Williamson (2008) states that 
transaction costs would vanish were it not for bounded rationality and contingent 
opportunism. The former give rise to incomplete contracts, the latter to defection. 
3.6.1.12.2 Information impactedness 
According to Williamson (1975) this condition arises mainly due to uncertainty and 
opportunism, but bounded rationality is also involved. “It exists when true underlying 
circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, are known to one 
or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others.” (p.31). Thus 
this concept describes not merely information asymmetry, even though both can be a 
source of hazards in economic exchange. As Williamson argues:  
 
1) It is not merely asymmetry alone but asymmetry coupled with a) the high costs 
of achieving information parity and b) the proclivity of parties to behave 
opportunistically that poses the problem; 2) information problems can develop 
even when parties have identical information and, a fortiori, if information 
differences exist; and 3) the distribution of information between the parties is of 
special concern in small-numbers bargaining contexts. (p.31) 
 
An example of how this may affect the form of governance is given below in the case of 
first-mover advantages:  
 
Winners of initial contracts acquire, in a learning-by-doing fashion, non-trivial 
information advantages over nonwinners. Consequently, even though large-
numbers competition may have been feasible at the time the initial award was 
made, parity no longer holds at the contract renewal interval. The information 
acquired through experience is impacted in the sense that 1) original winners may 
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refuse to disclose it (which is a manifestation of opportunism) or 2) they may be 
unable, despite best efforts, to disclose it (because of bounded rationality of the 
language impeded variety). (p. 35) 
 
Small numbers bargaining situations thus evolve in this way, and markets frequently give 
way to hierarchies on this account. 
3.6.1.12.3 Atmosphere 
Williamson states that the power of economics is to a large extent to be traced back to its 
focus on net benefit analysis. However, he warns that care must be taken not to construct 
problems to narrowly, which can occur if net benefits are calculated in transaction-specific 
terms, when “interaction effects” should be taken into account. He emphasize that 
“technological separability does not imply attitudinal seperability. References to 
atmosphere is intended to make allowance for attitudinal interactions and the systems 
consequences that are associated therewith.” (p.37)  On page 38 he argues that sometimes 
it might be more accurate to regard the exchange process itself as an object of value 
instead of something strictly instrumental to the individuals involved. Satisfying exchange 
relations is therefore made part of the economic problem. 
3.6.1.12.4 Production- and transaction costs, and component design 
The purpose of this section is mainly to explore what TCE have to say about the relation 
between production- and transaction costs, and component design. But also to enquire into 
how “logistics costs” fit in with this theory. The main motivation for the first bit of the 
investigation are the objections that “TCE only focus on transaction cost, and should focus 
more on production costs” and the wish to obtain clarity on this matter. A concluding part 
of a section on the antecedents of TCE, Williamsons (1981) is instructive:  
Finally, although transaction cost economizing is an important and greatly 
neglected topic, such economizing cannot proceed regardless of the production cost 
ramifications. Put differently, transaction cost economizing needs to be located 
within a larger economizing framework and the relevant tradeoffs need to be 
recognized. (p. 552) 
Williamson (1979) says that at some general level the economizing problem includes 
choice between a special-purpose and a general-purpose good or service. He elaborates: 
A general-purpose item affords all of the advantages of market procurement, but 
possibly at the sacrifice of valued design or performance characteristics. A special-
purpose item has the opposite features: valued differences are realized but market 
procurement here may pose hazards.  ( p.245)  
This is reflected in one of the concluding propositions he draws on page 259 that 
optimization of commercial transactions requires simultaneous attention to 1) production 
economies, 2) transaction-cost economies, and 3) component design. 
For purposes of that particular paper (p. 245), and perhaps to some extent 
operationalization, Williamson (1979) assumes that the criterion for organizing 
commercial transactions is the strictly instrumental one of economizing on costs, 
essentially, production and transaction. He elaborates: 
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To the degree that transaction costs are negligible, buying rather than making will 
normally be the most cost-effective means of procurement. […] Since external 
procurement avoids many of the bureaucratic hazards of internal procurement (which 
hazards, however, are themselves of a transaction-cost kind), external procurement is 
evidently warranted. 
 
As indicated, however, the object is to economize on the sum of production and 
transaction costs. To the degree production-cost economies of external 
procurement are small and/or the transaction costs associated with external 
procurement are great, alternative supply arrangements deserve serious 
consideration. Economizing on transaction costs essentially reduces to 
economizing on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the 
transactions in question against the hazards of opportunism. Holding the 
governance structure constant, these two objectives are in tension, since a reduction 
in one commonly results in an increase in the other. (p. 245-46) 
 
According to Armbrüster (2006, p. 12) production costs include logistics costs. He further 
states that the make-or-buy decision is based on a comparison of the sum of production 
and transaction costs. Rindfleich and Heide (1997) summarizes the relationship between 
production and transaction costs in the framework like this:  
 
The basic premise of TCA is that if adaptation, performance evaluation, and 
safeguarding costs are absent or low, economic actors will favor market 
governance. If these costs are high enough to exceed the production cost 
advantages of the market, firms will favor internal organization. The logic behind 
this argument is based on certain a priori assumptions about the properties of 
internal organization and its ability to minimize transaction costs. (p.32) 
3.6.1.13 Critique of TCE 
Barney (2012) argues that the quest for capabilities is not captured well by the TCA. He 
makes the example that in order to gain access to capabilities, firms may prefer 
nonhierarchical (market or bilateral) governance even though transaction specific 
investments have been made and this form of governance may increase the threat of 
opportunism. This is because it may be costly for some firms to develop certain 
capabilities on their own and also costly to acquire another firm that already possesses 
these capabilities. Using market or intermediate forms of governance may therefore in 
certain cases become an attractive alternative. He discusses the conditions where capability 
considerations are of importance, and argues that those occur most frequently in fast 
evolving high-tech industries. Finally he posits that, whenever such capability access is 
important, the cost of using nonhierarchical  governance versus hierarchical governance to 
gain access to these capabilities must be compared.  
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) criticize the transaction cost approach and claim that it does 
not take into account organizations “unique advantage for governing certain kind of 
economic activities through a logic that is very different from that of the market.” 
They warn that the focus on opportunism may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
argument is summarized like this: 
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As the increased use of rational controls a) increases the organizations dependency 
on those controls, b) shifts voluntary compliance and extra role behavior to 
compulsory compliance and work-to-rule, and c) encourages more difficult to 
detect opportunistic behavior, the cost of removing these controls will grow until it 
is no longer an option for the organization. Management’s options for responding 
to opportunistic behavior will narrow to one of more controls that would serve only 
to increase opportunistic behavior. (p. 27). 
They further contend that firms caught in such a cycle will gravitate to business areas that 
are more suitable for governance through “rational control”. Allegedly such areas are areas 
where markets will have superior efficiency characteristics and will ultimately prevail.   
Another, at least interesting speculation that could be made, is that the theory may have 
gone from being descriptive or predictive to becoming prescriptive. At least firms, 
consultants and so on may treat it in a prescriptive way today. This line of thinking may 
use parts of the argument of Ghoshal and Moran (1996), but is also implying that 
organizations will be more aware of potential small-number bargaining situations 
developing, the tension between customization and standardization and so on than they 
would be likely to had they not been familiar with TCE. As a side point, Milton Friedman 
(1953) in his essay on methodology speaks of a to-some-degree similar relationship 
between positive and normative economics. 
Johansson and Mattsson (1987) of the Network theory sums up some of the critique made 
against TCE. They claim that it can be used as an argument for horizontal and vertical 
integration, as the use of hierarchies instead of markets for coordination of interdependent 
activities may economize on transaction costs. Further, they refer to critics such as Perrow 
(1986) and Kogut (1985) that claim that the transaction cost concept is vague and even 
badly defined and that there is little, if any, empirical evidence that economizing on 
transaction costs is a good explanation or even a dominating motive for vertical 
integration. 
 
Further, Johansson and Mattsson refer to claims that Williamson makes unrealistic 
assumptions about the differences between hierarchies and markets. Within firms there is 
also opportunism and organizations are not necessarily able to economize on bounded 
rationality. Markets can also be characterized by asymmetrical power relations, such as 
being controlled by fiat etc. One final issue is in the application of TCE, more specifically 
the limitation of the systems to be compared. TCE analyze a dyadic relation performing a 
transaction, but the industrial system is made up of many such relations that are 
interdependent to various degrees. If the institutional from will be changed in one of those 
dyads, for instance through vertical integration, this may affect other dyads. 
3.6.2 Agency theory 
Logan (2000) proposes to use agency theory to design successful outsourcing 
relationships. She addresses some of the failed ones and suggests two possible solutions to 
the problem: 1) diagnose the relationship from both sides of the contract. 2) The second 
one is to use agency theory to aid designing the type of contract and relationship. 
 
Principal-agent theory has been used in different fields such as the political sciences, law 
and economics (Eisenhardt, 1989). The model proposes that there is a conflict of interest 
between a principal and an agent. In a work situation, the principal is the employer of the 
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agent. For the agent the fulfillments of the working requirements are costly to him, and so 
he has some incentive to shirk. The problem then is centered on how to align the interests 
of the agent with the interest of the principal. In monitoring the agent the principal face the 
challenge of incomplete and asymmetry of information, and risk with regards to what 
degree of a contract the agent has completed (Investopedia 2013).  
 
The use of agency terminology and general logic is used in analysis section of this thesis in 
the investigations of the main information flows between activities and agents, and 
attempts to find if there is a relationship between the security classification of this 
information and employees recommendation for outsourcing. 
3.6.3 Property rights theory/new property right theory 
As specified in the introduction this section is used only to facilitate the primary objective 
of this literature study. The theory was eventually rejected for other theories that seemed 
both better defined and suited for the purpose. The property rights theory revolves around 
the idea that the firm can be conceived on the basis of the definition and distribution of 
property rights (Garrouste in Elgar, 2004). In his article Garrouste gives a survey of its 
developers, which is beyond the scope of this section to include.  According to Kim and 
Mahoney (2005), the Property rights theory has common antecedents with TCE and 
agency theory. Yet it is distinct from these. 
 
According to Gooroochurn and Hanley (2007) the property rights theory (PRT) is 
especially relevant to outsourcing where knowledge transfer and product innovation has a 
major role (while TCE is more important to explain process innovation). It thus is more 
limited in its applicability than TCE. They further claims that PRT and TCE is not 
mutually exclusive, but that while the emphasis in TCE is on costs/benefits, in the PRT 
case it is on revenue maximization and protection/appropriation environments. The PRT 
predicts that products either should be innovative enough to have patent protection, or that 
their returns are uncertain so that opportunism by partners are made less feasible. 
 
The result of adding contractual incompleteness to theory is sometimes called the New 
property right theory (Foss et al., 2000; Chen, 2005). Incomplete in this context means that 
not all the economic aspects and the benefits for the parties involved are specified ex ante. 
An additional contractual problem is that the actions of the parties are not observable or 
verifiable (Nisticò, 2008).  This theory tries to shed light on what effect the ownership of 
assets has on incentives of two parties (such as a buyer and a seller) to invest ex ante in 
non-contractible assets, knowing that after the event has taken place they will both share 
any payoffs that their investment from the investment (Colombatto, 2004). Factors in this 
theory that makes a contract incomplete is that knowledge about certain futures of the 
world may only become available ex post, the cost of specifying ex ante the different 
possible states of the world might be too high to be worth it, and actions of the parties 
involved may not be verifiable by even a third party (Nisticò, 2008).  
3.7 Resource-based theories 
This section will deal with the origin and contents of theories of the firm which emphasize 
capabilities, competence, dynamic capabilities, knowledge, learning, routines, or 
resources. Although in many respects these theories differ, it can be useful for analysis to 
group them together.  
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Madhok (2002) provide a justification for this and points out that “[…] ultimately they are 
all interested in the similar question of performance differences between firms” (p. 536). In 
this article he uses the term “resource-based” for such theories. This literature review will 
do the same. Williamson (1999) offers a seemingly different, perhaps simply broader, 
main similarity between these theories: “[…] the capabilities/competence perspective has 
distinguished antecedents, the overarching theme of which is the importance of process” 
(p. 1093). According to him much of this work can be traced to draw inspiration from 
Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942). Grant (2001) says the 
interest of such theories… 
reflect dissatisfaction with the static, equilibrium framework of industrial 
organization economics that has dominated much contemporary thinking about 
business strategy and has renewed interest in older theories of profit and 
competition associated with the writings of David Ricardo, Joseph Schumpeter, 
and Edith Penrose (p.114). 
According to Foss (1997) and Mills et al. (2003) Philip Selznick (1957) was also a key 
contributor to the resource-based view in that he introduced the idea that companies 
possess “distinctive competences”. Argyres and Zenger (2009) mention Richardson (1972) 
as one of the originators of the competence view. Still, it seems that Edith Penrose and her 
1959 book named “The theory of the growth of the firm” is most commonly mentioned in 
the literature as the main source of influence for resource-based theories (Williamson, 
1999; Langlois, 1996; Neves et al., 2013; Grant, 2001). Two prominent papers that take a 
synthetic view on resource-based theories are Williamson (1999) and Madhok (2002). 
According to McIvor (2009) such theories are important to the study of outsourcing “[…] 
as superior performance achieved in organizational activities relative to competitors would 
explain why such activities are performed internally” (p. 46). Argyres and Zenger (2007) 
explains is thus: “[…]capabilities logic explains the choice to internalize (or the 
persistence of this choice) as a reflection of superior capability to perform the activity 
within the firm relative to the capabilities of external providers” (p. 3). Several other 
authors have proposed that comparative capabilities of firms play an important role in 
defining boundaries (see Argyres and Zenger, 2009, for a collection of authors). 
Apart from facilitating the main objectives for this literature survey mentioned above, this 
section also has a direct bearing on the analysis part of this thesis in that it provides the 
main basis for which alternatives theories are tested against the data. 
3.7.1 Main ideas 
Outlines of the theory in the form common today is given in several papers (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Dosi and Teece, 1998; Williamson, 1999; Cousins 
2005).Due to the central position of Penrose in this stream of though, two relevant quotes 
are here given. The following from Penrose (1959) is illustrative on the relationship 
between resources, capabilities and the distinctiveness of firms: 
 
The services yielded by resources are a function of the way in which they are used 
– exactly the same resource when used for different purposes or in different ways 
and in combination with different types or amounts of other resources provides a 
different service or set of services. The important distinction between resources and 
services is not their relative durability; rather it lies in the fact that resources 
consists of a bundle of potential services and can, for the most part, be defined 
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independently of their use, while services cannot be so defined, the very word 
‘service’ implying a function, an activity. As we shall see, it is largely in this 
distinction that we find the source of the uniqueness of each individual firm. (p.22) 
 
Presumably the word “capability” has to a large extent replaced “service” in the modern 
literature. Penrose (1959) offers the following explanation of the contents of her theory: 
 
A theory of the growth of firms is essentially an examination of the changing 
productive opportunity of firms; in order to find a limit to growth, or a restriction 
on the rate of growth, the productive opportunity of a firm must be shown to be 
limited in any period. (p. 28-29). 
According to Cousins (2005), the resource-based view considers the firm as a bundle of 
resources and capabilities which, when combined become sources of economic rents and 
sustainable competitive advantage. By varying, combining and recombining these 
resources firms can change themselves in a variety of ways. Dosi and Teece (1998) 
describes distinctive competence in the theory like this: 
…a firm’s distinctive competence needs to be understood as a reflection of 
distinctive organizational capabilities to coordinate and to learn. By ‘organizational 
capabilities’ we mean the capabilities of an enterprise to organize, manage, 
coordinate, or govern sets of activities. The set of activities that a firm can organize 
and coordinate better than other firms is its distinctive competencies. Posed 
differently, a distinctive competence is a differentiated set of skills, complementary 
assets, and organization routines which together allow a firm to coordinate a 
particular set of activities in a way that provides the basis for competitive 
advantage in a particular market or markets.” (p. 284) 
 
Barney (1991) suggests that sources of sustained competitive advantage resources of a 
firm that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutionable. He adds that in 
addition to these sources sustained competitive advantage is dependent on the role of 
management. Further he adds that implicit in the model is the assumption that managers 
have a limited ability in manipulating the attributes of the firm. Williamson (1999) argues 
that competence include coordination and learning, and is based on skill, assets, and 
routines. Some of the theories which may arguably be viewed as outgrowths of the RBV 
are briefly described below. 
3.7.2 Capabilities as organizational routines 
Grant (1991) refers to Nelson and Winter’s (1982) concept of “organizational routine”. 
The concept is explained by Grant thus:  
 
Such routines are regular and predictable patterns of activity which are made up of 
a sequence of coordinated actions by individuals. A capability is, in essence, a 
routine, or a number of interacting routines. The organization itself is a huge 
network of routines. (p. 122)  
 
He compares the concept of routines with the human concept of skill. Nelson and Winter 
(1982, p.14) compares it to biological genes. Williamson (1999) comments on this latter 
hypothesis by saying that if the analogy holds, “[…] then we are evidently onto something 
very basic” (p. 1095). 
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3.7.3 Knowledge based theory of the firm 
Grant (1996) argues for a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Within this approach, the 
firm as a knowledge producing and knowledge absorbing entity is distinguished. He argues 
that the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the firm may be analysed in terms of relative 
efficiency of knowledge utilization. It assumes that markets transfer products in an 
efficient manner, but knowledge in an inefficient manner. Integration will then occur 
between stage A and B of production if stage B require access to the knowledge in stage 
A. To the author of this thesis this sounds like the argument for technological 
nonseperability that Williamson (1975) attempted to show was not the only determinant 
for vertical integration. Kogut and Zander (1992) has also presented a much cited 
investigation into the relationship between firm knowledge, capabilities, technology and 
the make-or-buy decision.   
3.7.4 Learning based theories 
Several authors have argued that firms may be usefully viewed as institutions for learning. 
Madhok (2002) refers to Teece, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; 
Madhok, 1996, 1997). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Levinthal and March (1993) are 
some of the most cited papers that explore the various aspects of organizational learning. 
Incorporating such learning views, governance structures may not only serve to align 
transaction and governance characteristics, but also have the function of managing skills 
and knowledge.  Advantages of integration include under this approach include facilitating 
the learning required in capability formation (Argyres and Zenger, 2007 p. 7).  
3.8 The relationship between TCE and resource-based theories: 
A number of scholars have in recent years made attempts at clarifying the relationship 
between the TCE and the RBV and what is similar and different in how the two theories 
relate to the make-or-buy decision. Several authors claim that the two theories are 
complementary (e.g. Williamson, 1999; Langlois and Foss, 1996; Neves et al., 2013; see 
McIvor, 2009 for other authors). And some have attempted to create a synthesis of the two 
theories (e.g. Argyres and Zenger, 2009; Tsang 2000). This section will first present a 
table that include the relevant papers that has been reviewed for the purposes of this 
section in the literature survey, then a section literature commenting on the difference of 
the theories will follow, before a section on the complementariness of the theories.. A 
section on studies that has compared the theories empirically will then follow. At the end a 
short summary is provided. 
Table 6. Relevant papers reviewed for the purposes of this section in the literature 
survey. 
Author(s) (year) Title Type of study Purpose and/or key finding 
Argyres, N., & 
Zenger, T. (2007) 
Are capability-based 





Conceptual. Argue that capabilities and 
transaction cost determinants interact 
with other dynamically, and that the 
two theories of the firm cannot be 
conceptually distinguished. 
Argyres, N., & 
Zenger, T. (2009) 
Capabilities, 
transaction costs, 
and firm boundaries: 
A dynamic 
Conceptual. Same as above. In addition sets out 
to articulate an integrated perspective 
that incorporates both capabilities 
and transaction cost logic. 
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Foss, K., & Foss, 
N. J. (2004) 
The next step in the 
evolution of the 
RBV: Integration 
with transaction cost 
economics. 
Conceptual Addresses the role of transaction 
cost economics (TCE) in advancing 
the 
resource-based view. In particular, it 
is argued that TCE has the potential 
to remedy a number of weak spots in 
the RBV, such as the absence of 




Combs, J. G., & 





a reconciliation of 




Empirical. Attempts to reconcile differing 
predictions of the two theories by 
positing that firms place resource-
based concerns in front of 
consideration from organizational 
economics when deciding whether or 
not to engage in interfirm 
cooperation. Empirical results 
supports what they call their 
integrated view. 
Conner, K. R., & 
Prahalad, C. K. 
(1996) 
A resource-based 
theory of the firm: 
Knowledge versus 
opportunism. 
Conceptual. Attempts to develop a resource and 
knowledge based theory of the firm. 
Allegedly have predictive power in 
the make-or-buy decision. Compares 
this with TCE.  
Cousins, P. D. 
(2005) 
The alignment of 
appropriate firm and 
supply strategies for 
competitive 
advantage. 
Empirical. Tests the hypothesis that a firm’s 
perception of the strategic nature of 
sypply depends on how it defines its 
competitive advantage (CA). Finds 
that views its CA as cost-focused 
will generally consider supply as 
merely having a cost reduction role 
(passive and supportive), while the 
other group will see it as a distinctive 
capability (strategic). 
Das, T. K., & 
Teng, B. S. 
(2000) 
A resource-based 
theory of strategic 
alliances. 
Conceptual. By examining the role of firm 
resources in strategic alliances, the 
paper attempt to put forward a 
general 
resource-based theory of strategic 
alliances by synthesizing the various 
findings in the literature on alliances 
from a resource-based view. 
Espino‐




A review of 
outsourcing from the 
resource‐based view 
of the firm. 
Conceptual. Contributes with a review of the 
principal works that address 
outsourcing from the RBV. Analyze 
main differences between treatments 
of outsourcing from RBV and TCE. 
Propose a framework based on RBV 
and capabilities. 
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interaction between value creation 
and value appropriation 
Holcomb, T. R., 
& Hitt, M. A. 
(2007) 
Toward a model of 
strategic 
outsourcing. 
Conceptual. Claim that although research in 
supply chain management has 
expanded substantially, only limited 
applications of TCE and the RBV 
are available, especially in the field 
of operations management. Attempts 
to extend both perspectives to 
explain conditions leading to 
strategic 
outsourcing. 





and learning curves 







By varying the level of transaction 
costs and changing the structure of 
the correlation between upstream-
downstream capabilities in the 
industry, as well as economies of 
scale; learning curves; and the way 
in which profitability leads to 
capability improvement in the 
upstream and downstream segments, 
numerical results are generated to 
explain how vertical integration 
evolves over time. 
Jacobides, M. G., 
& Billinger, S. 
(2006) 
Designing the 
boundaries of the 
firm: From “make, 
buy, or ally” to the 




longitudinal study of a major 
European manufacturer Suggests 
that to understand how firm 
boundaries are set and what their 
impacts are, it is needed to 
complement microanalytic 
focus on transactions with a systemic 
analysis at firm level. Also claims to 
show how, over and above 
transactional 
alignment, decisions about 
boundaries and vertical architectures 
can transform a firm’s strategic and 
productive capabilities and 
prospects. 
Jacobides, M. G., 
& Hitt, L. M. 
(2005) 
Losing sight of the 
forest for the trees? 
Productive 
capabilities and 
gains from trade as 




Considers how productive capability 
differences shape vertical scope 
through gains from trade. Find this 
to be a key determinant in the make-
or-buy decision. Conclude that the 
distribution 
of productive capabilities along the 
value chain, catalyzed by transaction 
costs, ultimately drives 
scope. 
Jacobides, M. G., The co‐evolution of Conceptual. Propose that transaction costs and 
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capabilities are fundamentally 
intertwined in the 
determination of vertical scope. 
Attempts to identify the key 
mechanisms of a co-evolution.  
Jacobides, M. G., 











It assesses recent progress toward an 
integration 
of the capabilities and transaction 
cost approaches. Finds that progress 
has been substantial and that key 
elements of a promising dynamic 
synthesis have been identified. 
Jain, A., & 
Thietart, R. A. 
(2013) 
Capabilities as shift 
parameters for the 
outsourcing 
decision. 
Empirical. Argue that the effect of capabilities 
on the outsourcing dilemma 
integrates seamlessly into transaction 
cost reasoning if capabilities are 
regarded as shift parameters. The 
result of such a process is that the 
frontier at which market governance 
gives way to firm governance shifts. 
Langlois, R. N. 
(1992) 
Transaction-cost 
economics in real 
time. 
Conceptual. Attempts to place, as it says,”the 
theory of the boundaries of the firm 
within the context 
of the passage of time”. Introduce 
the concept of “dynamic transaction 
costs”.   
Langlois, R. N., 




rebirth of production 
in the theory of 
economic 
organization. 
Conceptual. Argues that competing and 
complementary theories of TCE are 
emerging. These theories  
are founded on economizing on 
bounded rationality but pay more 
attention to changing technology and 
to evolutionary considerations. 
Surveys and synthesize a developing 
perspective 








transaction cost and 
resource‐based 
theories of the firm 
and the institutional 
structure of 
production. 
Conceptual. Argues that Coase foresaw many of 
the questions that RBV is concerned 
with today, that RBV play a more 
critical explanatory role than many 
RBV scholars recognize, and lastly, 
that a more complete understanding 
of the organization of economic 
activity require a greater sensitivity 
to the interdependence of production 
and exchange relations. Calls for a 
triangular alignment between 
governance structure, transaction, 
and resource characteristics. 
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Mayer, K. J., & 









Empirical. Address independent and joint 
effects of contractual hazards and 
technological 
capabilities on governance, arguing 
that strong technological capabilities 
improve a 
firm’s ability to govern transactions, 





How the transaction 
cost and resource-







Argues that neither TCE nor RBV 
alone can fully explain the 
complexities of outsourcing. Finds 
that the theories should be applied 
with caution due to contradictory 
prescriptions in some instances. 
Poppo, L., & 
Zenger, T. (1998) 
Testing alternative 










Develops and tests a model of 
comparative institutional 
performance (rather than 
institutional choice). Examine the 
degree of support for competing 
explanations of boundary choice. 
Results suggest that a theory of the 
firm and a theory of boundary choice 
is likely to be complex, requiring 
integration of transaction cost, 
knowledge-based, and measurement 
reasoning. 
Silverman, B. S. 
(1999) 
Technological 





integration of the 
resource-based view 
and transaction cost 
economics. 
Empirical. Considers how firms resource base 
affects the choice of industries that 
the firm diversifies into. Findings 
point to circumstances where 
resources can be and are exploited 
through contracting rather than 
through diversification. 
Tsang, E. W. 
(2000) 
Transaction cost and 
resource-based 




Conceptual. Attempts to explain the formation of 
joint ventures from the RBV and to 
compare this perspective with TCE, 
make synthesis of the two theories 








Conceptual. Apply the lenses of governance and 
competence to the study of strategy. 
Finds that research challenges posed 
by the competence view such as 
dynamic TC, learning, and the need 
to push beyond generic governance 
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to respond to challenges faced by 
particular firms can and should be 
responded to by the governance 
perspective. 
Table 6. Composed by the author. 
3.8.1 Difference between theories 
This section will survey some of what has been said about the difference between the 
theories. Cousins (2005) summarize the main difference between Transaction cost 
economics and the RBV in the following way: 
The fundamental difference between TCT and RBV is that TCT is a theory based 
on the transaction process of firms, and sees the firm operating in a cost driven 
environment. RBV, however, sees the firm as a basis for competitive advantage 
and attempts to understand how the firm can achieve this through the combining f 
its capabilities and resources. It would appear that firms operating under a RBV 
perspective would tend to see themselves as market differentiators, whereas those 
operating under a TCT focus would tend to see competitive advantage coming 
from a cost focus strategy.  (p. 408) 
 
Rodriquez and Robaina (2006) composed a table showing the main differences between 
the TCE and RBV: 
Table 7. Comparison of TCE and RBV 1: 
 Transaction cost economics RBV 
Unit of analysis - Transactions - Resources and capabilities. 
Behavioral assumptions - Opportunism and limited 
rationality 
- Limited rationality (the 
firm does no master 
everything; it will do what it 
determined by its 
organizational routines) 
Analysis for outsourcing - Specific assets and the 
small numbers related t the 
transaction. 
- Only individual analysis of 
the transactions. 
- Frequency of the 
transaction 
- Specific resources. 
- Analysis of the resources 
as a whole. 
- Skills and capabilities. 
- Experience of suppliers. 
- Analysis of 
complementary capabilities. 
Criterion for outsourcing - Minimizing the transaction 
and production costs 
- Efficiency. 
- Better economic strategy. 
-Tactical and operational 
decision. 
- Observe the creation of 
value. 
Desired effect on the 
organization 
- Dependence on supplier. 
- Hidden costs.  
- Competitive advantage. 
- Strategic decision. 
- Development of 
capabilities across 
organizational boundaries. 
Risks - Post-contractual threat. - Loss of critical skills and 
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capabilities. 
- Service provider’s lack of 
necessary capabilities. 
Table 7. Main differences between TCE an RBV. From Espino‐Rodríguez et al. (2006). 
 
Madhok (2002) give the following description of the claimed limitations of TCE: “The TC 
theory of why firms exist (i.e., why firms in general would/should organize a particular 
activity internally) does not fully explain why a particular firm will/should (or 
would/should not) organize that activity hierarchically within its boundaries” (p. 541). He 
produces a table with a comparison of the theories: 
Table 8. Comparison of TCE and RBV 2. 
 Transaction cost theory Resource-based theory 
Broad theoretical arena Theory of the firm Theory of a firm 
Primary theoretical question Why do firms exist? Why do firms differ? 
Primary driver Search for efficient 
governance structure 
Search for competitive 
advantage 
Primary domain of interest Exchange and the 
transaction 
Production and firm 
resources/capabilities 
Primary focus of analysis Transaction attributes (e.g., 
asset specificity) 
Resource attributes (e.g. 
value, stickiness) 
Primary emphasis (Transaction) Costs. Firm resources, skills, 
knowledge, routines 
Table 8. Comparison of TCE and RBV. From Madhok (2002). 
 
McIvor (2009) compared the outsourcing positions of RBV and the TCA based on two 
variables: resource position, and potential for opportunism. He found that some of the 
predictions were contradictory and came up with a table summarizing the differences. 
Watjatrakul (2005) also identified cases where TCA and RBV differ in its predictions, 
summarized in a table. The table is reproduced in the data analysis section of this case 
study. According to Watjatrakul an asset/resource can be strategic and/or specific. Specific 
assets under TCT cannot be redeployed or transferred to other uses without a significant 
reduction in value and lead to a hold-up problem. Strategic resources in the Resource-
based view yield sustainable competitive advantage by exploiting opportunities in the 
market or neutralizing threats from competitors. 
Conner and Prahalad (1996) make a distinguishing factor of TCE out to be the emphasis 
on opportunism, and contrast this to a resource-based approach that does not emphasize 
opportunism. They suggest that the focus on either of these two elements is the main 
reason for why the choice of organizational mode may differ between the two theories.  
3.8.2 Complementariness of theories 
Langlois and Foss (1996) observes that these two traditions (the TCE and RBV) are 
regularly viewed as addressing the same phenomena; namely the existence, boundaries and 
internal organization of firms, and while they therefore be viewed as competing theories, 
Langlois and Foss emphasize the complementary aspects between the theories and the 
need for integrative effort. The same is done by several other authors (e.g. Neves et al., 
2013; Williamson, 1999, see McIvor, 2007 for more). Langlois and Foss (1996) concedes 
that TCA has been more operationalized of the two and has the more rigorous vocabulary, 
the capability view, they argues, have more plausible explanation mechanisms. Langlois 
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and Foss (1996) notes that Williamson changed his basic TCA formula to include 
competencies/capabilities in a 1991 paper: “Align transactions, which differ in their 
attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies in a 
discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way” (Williamson, 1991a, p.79). 
Langlois states that: “the notion of the firm as a bundle of capabilities may harmonize with 
key ideas of the post-Coase literature.” 
 
The paper “Strategy research: governance and competence perspective” (1999) by 
Williamson is dedicated to precisely the issue of the relationship between the two schools. 
In it he suggest that one possible way of viewing the relationship between the theories is 
that TCE informs the generic decision to outsource, while the RBV/competence 
perspective bring in particulars. Clusters of transactions and process considerations such 
as learning, path dependencies, technological opportunities, selection and complementary 
assets need to figure more prominently Williamson concedes, while at the same time 
urging operationalization of such features. He comes up with the following table as a 
guideline in extending the make-or-buy calculus to include such factors: 
 
Table 9. Levels of TCE and strategy. 
Level 1 Generic: How do alternative generic modes (markets, hybrids, firms, bureaus) 
compare for purposes of organizing transaction X? 
Level 2 Particular: How should firm A, with its pre-existing strengths and weaknesses 
(core competencies and disabilities), organize transaction X? 
Level 3 Fixed niche: How do the pre-existing strengths and weaknesses of firm A 
compare with those of its extant rivals with respect to market niche α1? 
Level 4 Variable niche: How do the pre-existing strengths and weaknesses of firm A 
compare with those of its extant and potential rivals with respect to niches 
described by (α1, α2; β1, β2, β3; γ)? 
Level 5 Repositioning: How should firm A, with its pre-existing strengths and 
weaknesses, reposition for the future in relation to the strategic situation (actual 
and potential rivalry; actual and potential market niches) of which it is a part or 
to which it can relate? 
Level 6 Strategizing: If firm A possesses monopoly power, how can it best deter and 
discipline actual and potential rivals? 
Table 9. From Williamson (1999). 
 
In the table above, he explains, that TCE traditionally have worked on level 1: “what is the 
best generic mode (market, hybrid, firm, or bureau) to organize X?”. By incorporating into 
the calculus aspects of the RBV it could instead operate on level 2: “How should firm A – 
which has pre-existing strengths and weaknesses (core competences and disabilities) – 
organize X?”. 
 
Langlois and Robertson (2002) provides some insight into how the outsourcing decision is 
based on capabilities, production cost, and transaction cost considerations: “Depending on 
its own capabilities relative to those of others, a particular firm may decide that combined 
production and transaction costs for any given input justify either internalization or 
outsourcing” (p.202)   
Cousins (2005) are of the opinion that, even though the two approaches may seem opposite 
to each other, this is not the case, and that any strategic approach to supply management 
should combine both of the approaches with a greater emphasis on either of the theories.  
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Neves et al (2013) concludes in a case study that the TCA and RBV, if one of them is used 
in isolation, may lead to wrong outsourcing decisions. They argue that the two theories 
should be used in a complementary way.  
Madhok (2002) calls for a shift away from a bilateral alignment (a focus on transaction- 
and governance structure particulars) toward a triangular alignment between governance 
structure, transaction, and resource attributes, and attempts in his paper to demonstrate 
how the identity as well as strategy of one particular company in influence the way its 
resources interact with the transaction, as well as how the firm choose to govern it. His 
then take a broader focus to include not just cost, but also skills and knowledge in the 
context of interfirm collaborative relations. The interdependence between cost and skills in 
the determination of firm boundaries by choice and “nature” is then treated. In the article 
he argues that Coase foresaw a need to discover the reasons why there is a different cost in 
organizing particular activities among different firms. 











Figure 7. The “triangular alignment hypothesis”. 
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Figure 7. Madhok’s “triangular alignment hypothesis”. From Madhok (2002). 
 
In the paper Madhok also refers to authors that points out that a firm can be viewed as 
being both a collection of resources as and a collectivity of transactions (Ulrich and 
Barney, 1984; Winter 1988). Williamson (1999) observes that the firm can also be viewed 
as a bundle of routines (from the evolutionary perspective). 
Argyres and Zenger (2007; 2009) set out to prove that the tendency in the existing 
literature to treat comparative capabilities as determinants that are dependent on 
transaction costs are mistaken. They argue that instead, capabilities and transaction cost 
determinants interact with each other dynamically, and that there are difficulties in 
conceptually distinguishing the two theories. The following passages are illustrative 
(2007): 
We contend that these concepts of specific asset investment and approapriable 
quasi rents are very closely related to, if not synonymous with, the resource-based 
concepts of firm specific capability and their associated rents. In theory, a firm-
specific capability can reside either within the boundaries of a focal firm or within 
the boundaries of a supplier. (p. 9) 
In summary, therefore, transaction cost logic can be understood to argue that 
efforts to generate unique capability through exchange with an outside supplier 
produce hazardous exchange conditions that promote integration. Thus, the desire 
to generate unique capability drives the decision to integrate (p. 11) 
The following citation seemingly directly addresses the question of the relationship of 
TCE and RBV: 
The distribution of specialized capabilities across firms and their buyers and 
suppliers at a particular point in time reflects a series of past decisions by these 
firms to either develop or not to develop capabilities internally. Thus, the 
possession of a capability today reflects a choice to internally develop (or 
purchase) that capability yesterday. These decisions, we argue, were likely driven 
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by comparative governance or transaction cost considerations. Consider the 
following example. A firm decides to internalize an activity at time 1 because 
performing this activity with the desired level of capability requires highly 
idiosyncratic investments—investments that suppliers are reluctant to make in the 
absence of carefully crafted safeguards. Due to the high costs of contractually 
creating and enforcing these safeguards, the firm chooses to integrate this 
capability development. As these specific investments are made over time, the firm 
develops the desired, superior capability to perform the activity, so that by time 2, 
the capability is fully developed, leaving no outside supplier with a comparable 
capability. Thereafter, the firm continues to be integrated (p. 12). 
 
Based on a consideration from both the TCE and RBV, Argyres and Zenger (2009) 
distinguish between four asset types which have implications for the make-or-buy 
decision. They produce the table below to illustrate: 
Table 10. Predicting integration. 
State of asset or activity Generic Unique (actual or potential) 




other bundle elements 
Outsource Outsource 
Table 10. From Argyres et al. (2009): 
 
Finally, Jain and Thietart (2013) argue that the effect of capabilities on the outsourcing 
dilemma integrates seamlessly into transaction cost reasoning if capabilities are regarded 
as shift parameters. Two effects of capabilities are distinguished: a change in production 
costs and a change in governance costs of the firm relative to the market. The result of 
such a process is that the frontier at which market governance gives way to firm 
governance shifts. This argument was allegedly demonstrated empirically. 
3.8.3 Empirical comparisons: 
Poppo and Zenger (1998) conducted statistical tests comparing the explanatory power of 
TCA, “measurement costs” and the knowledge based view in the make or buy decision in 
information services and came to the conclusion that a theory of the firm as well as a 
theory of boundary choice is likely to be complex, and will need integration from the 
traditions of TCE, the “knowledge-based view”, and measurement-cost explanations (the 
consideration that accurate measurements are costly to perform, and that internalizing an 
activity can avoid such costs). 
 
Barthélemy et al. (2006) used the transaction cost approach as well as the resource based 
view to empirically study outsourcing agreements. It developed an original approach of 
contract complexity and analyzed the links between contractual hazards (specificity and 
environmental uncertainty), the contractual aspect of outsourcing (control, incentives, 
penalties, price and flexibility clauses) and ex post transaction costs. It uses three 
measurements to assess the strategic importance of an outsourced activity: proximity to 
core business, switching costs and adaption costs. It claims the findings extend TCE’s 
validity for outsourcing of activities with strategic value. 
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3.8.4 Summary 
As seen in this section there is a whole genre of literature dealing with the relationship 
between RBV-theories and TCE. Most of them seem to call for an alignment of them, 
summed up in what Madhok (2002) calls the “triangular alignment hypothesis”. The 
relationship between the two traditions is treated in the clearest way, it seems, in 
Williamson (1999), and given a clever time-related explanation by Argyres and Zenger 
(2007), summed up in the citation above. Some have produced tables with the differences 
between the outsourcing-predictions of TCE and RBV, such as Watjatrakuls (2005). The 
insight from this table will be used in the analysis section of this thesis in order to test the 
data against other theories than TCE. 
3.9 Tautology criticism 
Both TCE and RBT have been subject to the criticism that the theories are tautological 
(Williamson, 1999, Barney, 2001). The tautology argument is that the assertions made by 
the theories are true by definition and hence not subject to empirical tests. 
Barney (2001) makes the point that parts of many theories can be reduced to tautologies. 
For instance the so-called Coasian tautology: “hierarchical forms of governance will 
replace market forms of governance when the costs of market governance are greater than 
the cost of hierarchical governance” (p. 42). Barney argues that being able to restate a 
theory a way that make it tautological can always be done, the issue however, is whether at 
least some of the elements of that theory have been parameterized in a way that makes it 
possible to generate testable empirical assertions.  The TCE for instance has parameterized 
the main characteristics of a transaction that enable the theory to hold predictions about the 
conditions where market governance is more expensive than hierarchy, which can be 
tested empirically. 
 
Penrose (1959) includes a comment on tautology and her theory of the Growth of the firm 
(p. 6). Two concerns Williamson (1999) pose to the competence perspective (or RBT 
presumably) are “obscure and often tautological definitions of key terms; and failures of 
operationalization” (p. 1093). 
 
This section on tautology was useful for the rest of the thesis to make the present 
researcher more aware of its dangers and the importance of being able to derive refutable 
propositions. 
3.10  Network theory 
The Network theory was developed by Swedish researchers in industrial marketing and 
international business  (Johanson & Mattsson 1987). It may explain some of the dynamics 
in third party agreements. It states that the existence of firms to some degree is 
interdependent. Therefore activities need to be coordinated. This takes place through firms 
in a network. Price is just one of several influencing factors here. To gain access to 
external resources and make it possible to sell products exchange relationships must be 
established with other firms. Such relationships can take time and efforts to establish and 
develop. The need for adjustments in the amount and type of products and services 
exchanged, as well as planning times for the exchange requires some form of coordination 
through either joint planning, or some sort of power exercised by one party over the other. 
Network position is a relevant concept in the theory as it describes the firm’s relationship 
with other firms. The network position is regarded as a market asset. The theory places 
much emphasis on the various interactive elements that the firms make in order to 
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facilitate the other firms in its network, such as exchange and adaption processes. The 
former being about testing how well the parties fit each other. This is not only a learning 
process, but also an adaption process.  
Figure 8. Network approach. 
 
Figure 8.  From Håkansson (1987). 
3.11  Social exchange and Resource-dependence theory 
Power may be a relevant variable in evaluating the desirability of outsourcing. Often 
considered the founder of social exchange theory, George C. Homans, made a call in a 
1958 article to make sociology more rigorous and view it as an economy. On power 
relations between parties, Richard M. Emerson, one of the major contributors to social 
exchange theory formalized a relationship which stated that power a has over b must be 
equal to the dependence of b over a in 1962. Stolte and Emerson wrote in 1977 about 
power as a function of position in a network. They also elaborated on more intricate 
dependence relations. Very similar methodologies have been applied in the study of firms 
as an article titled “Supply chains and power regimes: Toward an analytic framework for 
managing extended networks of buyer and Supplier Relationships” by Cox et al. from 
2001 is an example of.  
A business organizations theory which makes use of the concept of power view is the 
resource-dependence theory of Pfeffer and Salancik presented in “The External Control of 
Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective” (1978). Its basic arguments have 
been summarized as follow: “Organizations depend on resources  These resources 
ultimately originate from an organization's environment--> The environment, to a 
considerable extent, contains other organizations, The resources one organization needs 
are thus often in the hand of other organizations.  Resources are a basis of power.  
Legally independent organizations can therefore depend on each other.  Power and 
resource dependence are directly linked: Organization A's power over organization B is 
equal to organization B's dependence on organization A's resources.  Power is therefore 
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relational, situational and potentially mutual. A tradeoff it predicts is therefore between 
access to resources, and the risk of being victim of power abuse. The theory also predicts 
that customers are the ultimate resource that companies depend on. According to Shook et 
al. (2009, p. 15) Resource dependence theory could “prescribe the best means for 
obtaining such resources [resources that are critical to long-term organizational 
performance], and for managing the dependence relationships with supplier firms.” 
3.11.1 Critique against power-arguments 
The two theories immediately above, and to some extent the Network theory rely on a type 
of arguments involving the concept of power. Williamson (1991b) contains comments on 
the use of power arguments (see also Williamson 1981 and 1993). The following quote is 
illustrative: “power of two kinds is usefully distinguished within the strategy arena: market 
power and resource dependency. Transaction cost economics cautions against the over-use 
of power arguments of both kinds.” (p. 80). Part of the argument is the following:  
[…] strategizing is relevant principally to firms that possess market power – which 
are a small fraction of the total (ephemeral market advantages ignored). More 
importantly, I maintain that a strategizing effort will rarely prevail if a program is 
burdened by significant cost excesses in production, distribution, or organization. 
(p. 75)  
Another reason is that  
the standard transaction cost economics assumption that parties to a transaction 
adopt a relatively far-sighted approach (or quickly learn from mistakes, including the 
mistakes of others) has power-mitigating/vitiating effects. Such parties anticipate 
potential dependency conditions and organize with respect to them from the outset. 
Accordingly, dependencies that come as a surprise to unwitting victims under a 
resource dependency setup are priced out and elicit safeguards and related 
organizational responses under an approach in which the contracting process is 
examined in its entirely. (p.81) 
3.12  Marketing channels 
Heide (1994) conducted a review of the literature in the marketing channels tradition and 
found that its traditional research paradigm involved particular functions that are 
considered candidates for contracting out, or “functional spin-offs”. According to him the 
economic models in at least part of the literature involves a choice between internal and 
external governance and to some extent parallels the approach of TCE, although different 
types of costs are used as explanatory mechanisms. According to the American marketing 
association marketing channels are:  
 
A set of institutions necessary to transfer the title to goods and to move goods from 
the point of production to the point of consumption and, as such, which consists of 
all the institutions and all the marketing activities in the marketing process. 
 
A closely related, or alternative term, is “distribution channel” (Armstrong, 2009). 
Knemeyer and Murphy (2004) use a relationship marketing perspective, presumably also 
closely related, to study perceived performance of third-party logistics arrangements. In 
particular the effect of eleven relationship marketing factors on perceived 3PL 
performance was studied. It was found that six of these that were statistically significant. 
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Highlights were that opportunistic behavior was negatively correlated to trust, while prior 
satisfaction and 3PL reputation was positively so. Trust and communication was positively 
correlated to operations performance. According to Knemeyer and Murphy (2005) 
communication with the provider emerged as the one characteristic  that  had a statistically 
significant relationship with all four factors tested for; customer retention, customer 
referals, service recovery, and operational performance improvements of a sample size of 
388 users. 
 
Any particular piece of the theory on Marketing channels will not be included in the 
methods or analysis section of this thesis due to its to some extent parallel approach to 
TCE, as stated by Heide (1994). 
3.13  Other relevant literature 
This section will attempt to briefly outline some of theories and findings that do not 
obviously fit into any of the above categories, but which claims to explain at least part of 
the outsourcing decision. The section is divided into three parts. Theories, empirical 
findings, and summarizing remarks. 
3.13.1 Theories 
Of these the post contractual opportunism theory is one. It focus on quasi-rents made from 
the transaction (Nisticò, 2008). Quasi-rents are differs from economic rents in that they are 
a temporary phenomena. This theory focuses on opportunistic behavior arising from 
contractual incompleteness. This leads to something that is termed a hold up problem. Due 
to a fear of being in a weak bargaining position ex post agents might prefer to underinvest 
to avoid being tied to bad investments. When asset specificity should be high for the sum 
of the payoffs to be optimal this is particularly a problem as this may cause firms to 
underinvest. The hold up effect can be diminished by vertical integration. 
There are also specific theories concerning international outsourcing and the make or buy 
decision. Antras (2003) combines the property rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) 
with the Helpman-Krugman (1985) model of international trade and tries to explain the 
empirical shown fact that intermediate capital-intensive goods are often transacted within 
the boundaries of multinational firms, whereas labor-intensive goods more often are kept 
at closer proximity. He attempts to show that the residual rights of control may not suffice 
to induce suppliers to undertake desired levels of investment. Final good producers may 
therefore find it helpful to alleviate underinvestment their usual suppliers by contributing 
to relationship-specific investment. If such an investment is large enough it may be 
efficient to vertically integrate. Vertical increase its attractiveness if the capital intensity of 
intermediate input production increases. Antras and Helpman (2004) build on this model 
by considering two sectors with respectively high and low headquarter intensity which are 
different in productivity rates. The aim of that study is to investigate the effects of 
productivity differences on international trade, foreign direct investments and firms’ 
organizational choices. There are two countries in the model, the North where final as well 
as intermediate good producers are localized and wages are higher, and the South where 
there are lower wages and intermediate-good producers only. The model therefore gives 
the following trade-off for the producer of the final good with regards to the organizational 
form: between lower wages in the South and the benefits of lower fixed organizational 
costs such as quality control, supervision, marketing and so on in the North. The theory 
predicts that sectors that exhibits low headquarter intensity should not integrate because 
outsourcing means both lower fixed organization costs than would be the case with vertical 
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integration, and the advantage of not lowering the investment incentives of the supplier. It 
further states that only high productivity firms should vertically integrate with suppliers of 
intermediate inputs in the South, due to high productivity firms’ higher revenues and the 
possibility of facing higher organizational costs. Low productivity firms should outsource 
to the North, in the model. 
The adaption theory of the firm holds has as one of its central areas the impossibility of 
creating complete contracts due to uncertainty. The idea that adaption is an important part 
of organizations was launched by Simon in 1951 analyzing the employer-employee 
relationship. It says that there are two strategies the parties’ can choose under uncertainty: 
to negotiate a decision before uncertainty is resolved or to delegate decisional authority to 
a self interested agent who takes decisions when situations occur and uncertainty is 
resolved. These alternatives then imply a trade off between flexibility and opportunism. 
Mandar Dabhilkar (2010) argues that there often seems to be a tradeoff in outsourcing 
decisions between cost and flexibility, and backs up the claim using statistical data.  
Pirrong (1993) concentrate on the loss that parties in a transaction could suffer as 
consequence of delivery delays and other contractual hazards. They consider that these 
could be reasons for integration even in the absence of asset specificity. Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard (1999) from a marketing perspective made a theoretical model where 
opportunism is a determinant of transaction costs and where cooperation and formalization 
alleviate opportunism. They reportedly found that opportunistic behavior increases 
transaction costs, cooperative interaction limits bargaining costs, and that formalization 
reduces opportunism. Heide (1994) developed a typology of three different forms of 
governance and postulates therefore that there three main ways of organizing interfirm 
relationships; market governance, and “hard/unilateral/hierarcical” and “soft/bilateral” 
nonmarket governance, where the latter is much dependent on mutuality of interests. 
Achrol (1997) argues that in the 21
st
 century the trend is no longer huge, multidivisional, 
vertically integrated, companies, but rather leaner firms that specialize on one or a few 
areas of core competence. These leaner firms have to compete in a world based on large 
networks of closely knit alliances and partnerships with other highly specialized 
organizations. These large inter organizational clusters are more than the sum of their parts 
and may be referred to as network organizations. Aas et al. (2008) argues that the 
evolution of gradually more complex supply chains makes the logistics outsourcing 
decision more difficult and that a main reason for this is the increased number of 
interorganisational links that appear in complex supply chains. Hence dyadic approaches 
commonly used in the outsourcing literature do not provide adequate decision support in 
outsourcing decisions, they suggest.  
 
Vlaar et al (2007) developed a framework of how to analyze the tradeoffs in formalization 
in inter-organizational relationships apparently using the concept of dialectics. In the 
framework, formalization is presented as a duality, involving tradeoffs and eventuating in 








Figure 9. Framework for formalization in inter-organizational relationships “based 
on dialectics”. 
 
Figure 9. From Vlaar et al. (2007). 
 
The article emphasize that formalization creates contradictory forces that are present 
simultaneously and should be recognized and managed. For instance, when managers 
apply formalization in order to control their partners, this may introduce rigidity in 
decision-making as well as making the other parties more likely to cover themselves 
against risk. It provides a discussion of different effects of formalizing business 
relationships. This theory may not explicitly claim to explain part of the outsourcing 
decision, but it seems nevertheless to be of such an obvious relevance to it that it is 
included in this survey. 
3.13.2 Empirical findings 
Of the global sourcing literature there is Trent and Monczka (2005). The paper found 
seven characteristics of companies that have achieved what they call global sourcing 
excellence; that is being particularly effective at global sourcing. These are: executive 
commitment to global sourcing, rigorous and well-defined processes, availability of 
needed resources, integration through information technology, supportive organizational 
design, structured approaches to communication, and methodologies for measuring 
savings. It was stated in the study that few, if any, organizations demonstrate all the 
features presented above.  
Carson et al. (2006) found indications that showed that formal and relational contracts 
each have advantages and disadvantages and are not simply substitutes, and that relational 
contracts are not resistant to opportunism. Audi et al (2010) found five coordination 
mechanisms that contribute to enhanced information sharing, coordinated logistics 
activities, and shared benefits. Akbar et al (2005) found a correlation between the level of 
interorganizational trust and exchange performance. 
3.13.3 Summarizing remarks 
Clearly there are many theories explaining elements of the outsourcing decision. Nisticò 
(2008) speculates that the analysis of firms has developed along two different lines, one 
concerning the factors affecting the firms’ boundaries, and the other one relating to the 
internal structure of the firm. She claims that a grand unified theory is commonly 
considered not to exist. Further, among the various theories it is often difficult to 
distinguish which elements are similar in essence but goes under different names, or which 
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elements are different. One common characteristic which is easy to distinguish and is 
common to many of the theories are uncertain environments. Other common features are 
incomplete contracts and opportunistic behavior. Nisticò (2008) refers to authors such as 
Gibbon (2005), Garrouste and Saussier (2005), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) who 
have called for a unified and formalized model by pointing to the many theories out there 
covering various aspects of a firm.  
3.14  Case studies and prescriptive approaches of relevance to this 
master thesis: 
3.14.1 Descriptive, predictive and prescriptive properties 
An issue which sometimes appeared in the process of surveying theories dealing with the 
boundaries of firms was the distinction between descriptive, prescriptive and predictive 
theories. Even though the original function of a theory, such as TCE, may have been to 
describe and predict these boundaries, as the theory’s popularity in business grew, 
functions of the theory is transformed to also include a prescriptive aspect. Further, this 
may reinforce its predictive value. The distinction between descriptive, prescriptive and 
predictive values may therefore in some cases be complex. As this issue is on the margin 
of this study, no further attempts was made to pursue this. 
3.14.2 Case studies 
The author had some trouble finding relevant case studies from any of the major traditions 
on the boundaries of the firm to use as a basis or a point of reference for the present one, 
despite serious attempts at database searching and communication with some relevant 
people. The only relevant case studies found was “Outsourcing from the perspectives of 
TCE and RBV: a multiple case study” by Neves et al. (2013) and “Offshore outsourcing of 
professional services: A transaction cost economics perspective” by Ellram et al. from 
2008, “The outsourcing dilemma: a composite approach to the make or buy decision” by 
Fill and Visser (2000) and a multiple case study by Jaswa (2010) relating to software 
development and using a customized framework of the one in Williamson (2002; 2008) 
was found. This latter case study was made at UC Berkeley and advised directly by 
Williamson, and, out of the case studies mentioned, provided the best illustration on how 
certain things could be done. There were too many differences in the case(s) however (it 
was a multiple case study) for it to serve as a model for the present case study. 
The procedure that Fill and Visser suggests for outsourcing evaluation is based on Beulen 
et al. (1994) overall outsourcing model and consists of asking several questions covering 
the three areas contextual factors, strategy and structure, and costs. Cost evaluation was 
supported by Williamsons 1979 framework. The results are then judged qualitatively and 
as a whole. The framework was used “as a means to encourage managers to appraise the 
range and complexity that needs to be considered when making decisions about 
outsourcing” (p. 49). 
 
The present master thesis case study is using the framework described in Williamson 
(2002; 2008) in order to test its propositions as it hopefully can produce clear refutable 
hypotheses and hence does not have  the very high degrees of freedom which may arise 
from other more “managerial” methods such as described in the paragraph above.  
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3.14.3 Non-case study prescriptive approaches 
In an article from 2000 entitled “New dimensions of outsourcing: a combination of 
transaction cost economics and the core competencies concept” Ulli Arnold makes an 
attempt at combining TCE and the core competencies approach. In this scheme, a firm 
should answer three questions before making the outsourcing decision (p. 26-27):  
 
1) Is the activity highly specific?  
2) Is the activity strategically important? (Sometimes it is not helpful to outsource 
activities with low specificity because they are very important for a company's 
ability to survive).  
3)  Is the activity a core competence, a central part of competitive advantage? 
 
This approach was not taken for the following reasons: if an activity involves a core 
competence, it is probably sufficiently obvious for management that they should not 
outsource this, and it does not take into account uncertainty or the ease at which contract 
can be implemented. On the other hand one could probably have derived three testable 
propositions from these three questions, supported by the literature. In any case it was 
chosen not to do this as such a construction of propositions would have mean a more 
eclectic mix of core theories than the ones presently used (Williamson 2002; 2008). 
 
Other approaches are “Outsourcing: guidelines for a structured approach” (2003) by 
Franceschini et al and McIvor’s “A practical framework for understanding the outsourcing 
process” (2000). A central element in both of these is to compare internal with external 
capabilities, much like a SWOT analysis. Neither was adopted as main framework for this 
thesis as they are prescriptive. This means that they are more geared towards making 
managers conscious about complex decisions and only contains propositions in an implicit 
way. Further, such propositions are in most cases borrowed from “core theory” such as 
TCE and RBV. 
3.15  Summary 
This literature survey has attempted to cover the essential insights from the academic fields 
relevant to this case study. This form was chosen due to the surveys main objectives given 
in the introduction: to find out what kind of theory could be best applied to the Havyard 
case in order to facilitate the research questions concerning outsourcing, and to obtain a 
satisfactory level of understanding of the relevant literature. It also attempted to find 
industry specific literature.  
 
After the introduction there was a section on definitions and relevant statistics on 
outsourcing. This was useful for the research as a whole as background knowledge, even 
though it may not have been used directly in the method or analysis sections. Then a 
section on the drivers for outsourcing followed, which was usefully used as a reference 
point in the analysis section which attempted to answer research question “2: What are the 
main considerations facing Havyard in evaluating outsourcing of the mapped activities?”. 
A section on 3/4PLs, intermediaries, and categorizations and properties of business 
relationships followed. These first two subsections were included as they were basic 
concepts describing phenomena involved in the thesis case. This also applies to the third of 
these, even though a potential use of some of these models was identified that goes beyond 
the scope of the thesis. Industry specific literature was then identified, even though in the 
end, this literature had little direct implications for the method or analysis sections.  
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The rest of the literature survey then dealt with theories and findings which claims or 
appears to have implications for the outsourcing question, or more generally the 
boundaries of the firm. An attempt at a summary of the three schools commonly grouped 
under the name of the “New institutional economics” followed. The first subsection, on 
TCE, attempted to cover all the main elements in this theory. There were two main reasons 
for this. The first was so that the author could become well familiar with the theory which 
became gradually clearer was to be one of the cornerstones of the case study. The other 
reason was to connect what seemed to be the main insights with the relevant references for 
the benefit of any interested reader. As the whole section became perhaps unjustifiably 
long as a result of this, it was arranged so that it started with the most relevant subsections 
for the case study as a whole. A section on agency theory then followed. This piece had 
some relevance to the study of information flows in the analysis section. The subsequent 
part on property rights theory did not have any such relevance, and the explanation for its 
inclusion is to facilitate the main objectives of the survey. 
 
The next chapter was on RBV-related theories. These theories were soon considered the 
strongest contestants to TCE in being the main theoretical foundation of the case study. 
For this reason some details of the origins, content and offshoots are covered, the main 
result being an addition to the total understanding of the matter. Some of the core 
predictions of the RBV-theory were used to compare the data with an alternative theory. 
The basis for these predictions were mainly codified in the table of Watjatrakul (2005), 
reproduced in the next chapter on the relationship between TCE and theories in the RBV-
tradition. The material in this chapter was essential to increase the authors understanding 
of this relationship, and hence how to relate to the two theories in the case study. A short 
chapter then follows which attempt to illustrate the criticism both TCE and RBV have 
faced about the theories being tautological. The section is arguably about an important 
concept in research, and also served a useful purpose in making the present researcher 
more aware of the importance of being able to derive refutable propositions from theories, 
as well as testing these. 
 
A chapter on Social exchange theory and Resource-dependence theory followed, which is 
relevant to the case as it codifies power aspects of trade relationships. In the course of the 
research it was discovered that TCE take much of the same power arguments into account 
in terms such as “small numbers bargaining relations”, and assumptions such as “relative 
far-sightedness”. The findings from the next section on Marketing channels were not 
included in the methods or analyses section as they to some extent parallel the approach of 
TCE, as stated by Heide (1994). The next section on “other relevant literature” contains all 
those theories and empirical findings relevant to the surveys objectives that did not fit in 
under any of the sections before it. Among other models, one based on dialectics 
developed by Vlaar et al (2007) was presented here, and was seriously considered for use 
in the analysis section in order to identify the main forces to be reckoned with arising from 
hypothetical situations of outsourcing different variations of the mapped activities. In the 
end it was decided against this due the need to define the limits boundaries of the study.  
The last section deals with specific works which are case studies or prescriptive 
approaches and which were found to be relevant to this case study. For each of them, their 
main approaches are discussed, as well as why it was decided not to use any of them as a 





4.0  Propositions 
 
 
1. High asset specificity, high uncertainty, and high costliness of implementing sufficient 




2. Low asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are strongly associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
3. High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and high costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are strongly associated with employees’ recommendation for 
internal governance.  
4. Low asset specificity, high uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
5. High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
6. High asset specificity, high uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
internal governance. 
7. Low asset specificity, low uncertainty, and high costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards give ambiguous employees’ recommendation. 
8. Low asset specificity, high uncertainty, and high costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards give ambiguous employees’ recommendation. 
9. Employees’ recommendations will in general be more favorable to outsourcing in the 
high demand future scenario. 
10. The need to use highly sensitive information *3 in the mapped activities is associated 
with employees' recommendation not to outsource. 
11. Considerations that clearly exclude the possibility of outsourcing exist for 
only a minority of the mapped activities. 
 
 
* “Employees’ recommendation” are based on employees’ reported belief of whether the 




 Note that the propositional forms involving these three variables have not explicitly 
been found in Williamsons works, but are inferred mainly from Williamson (2002; 2008). 
The use of “employees’ recommendation” instead of the current state of ownership of the 




 “Highly sensitive information” refers to information that, in the hands of competitors, 
may reveal aspects of Havyards core competence that may be exploited by competitors and 
cause significant damage (including loss of advantage) to Havyard.  
 
On the basis of the research questions (given in the case description) eleven propositions 
was constructed. The first eight of these have their basis in the framework presented in 
Williamson (2002; 2008). From the literature survey it appeared that this framework was 
the most complete and well defined for the problem of the case. A consideration to keep in 
mind in testing these propositions is that the classical TCE-predictions may not have been 
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realized yet as operations are relatively new. This should have no effect on the test of the 
form of the propositions in this case study, as these are testing the “employees’ 
recommendations” and not the actual ownership of the activity. However, any potential 
delays in a change of the ownership of the activities due to the recent start up of operations 
may be significantly reflected in the recommendations given by the employees if 
individual inertia is present in a significant degree. If this is the case then it could perhaps 
account for some cases where the recommendations are “not to outsource” when TCE-
would predict “outsource”. 
 
The remaining three propositions do not have specific origins in the literature, and is based 
mostly upon theorizing by the author of this thesis presented below. Proposition 9 is meant 
to facilitate the “supporting research question” number 1. Its basis is the suspicion that a 
large increase in demand and activity will make the outsourcing option more desirable. 
Such an increase in demand may for instance reduce any potential effort of individuals in 
defending individual job positions during outsourcing transition, as favorable 
compensation schemes are more likely. As a result, individuals may be more likely to 
answer “recommend outsourcing” in this scenario. That these operations are new (from 
2012) and if Havyard initially outsourced less than what would be optimal for a risk 
neutral agent (so for instance, if operations started small and a lot of unknown 
customization was needed in the beginning so that outsourcing would require relatively 
high set-up costs) may further enhance the effect that a large increase in demand will make 
the outsourcing option more desirable 
 
As a side note, one could perhaps also argue that because these operations in Havyard are 
relatively new, the effect would be the opposite: that many activities would be outsourced 
in the start-up phase if the firm is risk averse in an attempt to limit sunk cost.  
Proposition 10 is meant to facilitate the “supporting research question” number 3. Its 
theoretical basis has similarities to proposition 8. Proposition 9 might be true because 
Havyards operation is relatively new, and therefore one of the factors contributing to the 
decision to have activities internally is because Havyard does not like the added risk of 
information disclosure in involving 3PLs where it should not obviously do so. Proposition 
11 is meant to facilitate the “supporting research question” number 2. It has similar 














5.0  Research method 
5.1 Introduction 
In addition to following formal procedures suggested from written material, the method(s) 
employed as well as the order of their implementation was to a large extent dictated by the 
research questions (RQs) given in the introduction. The thesis followed several of the 
guidelines suggested in the book Case Study Research: Design and Methods by Robert K. 
Yin (2003; 2014), as well as some elements of pragmatic methodology presented in 
Williamson ( 2007; 2008). These are presented over the rest of this chapter.  
 
Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). He mentions five 
different steps in the case study research process:  
 
1. Designing case studies. 
2. Conducting case studies: preparing for data collection. 
3. Conducting case studies: collecting the evidence.  
4. Analyzing case study evidence.  
5. Reporting case studies. 
 
One of the priorities in the initial stages of this study is to obtain a good understanding of 
the case. The main efforts will therefore be spent on this aspect before the application of 
relevant theories can be decided on. Understanding the case involves data gathering. The 
initial stages must also include a mapping of all the transportation related activities in 
order to map the candidates for outsourcing. 
5.2 Method of the literature survey 
The author did not have prior knowledge of literature on the outsourcing decision and 
therefore attempted to cover a large area in order to accumulate a basic theoretical 
knowledge and increase the probably that the most relevant theory or theories was being 
applied to the case problem. Some theories were not evaluated in as much detailed as 
perhaps desirable, while others perhaps too much.  
 
While the relevant industry-specific literature was found to be of modest scale, the volume 
of literature on both outsourcing and 3- and 4PL’s is very large and the literature survey 
above does not pretend to be a rigorously methodical review of any of the fields. Relevant 
literature was found mostly using different combinations of the techniques below. 
 
1) performing search on Google scholar or directly in academic databases such as 
ProQuest or ScienceDirect  and informally judging their relevance based on a 
combination of title and abstract, number of citations, and/or author,  
2) reading about the reference in other authoritative papers, or 
3) learning about the reference from people. 
 
5.3 Research design: 
Yin (2014, p 28) defines a research design as “a logical plan from getting from the initial 
set of questions to be answered to some set of conclusions about these answers”. A 
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research design is more than a work plan as its purpose is to avoid ending up in a situation 
where the data evidence collected does not address the research questions. The design 
therefore solves a logical and not a logistical problem. 
 
This case study will use the five components Yin provides as a basis for a research design 
(p. 29):  
 
1. A case study’s questions: Some of the initial tasks are to clarify the research questions. 
It is important to make sure that the same questions are not already well covered in 
previous studies. An area worked on simultaneously with this point is attempting to 
precisely describing the relevant internal processes, in order to narrow down the set of 
possible research questions. This was originally decided by the author to be done by 
January, but in reality refinements were not finished until some time after this. 
 
The question arises from whose point of view should it be evaluated if more 
outsourcing should take place? What is good for Havyard may be different from what 
is good for the supply chain as a whole, what is good in the short run may be less good 
in the long run. The author will try to mention whenever this problem is present (it 
turned out to be none). Due to the short history of this type of trading there is little 
historical data present, and perhaps little point in trying to quantify such operational 
measures in evaluating if outsourcing should take place. There is also the problem of 
how to measure the desirability of outsourcing the various activities may have to be 
decided upon. Long term lower costs, increased revenue or perhaps increased profits 
long term? In this thesis “long run economization on cost” was chosen. 
2. Identify the study propositions: For some time it was questioned whether propositions 
should be included in the study. The author thought perhaps it was less interesting to 
test the propositions commonly used in testing TCE as only one firm was included in 
the study so that generalizability could therefore not be implied based on statistical 
methods. 
3. Unit of analysis – the “case”: This involves at least two different points: defining the 
case, and bounding the case. Bounding the case refers to temporal, spatial and other 
concrete boundaries. The temporal boundaries for the study are from approximately 
September 2013 to June 2014. Other specific boundaries for the case are the three 
scenarios of demand in 2016, of which only two was used in the interviews. The unit 
of analysis will be the transactions between Havyard and the (most favorable for 
Havyard) 3PL involved in governing the mapped activities. Point 3 helps distinguish 
data about the case or the phenomena from data external to the case or the context.  
4. The logic linking the data to propositions: Basically how to analyze the data. More on 
this below under “analyzing the data”. 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings. This is mostly relevant for quantitative studies 
where a significance level needs to be set. In case studies an alternative strategy is to 
identify and address rival explanations to the findings. The most relevant candidate 
alternative theories seem to be the ones associated with the Resource-based view. 
5.4 Four principles of data collection: 
Yin (2014) describes four principles behind collecting data. These are: 
1. Use multiple sources of evidence: A study on case study methods found that the case 
studies where different sources of evidence were used were rated higher for overall 
quality than the single source studies (COSMOS Corporation, 1983, referred to on p. 
119 in Yin, 2014). Yin gives the analogy of navigation to explain why multiple sources 
 63 
of evidence is important; a more precise location of an object is found by looking at the 
intersection of various reference points (Yardley, 2009). Such data triangulation help 
strengthen the construct validity of the study. 
2. Create a case study database. Most of the database will be stored on a computer during 
the study. To increase the reliability of the study, field notes taken in a scrap-book may 
be scanned into the database at the end of the study period. The same applies to case 
study documents collected throughout the study.. A bibliography was also planned to 
be continuously updated into a text document for easy overview as well as chronology 
in the collecting of material. 
3. Maintain a chain of evidence. This is done to increase the reliability of the information 
in a case study. It means that the reader of the case should be able to trace all the steps 
from research questions to conclusions as well as from the conclusions to research 
questions. It implies that no original evidence shall be lost. 
4. Exercise care when using data from electronic sources. This point refers to being time 
conscious about how much time to spend finding and probing such sources, how much 
to cross-check sources used, how to relate to social media sites such as Facebook or 
Twitter. For the latter, a caution is that ownership claims may not necessarily be 
accurate.  
 
The study will be largely based on interviews, but also other data collected from Havyard. 
It was considered whether speaking to the 3PL K+N was a good idea, but it was decided 
against it as only one of the mapped activities today is outsourced, and therefore K+N do 
not have intimate knowledge of the other activities. 
A variety of data sources will be used in order to ensure triangulation: 
Table 11. Data sources used in case study. 
 Sources of data 
Data collection Internal External (to the firm) 
Primary - Interviews with four 
employees from across 
the company: Chief 
procurement officer 
(CPO) in Havyard group 
AS, Purchasing manager 
(PM) in Havyard ship 
technology AS, Project 
manager (PJM) in 
Havyard design & 
solutions AS, and 
Service coordinator (SC) 
in Havyard ship 
technology AS. 
- Observation in the 
Havyard Group 
(Fosnavaag-offices) 
during the initial phases 
- Considered interview 
with Kuehne+Nagel, but 
did not do as they would 
have no knowledge of 
the relevant activities 
they were not involved 
in. 
- Obtain understanding of 
constraints imposed by 
states customs and 
Incoterms. 
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of the study. 
Secondary - Outsourcing strategy 
documents and similar. 
- Planned: historical data 
of how many such 
packages have been sent, 
their origin and 
destination location and 
firm, their weights, size, 
fragility, value, true and 
promised delivery times, 
how handling and 
transportation was 
organized in each of 
these instances, if there 
is any recurring hold 
ups. This information 
was instead provided in 
interviews. 
- Example of batch-list. 
- Example of Certificate 
of insurance from 
insurance company. 
- Example of LC-letter 
from bank. 
- Relevant theory (TCE, 
RBV, industry specific, 
Incoterms.) 
 
Table 11. Composed by the author. 
 
The key informants were, as stated in the table above, the CPO, PM, PJM and SC. In 
addition to sporadic contact with the informants via e-mail and telephone, including the 
review of key tables and information, four main rounds of interviews were done. The first 
one was semi-structured and face-to-face at Havyards main office in Fosnavåg with both 
the CPO of Havyard group and the PM in Havyard Ship Technology present 
simultaneously (Havyard 2013b). It was aimed at getting a good initial understanding of 
the case.  
 
The second one was a semi structured phone interview with the same two subjects as well 
as the most relevant operative employee. The interviews were initially prepared to be 
implemented in a structured way using a questionnaire and Likert scale, but it became 
apparent during the interviews that a less structured approach worked better (Havyard 
2014h, Havyard 2014i). It was geared towards a deeper understanding of the processes as 
well as the views on outsourcing of the activities. 
 
The third round was structured around the specific model that it had been decided would 
be the cornerstone of the study. The questions asking if they believed outsourcing would 
be cost saving for Havyard in the longer run was asked at the very end to avoid 
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interference with the questions feeding the TCE model (Havyard 2014l; Havyard 2014m; 
Havyard 2014n; Havyard 2014o).  
 
The fourth round was a questionnaire-table sent out and returned by e-mail were CPO and 
PJM was asked to rate on a five point Likert scale the degree of sensitivity of the various 
information used in the mapped activities, as well as providing comments (Havyard 2014p; 
Havyard 2014r). A follow-up to this questionnaire was performed in order to see if 
convergence of answers between the two participants would take place if they were told 
about the discrepancies and asked to reevaluate the answers (Havyard 2014s; Havyard 
2014t). The information flow table was reviewed by PM and then CPO (Havyard 2014g; 
Havyard 2014u). 
 
There may be difficulties present in extracting knowledge from subjects via interviews. 
For instance, one of the phone interviews took about one and a half hour, and naturally the 
interviewee will to some extent grow tired. An obvious solution is to scatter out the 
interviews, and be very well prepared in terms of what to hope to achieve with the 
interview. 
5.5 Analyzing the data 
5.5.1 General strategies 
According to Yin (2014) this can be especially difficult because the techniques still have 
not been well defined. It describes four general strategies for analyzing the data especially 
useful if no priorities for what to analyze and why is established by other means (p. 132). 
The strategy followed in conducting the present study does not correspond perfectly with 
either, but is a mixture of all:  
a. Relying on theoretical propositions. “[…] the propositions would have shaped 
your data collection plan and therefore would have yielded analytic priorities” 
(p, 136): In the beginning phases of this case study only research questions, not 
theoretical propositions had been formed. These research questions guided the 
author to map the various activities, and to the idea that of considering these 
activities in the light of the most suitable candidate in the pre existing literature. 
When it became apparent that this candidate theory was TCE, theoretical 
propositions were also included. 
b. Working your data from the “ground up”. This strategy emphasis “playing with 
the data” and noticing patterns and seeing if the data suggests any useful 
concepts.  
c. Developing a case description: This one emphasizes describing the case in a 
good way. Although this is not the main goal in itself for the current thesis, 
such as some, especially perhaps sociological studies, it is a big part of it. 
d. Examine rival explanations. 
5.5.2 Criteria for interpreting a case study’s findings.  
Finding and evaluating rival explanations or solutions to the findings are of relevance here. 
The reason why it is included in the research design is that one all ready in the design 
phase will start anticipating these alternative explanations and can include data gathering 
to also cater for these. In addition Yin describes five specific techniques that can be used 
with any of the general strategies above.  These are: 
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1. Pattern matching. Compares an empirically based pattern with predicted ones made 
before data was collected. 
2. Explanation building. A special type of pattern matching. The goal is to analyze the 
case study data by building an explanation about the case. 
3. Time-series analysis. Less relevant. 
4. Logic models. Less relevant. 
5. Cross-case synthesis. Less relevant. 
Of these, the analysis in this case study will mostly make use of the pattern matching and 
explanation building techniques. An important point is made by Yin: “Throughout, a 
persistent challenge is to produce high-quality analyses, which require attending to all the 
evidence collected, displaying and presenting the evidence apart from any interpretation, 
and considering alternative interpretations.” (p. 132) In testing the TCE-propositions, there 
was a danger of being inaccurate when translating the input to the model. It may be a place 
where researcher bias can arise if not careful.  
5.5.3 Four principles for a high-quality analysis: 
Yin (2014, p. 187) claim that no matter what analytic strategy or technique one use, there 
are at least four principles of analysis that underlie all good social science research. They 
are the following: 
1. One’s analysis should demonstrate that one attended to all the evidence. The 
analysis should show how you sought to use as much evidence as was available, 
and the interpretation should account for all this evidence and leave no loose ends. 
2. The analysis should, if possible, address all plausible rival explanations. 
3. The analysis should address the most significant aspect of your case study 
(avoiding excessive dwelling on irrelevant issues). 
4. Use one’s own prior, expert knowledge in the case study. Demonstrate awareness 
of current thinking and discourse about the topic to be studied. 
5.6 Criterias for judging the quality of research designs: 
Yin (2014) says that four tests are commonly used to establish the quality of empirical 
social research. They are listed below together with some of the means I have used to 
ensure their success: 
 
 Construct validity: This means that the correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied should be identified. To ensure that this is satisfied I will 
use multiple sources of evidence, established a good chain of evidence, and have 
key informants review parts of the thesis.  
 Internal validity: Means having good explanations for casual relationships. Not 
trying to conceal that there are other factors that influence the matter studied, or 
failing in trying to exhaust the list of possible influential factors. This criterion is 
not used for descriptive or exploratory studies where such explanations are not 
needed. Such explanations are given in the concluding chapters. 
 External validity: Is about defining the domain where the studies findings can be 
generalized. Also given in the concluding sections.  
 Reliability: Demonstrating that the data collection procedures or other operations 
of a study can be repeated with the same results.  To address this I will store all my 
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data in a case study database, as well as making sure the text makes it clear where 
data is collected from. 
5.7 Reporting case studies 
Yin (2014, p. 176) identifies six alternative compositional structures for the reporting of 
case studies used for illustrative purposes. They are linear analytic, comparative, 
chronological, theory building, suspense, unsequenced structures. 
 
Out of these, the present case study report will identify the most with the first one which 
allegedly is the most common one. Three procedures for composing a case study report is 
suggested (p. 195): 
 
1. When and how to start composing. This refers to an advice to start composing the 
report in the earlier stages of the case study mainly due to a claimed high risk of 
writers block due to the high level of freedom in customizing the report. 
2. Case identities: real or anonymous? The general advice here is that the most desirable 
option is to disclose the identities of both the case and the individuals, within the 
constraints of protecting human subjects. 
3. Reviewing the draft case study: a validating procedure. This refers to an advice to have 
the draft report reviewed by not just peers, but also informants and participants of the 
study. This can strengthen construct validity. 
In addition the need to orientate a case study report for the intended audience is 
emphasized. 
5.8 Pragmatic methodology 
The present research will subscribe to four considerations associated with pragmatic 
methodology and presented in Williamson (2007; 2008). These are:  
 
1. Keeping it simple, which involves stripping away inessentials and focusing on first 
order effects. In time, qualifications, refinements and extensions can be introduced. 
Attempting to keep it simple requires the student of complexity to prioritize. Milton 
Friedman (1997, p. 196) said: “most phenomena are driven by a very few central 
forces. What a good theory does is to simplify, it pulls out the central forces and 
gets rid of the rest”. 
2. Getting it right. This involves working out the logic involved and accurately 
translating it into mathematics, diagrams, or words etc. 
3. Make it plausible. This involves preserving contact with the phenomena and keep 
away from fanciful constructions. 





6.0 Data analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This section is divided into five main chapters. The first one, “Information flows in 
activities”, aims to test proposition 10 and answer the supporting RQ3. The second one, 
“Considerations of outsourcing in the activities”, is meant to test proposition 11 and 
attempts to answer the supporting RQ2. The third chapter is the TCE-propositions. This 
section tests proposition 1 through 8, and attempts to answer the main research question. 
The fourth chapter is “Proposition about present vs. future scenario” and is testing 
proposition 9, and also attempts to answer the last part of the supporting RQ1. The last 
chapter, “Comparison with RBV-predictions”, explores the data in the light of what is here 
considered the main alternative theory. 
6.2 Information flows in activities 
This section aims to test proposition 10: “The need to use highly sensitive information in 
the activities is associated with employees' recommendation not to outsource”. It also 
attempts to answer the supporting RQ3: “What type of information is needed to be shared 
with a 3PL in order to outsource the mapped activities?” 
6.2.1 Sensitivity of information 
An understanding of how sensitive each bit of information is considered to be is required 
to test this proposition. For this purpose attempts were made at identifying and isolating 
the various information segments used in the relevant processes. Then on the basis of this a 
questionnaire was made were participant were to rate and comment on the degree of 
sensitivity of the information. The questionnaire used a five point Likert scale ranging 
from “not sensitive at all” to “highly sensitive information”, where the definition used of 
the latter is given on the propositions page at the top. The questionnaire also asked whether 
there were any relevant pieces of information missing from the main table. It was sent and 
returned by e-mail. Two employees, CPO and PJM were separately asked to fill it out. The 
results are given in the table below. 
 
* x is answer of CPO. + is for PJM. 
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(volume, size, and 
weight of goods in 
batch) 
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x    + Large 
discrepancy 
 
The price of the 




    x+   
The price of the 
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batches that end 
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Both of the above 
at the same time 
(same batch) 
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reloading hub(s)) 
 x +     
The delivery times 
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Both of the above 
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“project” 
   x +   
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pays suppliers for 
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during what 
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one “project” 
    x+   
The delivery times 
and places for all 
the batches from 
 x +     
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what Havyard 
defines as one 
“project” 
   x +  CPO: What is 
delivered in 






The price end 
customer pays 
Havyard for all the 
goods purchased in 
what Havyard 
defines as one 
“project” 
    x+   
The delivery times 
and places for all 




  x+     
The corresponding 
other terms and 
conditions (the rest 
of the contract) 
    x+   
Any potential 
adaptations/change
s in delivery times 
and/or places with 
end customer 
x  +   Some 
discrepancy 
CPO: Not 




bank governing the 
payment from end 
customer to 
Havyard 
    x+   
Table 12. Composed by the author. 
 












(2) (3) Somewhat 
sensitive 
information  






  x  + Some 
discrepancy 
CPO: May show 
sensitive prices, but 




x  +   Some 
discrepancy 
CPO: Not sensitive. 
EUR1 
document 
x    + Large 
discrepancy 





x    + Large 
discrepancy 
CPO: Insurance is a 
total insurance 
policy and have no 
value for our 
competitors. 
Table 13. Composed by the author. 
 






(2) (3) Somewhat 
sensitive 
information 
















x    + Large 
discrepancy 
CPO: This is 
project-specific 
information and 
have little value for 
competitors. PJM: 
This information is 
also contractually 
not allowed to share 
with third party. 








included in a 
future batch 
x    + Large 
discrepancy 
CPO: It has no 
value for 
competitors to 
know this.  
Country of 
origin 





















  x  + Some 
discrepancy 
CPO: Somewhat 
sensitive, but not 






  x  + Some 
discrepancy 
CPO: Somewhat 
sensitive, but not 
highly sensitive. 
Table 14. Composed by the author. 
 
As can be seen in the 19 of the 32 pieces of information used in the questionnaire, the 
participants were in close agreement on the level of sensitivity. In the remaining 13 
however there are discrepancies. Of these six were of only some magnitude, while seven 
were of a large magnitude. In all the cases of discrepancies in the answers the CPO 
answered that information was less sensitive than what the PJM did.  A new questionnaire 
was sent to the participants containing only the pieces of information containing the 
discrepancies, in an attempt to hopefully achieve a convergence of opinion. The main 
gains of this follow-up questionnaire were that more comments were gathered. Only one 
placement on the Likert scale was changed. 
 
Speculating about the reasons behind some of the discrepancies, one possible explanation 
may be that CPO did to a lesser extent that PJM took into account the informational side of 
the contractual obligations with suppliers, and hence thought more in terms of any direct 
harm that could come to Havyard from information disclosure. The comments given by the 
informants support such an explanation. It would not seem to account for all the 
discrepancies however. 
 
According to PM (Havyard 2014a), K+N do in principle have access to both the price paid 
by Havyard to suppliers, and the prices paid by end customer to Havyard. If K+N wanted 
to see the former they could look at the customs invoice when they receive the goods at 
consolidation hub. However, most often the goods are not delivered in full in the same 
batch, and therefore it is difficult to know the correct (total) price(s) for each supplier. 
When Havyard has added invoice with the prices end customer pay, a batch may include 
goods from one to five different suppliers, which also often are not delivered in full. The 
true underlying buying and selling prices are then difficult for a 3PL to gain knowledge of. 
In aggregating these results for use in the table on information flows below, as attempts to 
achieve consensus failed,  I will for practical reasons use a simple average as a rough 
approximation of the true sensitivity of information where discrepancies are present. 
6.2.2 Main information- and information flows involved in activities as 
they exists today 
 
Relevant to test proposition 10 is the possibility that because Havyards involvement in 
international sales of system packages is relatively new (from 2012) and much 
internalized, more sensitive information than is strictly necessary is sent to and from the 




















activity as it 
exist today, 
and other 
agents   
If the activity 














Highest in bold.  
Employees recommendation 








for batches).  
- Knowledge of 





















- Not sensitive 
at all 
- Not sensitive 
at all 
CPO, PM: Yes. PJM:  
Uncertain. SC: No. 













































- Parts of 
contracts 
including 




















for all batches. 
- The delivery 
times. 
- Suppliers. 
- 3PL: must be 
continuously 
informed to be 
able to receive 








CPO, PJM: Yes. PM: 













- The relevant 
documentation. 




















well as this 
documentation 
itself 






the batch is not 
complete, 
obtain list of 
goods to come.  
- The list(s) and 
some technical 
knowledge of 
what should be 












CPO, PJM: yes, PM: 
uncertain/yes. SC: no. 




















No (PM: no/uncertain, the 
rest no) 
7. Obtain list 
of components 
from suppliers, 
and merge this 
into a common 
list of packages 
with Havyard 





















Common list of 
components is 







CPO, PJM: yes, PM: 












- Place of 
delivery 






















sent to bank 














- 3PL does 




in some cases 
make 
certificate of 
origin, to be 
used instead 
of EUR1.  
- Not sensitive. 
- Not sensititve. 
Yes 
10. Insure the 
transport and 
obtain proof of 
- Quantity and 











CPO, PM, SC: no. PJM: yes 
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insurance for 








need to know 
places of pick-




that a 3PL do 





agent than is 
the case today 
is likely.) 
- Instead of 
LC-document 
in full, only 












sent to bank 
for LC). 
 
- LC (in order 
to know if such 
a certificate is 
needed, with or 
without original 
stamps etc) 











- Instead of 
LC-document 









SC, PM: uncertain. CPO, 
PJM: yes. 









and terms of 
delivery. 
- List of goods 
in each batch. 






- 3PL would 
perhaps not 























- Not sensitive. 
CPO: yes. PM: uncertain. 
SC, PJM: No. 
Table 15. Composed by the author. 
 
The following table sums up what the results relevant for proposition 10: The need to use 
highly sensitive information in the activities is associated with employees' 
recommendation not to outsource. 
 
Table 16. Summary of results relevant for proposition 10. 
Activities where proposition holds true 6, 10 
Activities where proposition is untrue 1, 8, (11) 
Activity where truth of proposition is 2 
 76 
ambiguous 
Activities not making use of highly 
sensitive information (proposition not 
applicable) 
3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12. 
 
For activity 11, the proposition is not as clearly refuted as in the case of the other two 
activities, 1 and 8. This is because, for activity 11, the information deemed highly sensitive 
may be reduced if a 3PL was to take over the activity. Therefore a lower security grade 
may be the result, and then the proposition would not be applicable for this activity. 
 
Activity 2 have highly sensitive information, but the recommendation to outsource is split 
50-50 between the extremes (yes and no), so that the verdict on the proposition for this 
activity is ambiguous. Activity 12 clearly has important considerations other than 
information disclosure for recommending outsourcing. This primarily include, as stated in 
the table below on considerations for/against outsourcing and the section testing the TCE-
propositions, the concern over the quality of information given by 3PL to end customer if 
activity is outsourced. 
 
Overall then the evidence suggest that it cannot be stated that the data support this 
proposition. But it can also not be stated that the data indicates that the proposition is 
untrue. 
 





6.3 Considerations in outsourcing of the activities 
The relevant proposition that is tested here is number 11: Considerations that clearly 
exclude the possibility of outsourcing exist for only a minority of the mapped activities. It 
also attempts to answer the supporting RQ2. 
 
It should be stated that most of the arguments in the table are collected from informants 
who were not made particularly prepared for the questions and therefore may not have had 
on the top of their heads all the relevant considerations it involved. PJM stated that in 
general, specific information gathering was problematic to outsource as 3PL may lack 
knowledge of particulars in much of the matter handled and tacit relationship skills with 
many of the agents involved. 
 
As can be seen from the table below the proposition is supported by the data. The table is 
based on interviews from round 2, with the exceptions of the ones marked with *, which is 
from interview round 3, and *
2 
which is from CPO (Havyard 2014e). 
 
Table 17. Main arguments for and against outsourcing and overall initial verdict. 
Activity (shaded are 
already outsourced)  
Reported main reasons 
to outsource 
Reported main reasons 
not to outsource 
Overall initial 
verdict 
1. Calculation of the 
transportation costs 
(including obtaining 
measurements for batches). 
PM:  
- Will save time. 
Advantage in planning as 
it will free resources. 
PM/SC::  
- 3PL can easier inflate 
price.  
- Less possibility to 
check prices /terms of 
other 3PLs. Then 
choice of 3PL is set. 
PM: 
- They may experience 
problems getting hold 
of correct person at 
suppliers. 
- 3PL get access to 
sensitive information 
they don’t need for 
job performance, such 
as supplier’s prices.  
- Havyard loose some 
knowledge of 
reliability of suppliers. 
Less communication 
with supplier may be 
good for Havyard to 
have such a 
communication. 
- If something 
unexpected happens 
Havyard may end up 
spending lot of time to 
sort it. 
- Loss of competence. 
- Havyard may be more 
flexible than 3PL. 
- Safer to do it 
internally. 
PM: Would keep it 
internally. (But then 
change to opposite 
in third question 
round)* 
CPO: Should be 
kept internally (But 
then change to 
opposite in third 
question round)* 
2. Make sure terms of 
delivery and delivery times 
Problem due to way 
question was specified 
 CPO: Could be 
outsouced.* 
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are correct, and obtain 
documents Havyard need 
for LC. 
(also make contract). 
3. Obtain delivery times for 
all batches.  
PM: A lot of nagging on 




SC: Activity not so 
complicated. 
PM: Would loose 
knowledge of reliability of 
suppliers. 
 
CPO: Here 3PL 
could have a bigger 
role in direct 
contact/follow-up 
against suppliers 
and rapport to 
Havyard. *
2 
PM: May perhaps 
be outsourced if 
good price. 
SC: Should be 
possible to 
outsource. 
4. Obtain delivery times for 
suppliers’ documentation 
such as engineering 
manual, installation 
manual, instruction manual, 
various drawings and 
calculations) as well as this 
documentation itself 
PM: A lot of nagging on 




PM: Would loose 
knowledge of reliability of 
suppliers. If 3PL take this 
job then they would be 
involved with the delivery 
times, not check the 
contents of the 
documentation. It could be 
nice to not have to do this, 
but it would be a challenge 
to get suppliers to respond 
to a party they do not have 
a direct contract with. It 
could be included in the 
contract with suppliers, but 
I think it still may be 
difficult to achieve in 
practice. 
SC: Risk is that 3PL will 
loose or send information 
too late. They may also not 
have high knowledge of 
various manuals, suppliers 
etc. 
CPO: Part of project 
management and 
important to keep 
internal.* 
PJM*: Difficult to get a 
3PL to collect [such] 
documentation from a 
supplier. They would have 
no knowledge of this, and 
cannot tell when some 
documentation contains 
errors. I would guess that 
they would not know what 
to ask about. In this case 
there is little help having 
lots of knowledge of 
logistics, what is needed is 
some knowledge of the 
machines etc. 
PM: May perhaps 
be outsourced if 
good price. 
CPO: Should 
absolutely not be 
outsourced. * *
2 
5. Make sure suppliers PM: There is no need to PM: Would loose amount PM: Could be 
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deliver on time, contact if 
necessary. If the batch is 
not complete, obtain list of 
goods to come.  
 
do this ourselves. 
 
of communication and 
some knowledge of 
reliability of suppliers. 
SC: Variations in 
contracts. Knowledge 
about equipment may be 
low with 3PL. Havyards 
people know better how to 
deal with suppliers when 
things are not well enough 
packed etc. 
outsourced. 
CPO: Could be 
outsourced.* *
2 
SC: The first 
projects are more 
difficult to 
outsource, but if 




(Answered “no” to 
both scenarios in 
round 3 however)  
6. Revisions of delivery 
times if necessary. 
PM: Would save time 
and resources. 
PM: Loss of knowledge 
about suppliers’ flexibility 
and hence potential future 
costs. 
PJM*: 3PL must then be in 
close dialog with Havyard, 
as such revisions must be 
accepted by all parts 
involved. I don’t think 
Havyard would allow that 
a 3PL can revise such 
dates without permission 
in each case. I think this is 
an untraditional area for a 
3PL to be involved in. 
PM: Typical 
activity that would 
not be outsourced, 
but would not be a 
very big deal if it 
was. (Later clarified 
(e-mail 28.04.14): 
all changes in 




7. Obtain list of 
components from suppliers, 
and merge this into a 
common list of packages 
with Havyard logo and 
send this to end-customer 
and bank. 
PM: Will save time and 
resources.  
SC: Not complicated. 
3PL know mostly what 
kind of information they 
need. 
PM: Would loose some 
control with bank 
connection. 
SC: 3PL may have low 
knowledge of equipment. 
 
PM: Could be 
possible to 
outsource. 
SC: Said “no” on 
interview round 3. 
CPO: Could be 
done by 3PL. *
2
 
8. Make customs invoice 
for outbound customs in 
country of the relevant 
Havyard hub 
 
 SC: 3PL would need 
information on component 
costs from suppliers. 
PM: 3PL could to 
this. 
SC: 3PL could do 
this. 
CPO: Could be 
done by 3PL. *
2 
9. Make EUR1-document 
for deliveries from Norway 
(will be sent to bank for 
LC). 
PM: Difficult for 
Havyard to do. 
 Performed in 
almost all cases by 
3PL today. 
10. Insure the transport and 
obtain proof of insurance 
for bank for letter of credit. 
 
 PM: Loss of control with 
bank connection. 
SC: Probably insurance 
company would not accept 
outsourcing this. An 
insurance agent could 
alternatively do it, as was 
done previously, but this 
resulted in many errors. 
Documents were sent in 
return from the bank due 
to not in line with LC 
requirements. 
PM: 3PL could do 
this (changed to 
“no” and 
“uncertain” for the 
two scenarios 
respectively in the 
third round). 
11. Obtain “certificate of PM: It would save time. PM: Is connected to PM: Havyard 
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origin” where this is 
necessary (also sent to bank 
for LC). 
 
SC: Much “nagging” in 
this process. 
contracts and purchasing. 
Suppliers need to know 
that he has to obtain this 
from their own suppliers. 
SC: 3PL lack knowledge 
perhaps. 
should do it as it 
should be done at 
the purchasing 
stage. (But if set as 
standards then….) 
CPO: 3PL can do 
this.*
2 
12. Be in continuous 
contact with customer to 
update them about status on 
shipment. 
 SC: Must know that 3PL 
will not misuse 
information. 




CPO: Should go 
through Havyard 
which is the 
contractual party for 
end customer. May 
perhaps be 
outsourced in the 
future when 
routines are well 
established, but 
always with a copy 
to Havyard of any 
communication.*
2 
Table 17. Composed by the author. 
6.3.1 Comparison of Havyard-drivers and the ones listed in the literature 
review 
Comparing the above table with the typical drivers for outsourcing presented in the 
literature review, it can be seen that, if the above comments are “standardized” to the same 
format as the drivers, the following drivers are some of the ones relevant in the Havyard 
case: “focusing on core activities”, “reducing costs”, “to achieve cost reduction with 
enhanced performance”, “to achieve cost reduction with enhanced performance”. 
“Eliminate the fixed cost of internal staff by moving the function to a supplier” and 
“increased flexibility for highs and lows in the market” was also mentioned in general 
previously (see section on “possible improvements from Havyards point of view”). This 
list of drivers is probably not exhaustive. A driver mentioned in the table above and not in 
the literature review was the opinion that the parts of the activity (activity number 4) could 
distract from a good relationship with suppliers. 
6.4 TCE-propositions 
The relevant propositions to be tested here are number 1 through 8: --- asset specificity, --- 
uncertainty, and --- costliness of implementing sufficient contractual safeguards are --- 
associated with employees’ recommendation for ---. 
 
The SC did not answer the two questions on behavioral uncertainty and contractual 
safeguards for each activity, as the person felt it was outside the SCs area of competence. 
CPO and SC gave different answers in many cases to the TCE-variables measured between 
scenario 1 and 3. PM and PJM gave similar answers to the two scenarios. CPO and PJM 
answered the same for the recommendations-questions in both scenarios. SC also did this, 
with the exception of activity 5 where “uncertain” was answered in scenario 1 and “no” in 
scenario 3, and  activity 8 where “no” was, perhaps surprisingly answered for scenario 3. 
PM had in most cases different recommendation the scenarios, with the general tendency 
being a move from not recommending outsourcing in scenario 1 to recommending it in 
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scenario 3. In almost all of the activities site and physical specificity was low, while 
learning-by-doing often was medium or high. Physical specificity increased slightly in 
scenario 2 (due to answers of SC). 
 
It was kept in mind that learning-by-doing should carry a high weight in the TCE-scheme 
for jobs in Europe and especially Norway due to high labor cost.  
 
Environmental uncertainty was clarified in the questionnaire in the following way (but in 
Norwegian): “Is it probably that unpredicted circumstances of considerable importance 
occur in connection with the activity?” Behavioral uncertainty was also clarified: “Is it 
costly to measure/control the performance of those responsible for the execution of the 
activity?”  
 
6.4.1 Criteria for accepting the TCE-hypotheses 
One of the advantages of qualitative over quantitative studies is the ability to investigate 
the data in a more detailed and flexible way. For instance, in attempts to better see the 
different properties of large amounts of quantitative data one commonly make use of 
measurements such as mean, mode, median, standard deviation and so on. With a smaller 
sample size there is often no need to calculate this, as it can be instantly estimated just by 
looking at the raw data. However, this does not have to mean that numerical criteria for 
judging whether the hypothesis is proven right or wrong are not useful in qualitative 
studies. For clarity and as a point of reference the following is the criteria for judging 
whether the proposition(s) relevant for each of the activities are supported: That at least 
two interviewees have the same value on the 5 point Likert scale as what the proposition is 
suggesting, in addition that at least one interviewee is within one point up or down, and 
that no more than one interviewee is within two points up or down. In some of the cases 
exceptions will be made from this rule due to aspects of the data not well captured by it. 
 
Wherever a mixture of  two propositions with somewhat differing predictions just below 
and above “uncertain” are relevant, such as 5 and 6, the predicted outcome are so 
ambiguous that I consider it to be three “correct” placements on the Likert scale that will 
determine if the data support the propositions: 2 (no/uncertain), 3 (uncertain) and 4 
(yes/uncertain). Where there is a mixture of two propositions with predictions  both 
leaning towards the lower or upper scale, such as a mixture of proposition 2 and 5 which 
strongly and moderately, respectively, predicts recommendation for outsourcing, then the 
main “support zone” on the Likert scale are simply the corresponding two alternatives (yes 
and uncertain/yes).  
 
As the difference in answers by the informants changed very little from scenario 1 to 
scenario 3, the TCE-hypotheses will only be tested for the information provided for 
scenario 1. 
6.4.2 Testing the TCE-hypotheses 
 






Table 18. Activity 1, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium/High. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Medium: heterogeneity in answers 
Behavioral uncertainty Medium: heterogeneity 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low 
Employees recommendation CPO, PM: Yes. PJM:  Uncertain. SC: No. 
 
Three reported medium to high environmental uncertainty, while only the PM reported 
low. A similar thing happened with the behavioral uncertainty. For contractual safeguards 
only PJM answered medium. 
 
Employee’s recommendation: CPO and PM clear yes to outsource. They were, however, 
interviewed before the line “including obtaining measurements for batches” was added to 
the questionnaire, but an assumption is made that their answer would remain the same. SC 
recommended outsourcing if such obtaining was not to be included in the activity 
description, but did not think outsourcing was a good idea if it was included. PJM 
answered uncertain. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
No difference.   
 
Relevant proposition: 
This situation corresponds most closely with a mix of proposition 6: High asset specificity, 
high uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient contractual safeguards are 
moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for internal governance and 5. 
High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
 
This is a case where there are three correct placements on the Likert scale for the mix of 
propositions to be deemed supported in this case. It can be seen that the spread of answers 
are too large for the proposition to be supported, and only one informant is in the 
“supported” zone.  
 
Verdict: propositions not supported by this case.  
 
Activity 2: Make sure terms of delivery and delivery times are correct, and obtain 




Table 19. Activity 2, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium/High. Idiosyncratic skills. only
  
Environmental uncertainty Medium/high 
Behavioral uncertainty Low/medium. 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low+ 
Employees recommendation CPO, PJM: Yes. PM, SC: No.  
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Three gave medium environmental uncertainty, while PJM gave high as there are “lots of 
thing that can go wrong: a supplier may be delayed, something may be wrong with 
equipment etc.” Two gave medium behavioral uncertainty, while PJM gave low. CPO 
commented that “it would be important to establish good information channels in case of 
outsourcing. Only PJM said it could be costly with the contractual safeguards. CPO and 
PJM though it would be a good idea to outsource this activity, while the other two 
recommended against it. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 20. Activity 2: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity - CPO note for this activity that some 
increase in learning-by-doing as a mixture 
of sea and land transport is likely to be the 
result of the increase in volume. 
- SC predicts some increase in physical 
specificity.  
Environmental uncertainty CPO also projects that both types of 
uncertainty will increase for the same 
reason. 
Behavioral uncertainty See preceding row. 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
- 
Employees recommendation -  
 
No difference in recommendation to outsource. 
 
Relevant proposition(s): 
A mixture of 5: High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing 
sufficient contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ 
recommendation for outsourcing and 6: High asset specificity, high uncertainty, and low 
costliness of implementing sufficient contractual safeguards are moderately associated 
with employees’ recommendation for internal governance. 
 
Same verdict as for the last activity, but with a higher certainty that the propositions are 
not supported as no informants are in the “supported  zone”. 
 
Verdict: propositions not supported by this case. 
 




Table 21. Activity3, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium. idiosyncratic skills only  
Environmental uncertainty Low 
Behavioral uncertainty Low 




Employees recommendation CPO, PJM: Yes. PM: Uncertain/yes. SC: 
No  
 
The answers collected for this activity are subject to some disturbance as this activity was 
grouped together with the next activity (“4. Obtain delivery times for suppliers’ 
documentation such as engineering manual, installation manual, instruction manual, 
various drawings and calculations as well as this documentation itself”) up until and 
including the third round of data collection (the one which measured the TCE-variables). 
The original reason for this was that this form is how it had been suggested originally by 
Havyard. For the answering of the third round of the questionnaire, the CPO said that the 
activities should be separated, and that he had different answers to them if they were. It 
was kept as one activity intentionally for the remaining three interviewees to see if they 
would comment on this point. Only PJM did, possibly due to suggestion made by the 
interviewer on the phone.  
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 22. Activity 3: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity -  
Environmental uncertainty - 
Behavioral uncertainty - 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
- 
Employees recommendation PM went from uncertain/yes to yes. 
 
The rest stayed the same. 
 
Relevant proposition(s): 
A mixture of 5: High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing 
sufficient contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ 
recommendation for outsourcing and 2: Low asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low 
costliness of implementing sufficient contractual safeguards are strongly associated with 
employees’ recommendation for outsourcing.  
 
Even though this activity does not fit the proposition verification rule outlined above, and 
even through there is an outlier in the wrong end of the spectrum, it seems justified to 
make an exception and say that the propositions are supported. The reason for this is that 
three out of four informants have recommendations that are in line with the predictions of 
the propositions in question. 
 
Verdict: Proposition supported by the case. 
 
Activity 4: Obtain delivery times for suppliers’ documentation such as engineering 
manual, installation manual, instruction manual, various drawings and calculations) as well 







Table 23: Activity 4, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity High. Idiosyncratic skills. Some site 
specificity.  
Environmental uncertainty High 
Behavioral uncertainty High 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Medium. Some differing answers. 
Employees recommendation CPO, PJM, SC: No. PM: uncertain/yes. 
 
The disturbances in interpretation of the answers for activity 3 above hold true for this one 
as well. The reason some site specificity is included here is that this information is 
important to know when contracts are written according to PM. It may further be inferred 
that it would be beneficial to perform such a job in close proximity of staff involved in the 
project management of the sale as they would presumably have a good idea of the 
customer’s valuation of the various suppliers’ documentation. For contractual safeguards 
CPO answered high, PM medium, and PJM answered low. The recommendation was not 
to outsource by all, except PM who answered uncertain/yes. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 24. Activity 4: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity - 
Environmental uncertainty - 
Behavioral uncertainty - 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
- 
Employees recommendation PM went from uncertain/yes to yes 
 
No change with the rest. 
 
Relevant proposition: 
1: High asset specificity, high uncertainty, and high costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are strongly associated with employees’ recommendation* for 
internal governance. 
 
Here again an exception is made to the decision rule because three of the four informants 
answered in line with the prediction of the relevant proposition. Also, the rule 
requirements are almost satisfied. 
 
Verdict: Proposition supported by the case. 
 
Activity 5:  Make sure suppliers deliver on time, contact if necessary. If the batch is not 









Table 25. Activity 5, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium. Idiosyncratic skills. Some site 
specificity.  
Environmental uncertainty High. 
Behavioral uncertainty Medium 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low/medium 
Employees recommendation CPO, PJM: yes, PM: uncertain/yes. SC: no* 
 
The reason why some site specificity is included here is that according to CPO this activity 
must either be done in the offices of Havyard or 3PL as it is important to collect this data 
close to the rest of project management. Environmental uncertainty is high due to the risk 
of deliveries being delayed or damaged, according to PJM. Behavioral uncertainty was 
characterized as low by CPO, but higher by the rest. PJM stated that it was ok to measure 
the delivery time precision, and that it was possible to ask to be sent a copy of the e-mail 
every time the 3PL needed to prompt the supplier. SC stated a belief that if this activity 
was outsourced Havyard 
 
would loose necessary control and the important contact with the suppliers.  
Further, several of the shipments are interdependent. Suppliers may for instance 
deliver some of the equipment to Havyard for installation in complementary 
equipment, while the rest is to be delivered to hub. Havyard will then not be able to 
send their own equipment before we have all the components from other suppliers. 
(Havyard, 2014r) 
 
*SC changed the given recommendation for this activity, as well as for activity 8 (Havyard 
2014v): “Make customs invoice for outbound customs in country of the relevant Havyard 
hub”, after I sent a mail containing the changed/refined description of activity 8 and a 
question to explain seemingly odd answers. For activity 5 (this one) SC had previously 
answered “uncertain” for scenario 1 and “no” for scenario 2, while for activity 8 SC had 
previously given “yes” and “no”, respectively. The same answers were changed to “no” 
and “no”, and “yes” and “yes”. It should be said that the description of activity 8 had been 
changed perhaps substantially so that a change of answer for this activity may have been 
justified on the basis of this alone. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 26. Activity 5: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity -  
Environmental uncertainty CPO answered that both types of uncertainty 
will increase.  
Behavioral uncertainty See preceding row. 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
- 
Employees recommendation PM went from Uncertain/yes to yes.  
 
SC believed that for this scenario the activity will be even more complex and too 




6: High asset specificity, high uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
internal governance. 
 
In this case it seems clear that the proposition not supported. Only one informant 
recommended internal governance, and this was a strong, not moderate, recommendation. 
 
Verdict: Proposition not supported by the case. 
 




Table 27. Activity 6, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Medium +  
Behavioral uncertainty Medium  
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Medium  
Employees recommendation No 
 
A reason why environmental uncertainty is present is that, if a revision of dates is taking 
place, which may for instance be due to holidays and/or closed customs office, the 
customer may say that they do not want the product, according to PJM. If a 3PL is given 
such power of attorney then it may also be difficult to know that they do it well. CPO 
thinks that the information disclosure part of contractual safeguards may be important in 
this activity. Recommendation was unanimously no, with PM being less certain than the 
rest with a no/uncertain. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 28. Activity 6: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity - 
Environmental uncertainty -  
Behavioral uncertainty -  
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
-  
Employees recommendation PM changed from no/uncertain to uncertain. 
 




This would correspond to a mixture of all, so there is no proposition to test. 
 
Activity 7: Obtain list of components from suppliers, and merge this into a common list of 





Table 29. Activity 7, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Low/medium  
Behavioral uncertainty Low + 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low+ 
Employees recommendation CPO, PJM: Yes. PM: Uncertain. SC: No  
 
According to CPO, one source of environmental uncertainty here is if lists of goods to 
come are missing from the components list from suppliers. CPO and PM both answered 
medium, while the two others answered low. For behavioral uncertainty only CPO 
answered medium, while the two others who answered this question answered low. Only 
PM answered medium for contractual safeguards, while the two others answered low. CPO 
and PJM recommended yes, PM uncertain, and SC no. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 30. Activity 7: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity SC increased estimate of physical 
specificity from low to medium as “3PL 
probably would not be interested in doing 
such a job manually, if volume was to 
increase that much”. 
Environmental uncertainty -  
Behavioral uncertainty -  
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
-  




1: High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
 
The proposition would be very close to being supported if averages were taken of the 
employees’ recommendation (almost uncertain/yes). However, this is not the decision 
criteria for evaluating the proposition. None of the informants moderately recommended 
outsourcing, even though PM moved in that direction for scenario 2. And one informant 
answered no.  
 
Verdict: Proposition not supported by the case. 
  
Activity 8: Make customs invoice for outbound customs in country of Havyard hub. 
Scenario 1: 
 
Table 31. Activity 8, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Low/medium  
Behavioral uncertainty Low  + 
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Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low +  
Employees recommendation Yes, with one exception. 
 
PJM states that for this activity it is important to have some knowledge about the customs 
declarations requirements in the county SC and PJM points out that there is some 
environmental uncertainty as the bank sometimes notices small errors in the documents for 
LC. However, PM later specified that most often this customs invoice is not used for LC 
(Havyard 2014w). Only PM answered medium behavioral uncertainty and medium 
contractual safeguards. 
 
All recommended yes, apart from PM who said no/uncertain. The main reason for this by 
PM was that “as we use the same values for this as on the invoice from supplier it is best 
that Havyard perform this activity” (Havyard 2014w). SC commented (Havyard 2014f) 
that as customs invoice are not sent to the bank, 3PLs probably have the best knowledge of 
what is important in the relevant countries. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 32. Activity 8: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity SC increase physical specificity to medium 
for the same reasons as the activity above 
(she though that at least if Havyard was to 
perform the activity then expansions of the 
software solutions would need to be made if 
volume increase). 
Environmental uncertainty SC changed environmental uncertainty to 
high. 
Behavioral uncertainty - 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
- 
Employees recommendation PM changed to uncertain/yes.  
 
Relevant proposition: 
5: High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
 
Again if simple averages were taken the proposition would be close to being supported by 
the case (slightly above uncertain/yes). However, the spread of the answers seem too high 
towards the extremes to justify a supported proposition. 
 
Verdict: proposition not supported by the case. 
 







Table 33. Activity 9, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Low/Medium. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Low 
Behavioral uncertainty Low 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low+ 
Employees recommendation Yes 
 
All answered that site and physical specificity was low. However, for learning-by-doing: 
CPO: low, PJM: low (with comment that he does not have that much knowledge about this 
activity), PM: medium, SC: high. For environmental uncertainty PJM commented that this 
activity differed from customs invoice as documentation requirements does not differ from 
country to country. PM commented that contractual safeguards implied some difficulties 
here, but the overall answers were “low”. 
 




1. Low asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are strongly associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
 
This activity is all ready outsourced. 
 
Verdict: Proposition supported in this case.  
 




Table 34. Activity 10, scenario 1. 
 
Asset specificity Medium. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Low 
Behavioral uncertainty Low 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low/medium 
Employees recommendation CPO, PM, SC: no. PJM: yes 
 
SC commented for this activity that she believes the insurance company would not let a 
3PL do this. CPO says that this activity is no so complicated, but that there might be some 
learning-by-doing in knowing what the values are and minimize the insurance expenses. 
The main issue with contractual safeguards is according to CPO and PJM to get 3PL to 
take responsibility that the values of the goods are insured at their proper value. CPO 
further said that if this activity was outsourced, then Havyard would inform the 3PL to 
about the values to insure. Only PM answered medium here. All recommended no to 
outsourcing, except PJM who said yes. 
 





2: Low asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are strongly associated with employees’ recommendation for 
outsourcing. 
 
Here the proposition is clearly not supported. 
 
Verdict: Proposition not supported by the case. 
 
Activity 11: Obtain “certificate of origin” where this is necessary (also sent to bank for 
LC). 
Scenario 1: 
Table 35. Activity 11, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Environmental uncertainty Medium+. Differing answers. 
Behavioral uncertainty Low+ 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low 
Employees recommendation SC, PM: uncertain. CPO, PJM: yes. 
 
For environmental uncertainty CPO and PJM answered low/medium, while PM and SC: 
high. Maybe underestimated by non-operative personnel? SC commented that 3PL would 
then need to send the certificate to the bank of the customer for LC. On goods made 
outsource of Europe there are often mistakes in the certificate of origin according to 
customer requirements. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 36. Activity 11: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
Asset specificity - 
Environmental uncertainty -  
Behavioral uncertainty - 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
-  
Employees recommendation PM changed from uncertain to 
uncertain/yes. No change for the others. 
 
Relevant proposition: 
A mixture of 5: High asset specificity, low uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing 
sufficient contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ 
recommendation for outsourcing and 4: Low asset specificity, high uncertainty, and low 
costliness of implementing sufficient contractual safeguards are moderately associated 
with employees’ recommendation for outsourcing. 
 
Here a simple average give that the proposition is supported. It may be justified in this case 
to pay attention to this measurement as the spread of the answers are not so great and 
symmetrically distributed around the predicted answer of the propositions. An exception is 
again made to the main decision rule. 
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Verdict: Propositions supported by the case. 
 
Activity 12: Be in continuous contact with customer to update them about status on 
shipment. 
 
Table 37. Activity 12, scenario 1. 
Asset specificity Medium+. Idiosyncratic skills only. 
Differing answers. 
Environmental uncertainty Med/high 
Behavioral uncertainty Medium 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
Low/med 
Employees recommendation CPO: yes. PM: uncertain. SC, PJM: No. 
 
For learning-by-doing CPO and SC answered high, PM: low/med, PJM low (and also 
commented that it should not be outsourced as Havyard “must have control with what we 
sell ourselves”). CPO and PJM commented in connection with environmental uncertainty 
that much can happen with the transport. For behavioral uncertainty PJM commented that 
it would be difficult to control the quality of the communication. End customer may be 
annoyed. Also may start talking about the contract, which the 3PL initially does not have 
access to. If it was to be outsourced the 3PL much be very integrated into Havyard, a bit in 
the way K+N did when they got their own office in Rolls Royce Ulsteinvik when these 
closed down their logistics/transport department. A lesson was apparently that personnel in 
this office varied too much to ensure optimal continuity in competences etc. For 
contractual safeguards CPO commented that there is an aspect of information disclosure 
here, for the reason mentioned in paragraph above presumably. 
 
Recommendation: CPO: yes, PM: uncertain, SC, PJM: No. 
 
Difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Table 38. Activity 12: difference between scenario 1 and 3: 
 
Asset specificity SC commented in regards to physical 
specificity that as communication today is 
by e-mail and if demand was to increase, 
perhaps some investments would need to be 
done. SC still chose to answer low for 
physical specificity however.  
Environmental uncertainty -  
Behavioral uncertainty - 
Costliness of satisfactory contractual 
safeguards 
-  





6: High asset specificity, high uncertainty, and low costliness of implementing sufficient 
contractual safeguards are moderately associated with employees’ recommendation for 
internal governance. 
 
Here the proposition is quite clearly not supported as the spread seems to be too great, and 
none of the answers were exactly that of the propositions prediction. 
Verdict: proposition not supported by the case. 
 
Table 39.  Summary table for scenario 1 (based on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 is a 
lesser degree than 5)  











Env. u. Behav.u.    




Mixture of 6 and 
5 not supported. 
2.  1 1 4 4 2 1+ CPO, PJM: Yes. 
SC, PM: No 
Mixture of 6 and 
5 not supported 
3.  1 1 3 1 1 1 CPO, PJM: Yes. 
PM: 
Uncertain/yes. 
SC: No  
Mixture of 5 and 
2 supported. 








6 not supported. 
6.  1 1 3 3+ 3 3 No (PM: 
no/uncertain. 
CPO, PJM, SC: 
no) 
No proposition to 








1 not supported. 
8.  1 1 3 2 1+ 1+  CPO, PJM, SC: 
yes, PM: 
no/uncertain. 






1 2 1 1 1+ Yes 1 supported. 
10.  1 1 3 1 1 2 CPO, PM, SC: 
no. PJM: yes 
2 not supported. 
11.  1 1 3 3+ 1+ 1 SC, PM: 
uncertain. CPO, 
PJM: yes. 
Mixture of 5 and 
4 supported. 
12.  1 1 3+ 4 3 2 CPO: yes, PM: 
uncertain, SC, 
PJM: No. 




Env. u.= Environmental uncertainty 
Behav.u.= Behavioural uncertainty 
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*Costliness of satisfactory contractual safeguards 
*
2 
Employee recommendation (scenario 1) 
*
3
 Relevant proposition(s) supported/not supported 
 
In total then four activities out of the 11 that fitted the description of particular 
propositions supported the relevant propositions, while seven did not. The propositions 
supported were the following: a mixture of 5 and 2, 1, mixture of 5 and 4. Number 1 was 
supported twice. The propositions “not supported” were: a mixture of 6 and 5, 6, 1, 5, 2, 
mixture of 5 and 4. The mixture of 6 and 5, as well as number 6, was “not supported” 
twice. The propositions that were both supported and not supported were a mixture of 5 
and 4, and 1. However, number 1 was supported twice. The only propositions which was 
supported without any cases of “not supported” was a mixture of 5 and 2.  Proposition 3, 7, 
and 8, as well as all the remaining combinations of propositions did not get to be tested. 
6.5 Proposition about present vs future scenario 
 
The relevant proposition to be tested in this section is number 9: Employees’ 
recommendations will in general be more favorable to outsourcing in the high demand 
future scenario. lt attempts to answer the last part of the supporting RQ1 
 
Table 40. Summary of the difference in recommendations between scenario 1 and 3. 
 Employees recommendation 
Activity Scenario 1 Scenario 3 
1. Calculation of the transportation costs (including 
obtaining measurements for batches). 
CPO, PM: Yes. PJM:  
Uncertain. SC: No. 
No difference (-) 
2. Make sure terms of delivery and delivery times 
are correct, and obtain documents Havyard need for 
LC. 
CPO, PJM: Yes. SC, 
PM: No 
- 
3. Obtain delivery times for all batches. (in the older 
questionnaires the next activity was included in this) 
CPO, PJM: Yes. PM: 
Uncertain/yes. SC: No  
PM went from 
uncertain/yes to yes. 
4. Obtain delivery times for suppliers’ 
documentation such as engineering manual, 
installation manual, instruction manual, various 
drawings and calculations) as well as this 
documentation itself 
CPO, PJM, SC: No. 
PM: uncertain/yes. 
PM went form 
uncertain/yes to yes. 
5. Make sure suppliers deliver on time, contact if 
necessary. If the batch is not complete, obtain list of 
goods to come. 
CPO, PJM: Yes, PM: 
uncertain/yes. SC: No. 
PM went from 
Uncertain/yes to yes. 
 
6. Revise delivery times if necessary No (PM: no/uncertain. 
CPO, PJM, SC: no) 
PM changed from 
no/uncertain to uncertain. 
7. Obtain list of components from suppliers, and 
merge this into a common list of packages with 
Havyard logo and send this to end-customer and 
bank. 
CPO and PJM: yes, 
PM: uncertain, SC: No. 
PM changed from 
uncertain to uncertain/yes. 
8. Make customs invoice for outbound customs in 
country of the relevant Havyard hub. 
 CPO, PJM, SC: yes, 
PM: no/uncertain. 
PM changed to 
uncertain/yes.  
9. Make EUR1-document for deliveries from 
Norway (will be sent to bank for LC). 
Yes - 
10. Insure the transport and obtain proof of 
insurance for bank for letter of credit. 
CPO, PM, SC: no. PJM: 
yes 
- 
11. Obtain “certificate of origin” where this is 
necessary (also sent to bank for LC). 
SC, PM: uncertain. 
CPO, PJM: yes. 
PM changed from 
uncertain to uncertain/yes 
12. Be in continuous contact with customer to 
update them about status on shipment. 
CPO: yes, PM: 
uncertain, SC, PJM: No. 
PM changed from 
uncertain to uncertain/yes. 
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Cases where outsourcing clearly is not favored more in scenario 2 than 1: Activity 1, 2, 9, 
and 10. 4/12. Cases in doubt: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12. 8/12. Even though the change of 
recommendation for outsourcing in these cases may not seem so large, they represent one 
person which is 25 percent of the total interviewees. The proposition then may perhaps be 
said to be weakly true. 
6.6 Comparison with RBV-predictions 
In this section Watjatrakuls table (2005) is used to briefly compare the results above with 
the results obtained if the data with the predictions of the RBV. This is in line with Yins 
(2014) advice to identify and address rival explanations to the findings in order to ensure 
good research design, as described in that section above. In using the table below it is 
assumed that all the relevant resources are non-strategic, even though no interview was 
conducted on this point. The concept of strategic asset is defined in the relevant part of the 
literature review. 
 
Table 41. Summary of cases where the predictions of TCE and RBV differ. 




TCT Outsourcing Insourcing 
RBV Outsourcing Outsourcing 
Low-specificity, 
strategic resource 
TCT Outsourcing Insourcing 




TCT Insourcing Insourcing 
RBV Outsourcing Outsourcing 
High-specificity, 
strategic resource 
TCT Insourcing Insourcing 
RBV Insourcing Insourcing 
 
Table  41. Adapted from Watjatrakul (2005). 
 
The table below summarizes the comparison. The tendencies in the uncertainties and 
specificities may be exaggerated some in order to find the closest prediction in the table 
above: 
 
Table 42.  Summary of test to see if RBV predictions better fit the data than TCE 
predictions. 
Activity Comments Does the RBV-prediction have a better fit 
with the data than the TCE-prediction? 
1 For the first activity combined uncertainty was 
neither low nor high. It is therefore difficult to 
conclude anything using this table. 
Nothing to test (-). 
2 For the second activity the same applies. - 
3 The third has low combined uncertainty, and 
pretty low specificity. From the table above this 
gives outsourcing, which in this case is the same 
prediction that TCE would give in the table. 
- 
4 Here the activity has a high combined uncertainty, 
and high-ish specificity. This gives outsourcing, 
which is the opposite of what TCE give. 
Clearly no (from looking at employees 
recommendations) 
5 Same as above. To much variation in employees 
recommendations to say definitely yes, but 
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it is not so far away from being yes. 
6 Combined uncertainty is neither low nor high, so 
difficult to place. 
- 
7 Uncertainty is low, but specificity is high-ish. This 
give outsourcing, the opposite of what TCE give.  
Same answer as in number 5. 
8 Same as above. Very close to being yes. Only one employee 
answered no/uncertain to outsourcing. 
9 Both uncertainty and specificity is low. This gives 
outsourcing, the same as TCE. 
- 
10 Same as above. - 
11 Specificity is low-ish, and uncertainty is high-ish. 
This give outsourcing, the opposite of TCE. 
Here the TCE-prediction of the table above 
conflicts some with the main TCE-
propositions used in the thesis, which are 
more nuanced. The propositions predicted 
“moderately employees’ recommendation 
for outsourcing”. The answers indicate just 
this, so here the RBV prediction is close to 
fitting the data. 
12 High uncertainty and high specifity give 
outsourcing, the opposite of TCE. 
Here the answer is definitely no. 
 
To sum up then there are three cases where the RBV seem to predict the employees 
recommendation better than the TCE. Further enquires into this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but would be an interesting direction for further research. Three potential sources of 
potential disturbances to these results are immediately spotted: 1) Employees 
recommendations are used as proxies for the actual ownership of the activities as they 
would materialize in the near future. Perhaps this is not a good solution. 2) Watjatrakuls 
table above is too simplistic to capture the nuances of the data. In this respect the main 
propositions used in this case study (where combinations of them were sometimes used) 
are superior. 3) The assumption of non-strategic asset made in the first paragraph in this 


























7.0  Limitations and future directions, generalizability to the 
industry, summary and concluding remarks 
7.1 Limitations and future directions 
 
One issue which turned out to be somewhat time consuming was that the author had to 
change several of the activity descriptions, and in one case split one activity into two, a 
few times during the study as weaknesses was spotted in them, either by me, or by some of 
the informants. For instance, activity 2 had until “data collection round 3” included in the 
description “make contract with suppliers”. In round 3 however it was insisted upon by 
CPO that it was definitely not an alternative to outsource the making of contracts with 
suppliers. The activity involving outsourcing obtaining technical documentation was 
originally part of another activity description, but had to be separated, as it was apparent 
that for two of the informants’ questions measuring TCE-variables would differ between 
two parts of what was originally one activity. Inaccurate description of the activities which 
may leave room for different interpretations was also a felt to be a problem a few times. To 
avoid or minimize problems relating to the logical separation as well as description of the 
activities in similar future studies, one should be even more specific about what each 
activity includes before starting the interviews based on the TCE-framework. One should 
also ask other informants, not just one, to check and revise the codified list of activities 
before such interviews. 
 
Another limitation is the trend study to rely less on “hard data” and more on “soft data” 
such as interviews. This may have some advantages such as perhaps easier data collection. 
In addition interviews may make it easier to roughly map the bigger picture as follow-up 
questions can immediately be asked and participants can more freely associate around 
questions. The study’s reliability on information held by subjects was large, and with 
potential for errors and misunderstandings, which was uncovered some times for instance 
in connection with the codifying of the activities as well as the interviews that was based 
on them. One way to get the best of both worlds in a potential future study could be to 
initiate the study using interviews (generally less structured in the beginning than the end, 
as was also done in the present study), and then find some standardized proxies for the 
TCE-variables which can be measured independent of the informants opinions. This option 
was considered in the present study, but it was concluded that such an undertaking would 
be too difficult as such proxies would be hard to obtain in most of the cases (the 
hypotheses being phrased: “if activity was to be outsourced…”). Further there is the 
problem that the TCE-propositions are to “coarse” in the way that it is not specified what 
is low and what is high. Again, this problem would be reduced if standardized 
“objectively” measured proxies were used as one would be able to compare the values of 
the different activities against each other and in this way obtain an understanding of “low” 
and “high”. A related argument of the possibility of “undervaluing” the asset specificity 
variable in selecting the correct proposition is included in the summary and concluding 
remarks section below. 
Another issue is that some of the participants changed some of their answers, mainly from 
round 2 to round 3 and from the “yes”-to-outsourcing-end of the spectrum towards “no”. 
This phenomena took place to a higher degree in operative personnel involved in the 
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relevant activities which may suggest any, or a combination, of the following explanations: 
1) There is generally a lesser focus on strategic issues and a higher one on operative issues, 
so that consistency in outsourcing recommendations given with some time interval may be 
less consistent than the case with employees daily phasing strategic issues. 2) Issues of job 
security were more determining for answers in round 3. 3) Detailed concrete knowledge of 
operations are held by operative personnel and taken more fully into account in in round 3 
than in round 2. When I inquired by e-mail into a related topic, I wanted a reason why it 
was answered that recommendation was “yes” for scenario 1 and then “no” for scenario 2, 
a side comment given was that it was easier to answer in writing. This may imply a lack of 
internal consistency (and hence a need to cross-check with ones own earlier answers) in 
the matter as suggested by explanation 1 above. No further inquires were made into this, 
but the general topic could perhaps be fruitful as a future study. 
Perhaps the sameness of the answers of the TCE-variables and recommendations to 
outsource in the two very different future scenarios is a source of limitation to the study. 
Considerable enquiries into why most of the answers were the same was not performed in 
the study, but one speculation is that a contributing factor was that informants started 
feeling time conscious about the questionnaires and interviews by the time the section on 
scenario 3 was reached and so was a little more inclined to say that the answers would not 
change for this scenario. 
A point worth stating is that the study does not really address whether or not the chosen 
TCE framework is a good prescriptive framework in this case. It only checks if the 
employee’s recommendation are in line with the TCE-predictions, not whether the 
business would actually save money if the prediction were followed. In other words: 
Employees recommendations are used as proxies for the actual ownership of the activities 
in the near future. How good this solution is may perhaps be argued. 
There were three cases where the RBV seem to predict the employees’ recommendation 
better than the TCE. Further enquires into why this was the case would perhaps be 
interesting work for future research. Three potential sources of disturbances to these results 
were identified: 1) Employees’ recommendations are used as proxies for the actual 
ownership of the activities. 2) Watjatrakuls table is too simplistic to capture the nuances of 
the data. 3) The present author’s assumption of non-strategic asset may not be justifiable. 
 
More specifically to the Havyard case, the CPO mentioned an alternative where a logistics 
coordination function forms a separate unit and has its own dedicated people from 
purchasing, engineering, project and so on. This alternative could possible have been made 
a starting point for a fruitful study, although it was not done in this one. One last direction 
that was not followed in this study are to use the categorizations of business relationships 
reviewed in the literature survey and attempt to categorize the current ones, as well as 
hypothetical ones should various combinations of the mapped activities be outsourced. The 
purpose could for instance be to investigate to what degree the character of the 
relationships would change as outsourcing was introduced. 
7.2 Generalizability to the industry 
Other shipyards are participating in the international trading of ships’ system packages, 
and the results obtained in this study are in different degrees generalizable to them as well. 
Probably the tables covering the information classification is generalizable to some extent 
to them. If the results of the relationship between “highly sensitive information” and 
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outsourcing recommendation are generalizable is more difficult to say. Perhaps the 
sameness of the answers of the TCE-variables and recommendations to outsource in the 
two different future scenarios are a generalizable feature, but to be more certain one should 
really have a better understanding of why these answers were largely the same (see 
limitation section above). Insofar as activities are similar in other firms, the results 
obtained from the tables covering the required information and the information flows, as 
well as the results obtained in testing the TCE-propositions, may also generalizable. 
 
The literature review, especially the part covering the relationship between competence 
view and TCE is obviously generalizable to other firms.  
7.3 Summary and concluding remarks 
The structure of this master thesis case study was as follows: it began with a general 
introduction of the focal company; it then proceeded to describe the problem that the 
author and mainly CPO had agreed would be suitable for the thesis. This descriptive 
section also includes sections of the firm’s challenges with todays practice and areas that 
could be improved. Then prognoses and three different future scenarios for 2016 followed. 
The scenarios answered the first part of the first supporting research question.  
The literature review followed, with the main emphasis being the section on TCE and the 
section on the relationship between TCE and RBV. Its main aim was to find the most 
suitable method for determining the desirability of outsourcing. This was found to be TCE. 
Although complex tools such as numerical optimization procedures and perhaps computer 
simulation may advantageously be used for the same purpose, which may involve hybrid 
solutions between TCE and RBV, it was decided to not include it in the thesis due to a 
stronger preference for a realistic comprehension of the large body of theory, as well as the 
case, in the timespan available. Then a section on the propositions used followed. The 
TCE-propositions were adaption to the case as it changed its propositions to be based on 
employee’s recommendation rather than the current ownership of the relevant activity. 
Another perhaps unconventional aspect of the use of TCE in this thesis was that the thesis 
incorporated the TCE-proposition into only one supporting method, together with the other 
propositions and supporting RQs, for answering a main RQ. A section on method came 
after this. 
In the data analysis section a table isolating the bits of information used in the activities 
was offered with a grading of the sensitivity of information, along with comments, given 
by two informants. This information was then used in another table linking together the 
activities, the information used for completion of the activities, any possible reduction in 
information used if the activity was to be outsourced, the corresponding grades of 
sensitivity of information, and the employees recommendation of whether to outsource or 
not. The purpose was to answer proposition number 10. Even though there were six 
activities that involved the use of highly sensitive information, it was found that the data 
could not really support this proposition. A possible reason for this may be, as other 
interviews gathered, that in most of the cases it would be relatively easy to alleviate risk 
arising from such information sharing through added contractual safeguards. A graphical 
illustration of the information flows and their highest grade of sensitive information were 
also included. This section also answers the supporting RQ number 3. Six of the 12 
activities involved the use of highly sensitive information for completion. Of the remaining 
six activities five included somewhat sensitive information. Only the activity that was 
already outsourced to K+N did not involve the use of any sensitive information. 
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Next, in order to test proposition 11 and answer the supporting RQ number 2 a table was 
made showing the activities and some of the main corresponding arguments for and 
against outsourcing, as well as some of the informants overall verdict. Common arguments 
for outsourcing included saving time and freeing up own resources, while arguments 
against often involved loss of control if 3PL were to take over communication with mainly 
supplier, but also end-customer. This loss of control involved not issues immediately 
solvable by contractual means, but included concerns which were relational or reputational 
(3PL could damage Havyards reputation in the view of other agents, but also that Havyard 
would have less change to directly assess the reliability other agents), including a worry 
that a 3PL might not hold the necessary technical competence. As a side comment, this 
may look as if it point to a more RBV or capability view based explanation for why 
outsourcing may not be desirable. However, the author finds Argyres and Zenger (2007; 
2009) view, which is referred to in the literature review above, that the classical TCE 
variables are accounting for capability factors in its “asset specificity”, convincing. 
Perhaps, however, in some cases this variable was “undervalued” by the author in selecting 
which proposition that corresponded to the activities, so that propositions moderately 
predicting “outsourcing” were wrongfully selected instead of those moderately predicting 
“not outsourcing”. If this is the case, and it had been corrected, more of the propositions 
would probably have been supported by the data. Another possible explanation for the 
failure of several of the TCE-propositions to hold was that operations were relatively new 
(from 2012) and so the predictions may not have been materialized yet. This lack of 
materialization may be reflected in the recommendations given by the employees if inertia 
is present in significant degree.  
A section was then dedicated to see if RBV gave more accurate predictions of the 
employees’ recommendations than TCE. Out of the twelve activities there were three 
where the RBV seem to give better predictions than the TCE. Serious attempts to identify 
the reasons for this were not pursued as it was outside the scope of this study.  
A comparison of the drivers given by Havyard employees to the ones found in the 
literature was then made. This found that “focusing on core activities” and “reducing 
costs” was of the most common ones to both. Further it was found that there seemed to be 
only one driver present not listed in the literature reviewed. 
The last section of the data analysis were meant to answer proposition 1 though 9, the 
second part of the first supporting RQ, as well as being the main source of input for 
answering the main RQ. It found that it mattered very little for the outsourcing assessment 
made by the employees whether scenario 1 (same demand as today) or 3 (very high 
demand) would materialize in 2016. But it can not be said to be entirely a matter of 
indifference as one of the informants had slightly different recommendations between the 
two scenarios in eight out of the twelve activities. Most of the TCE-propositions could not 
be said to be supported by the data, and the only ones to be supported (and which was not 
“not supported” in some other activity), was a mixture of proposition 5 and 2. In total it 
was found that the relevant propositions were supported in only four out of the 11 
activities that corresponded to particular propositions. Out of these four, one activity was 
all ready outsourced. Further, activity number 4 should probably not be outsourced as the 
TCE-prediction as well as employee recommendation was negative. Activity number 3 and 
11 however should be seriously considered for outsourcing as both employee 
recommendation and the TCE-prediction pointed towards outsourcing, although in a 
moderate degree. Activities number 5 and 8 should probably also be seriously considered 
due to the recommendation to outsource held by the majority of the informants. Some of 
 102 
the reasons why most of the TCE-predictions might have failed are discussed in this 
section above and in the section on the limitations of the study.  
This concluding section as a whole, and particularly the paragraph immediately above, 
sums up the findings collected towards answering the main research question. The study’s 
contribution to the academic literature are probably mainly the section in the literature 
review on the relationship between TCE and RBV, the lessons learnt in isolating and 
mapping candidate activities for outsourcing, the study of the relationship between the 
sensitivity of information and recommendation to outsource, the finding of the informants 
apparent indifference between the future scenarios for the questions asked, the finding that 
for most of the activities there were no consideration that clearly excluded the possibility 
of outsourcing, and finally the study’s adaption and application of classical TCE-




















8.1  Questionnaire used in interview round 3 
The following questionnaire was sent by mail to the respondents in order for them to be 
able to see and read the questions, and the answers were taken over the phone. The 
exception was in the case of PM who answered in writing. What is included below is the 
questions for one activity and one scenario only (in Norwegian language). 
 
Scenario x: --- 
 
Aktivitet y: --- 
 
Dersom aktiviteten hadde blitt satt ut til speditør: 
Asset specificity (Investeringer spesielt 
tilpasset aktiviteten, som vil synke vesentlig i verdi 
dersom kontrakten mellom Havyard og 3PL brått 
avbrytes)  
(nesten ikke)  (noe)  (i stor grad) 
Site specificity (Er det viktig at aktiviteten foregår 
på en spesifikk geografisk/fysisk posisjon?) 
     
Physical specificity (I hvilken grad må Havyard 
eller speditør gjøre aktivitetsspesifikke 
investeringer i fysiske eiendeler?) 
     
Human specificity (Er aktivitetsspesifikk learning-
by-doing involvert?) 
     
 
Dersom aktiviteten hadde blitt satt ut til speditør: 
Uncertainty (Usikkerhet) (nesten ikke)  (noe)  (i stor grad) 
Environmental uncertainty (Er det sannsynlig 
at uforutsette omstendigheter av vesentlig 
betydning inntreffer i forbindelse med 
aktiviteten?) 
     
Behavioral uncertainty (Er det kostbart å 
måle/kontrollere ytelsen til de som er ansvarlige 
for utførelsen av aktiviteten?) 





(nesten ikke)  (noe)  (i stor grad) 
Hvor kostbart er det å designe og implementere 
tilfredsstillende kontraktsmessige 
sikkerhetsmekanismer dersom aktiviteten settes 
ut? (dagbøter, bøter for for tidlig terminering av 
kontrakt, sanksjonering, informasjonssikring, 
verifikasjonsprosedyrer, spesialiserte 
konflikt/meglingsråd osv.) 
     
 
The section after this contained questions as the one cited below for only one activity and 
scenario: 
 
 Nei  Usikker  Ja 
Tror du det vil være kostnadsbesparende for 
Havyard på sikt dersom aktiviteten settes ut? 
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